Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

Daniel Pipes gave an interview yesterday to the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review entitled "Pipes calls war a success". In it Pipes calls Iraq a success:

Q: How will we know when the occupation or the invasion of Iraq was a success or a failure?

A: Oh, it was a success. We got rid of Saddam Hussein. Beyond that is icing.

According to Pipes, the real lesson in Iraq is not the failure of American policy, but the ingratitude of the Iraqi people:

Q: What is the biggest lesson you have learned from the Iraq war?

A: The ingratitude of the Iraqis for the extraordinary favor we gave them — to release them from the bondage of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. They have rapidly interpreted it as something they did and that we were incidental to it. They’ve more or less written us out of the picture.

I am really sorry the Iraqi people have hurt Mr. Pipes’s feelings. Clearly, the Iraqis failed to throw the requisite amount of roses at our feet for the favor we did them.

Mr. Pipes thinks that we should lower our expectations in Iraq. According to Mr. Pipes, we should only concern ourselves with destroying societies not rebuilding them. We’ve got smart bombs we should use them. The blue collar work of rebuilding a society that we bomb to oblivion should be left to the lowly Europeans or some other bleeding heart types:

Q: Does that mean a significant change in what we are doing now, in terms of policy. Should we announce withdrawals?

A: The number of troops is not my issue. It’s the placement and role of the troops. For three years now I have been protesting the use of American troops to mediate between tribes, help rebuild electricity grids, oversee school construction, which seems to me to be a wrong use of our forces, of our money. The Iraqis should be in charge of that. We should keep the troops there, in the desert, looking after the international boundaries, making sure there are no atrocities, making sure oil and gas goes out, otherwise leaving Iraq to the Iraqis.

…

Q: Is there anything major that the Bush administration should do now to make things go smoother?

A: We did something good in getting rid of the Taliban and getting rid of Saddam Hussein. That is really the extent of our role, to get rid of the hideous totalitarian regimes.

In any event, the theory is good. It’s the implementation that has gone wrong. Mr. Pipes’s theory has withstood the test of reality:

Q: Do you generally agree with President Bush’s Middle East policy — its goals and its methods?

A: I agree with the goals much more than the methods. I just gave an example of Iraq, where I believe the goal of getting rid of Saddam Hussein and trying to have a free and prosperous Iraq are worthy goals. I criticize the implementation. The same goes with democracy. I think democracy is a great goal for the region. I criticize the implementation; I think it’s too fast, too American, too get-it-done yesterday.

Lest you start thinking that Mr. Pipes is unhappy that the implementation of his theory might have led to unintended consequences, think again. He, like Charles Krauthammer, loves a good civil war. Mr. Pipes enumerates all the good things a bloody civil war can do:

Fixing Iraq is neither the coalition’s responsibility nor its burden. The damage done by Saddam will take many years to repair. Americans, Britons, and others cannot be tasked with resolving Sunni-Shiite differences, an abiding Iraqi problem that only Iraqis themselves can address.

The eruption of civil war in Iraq would have many implications for the West. It would likely:

• Invite Syrian and Iranian participation, hastening the possibility of an American confrontation with those two states, with which tensions are already high.

• Terminate the dream of Iraq serving as a model for other Middle Eastern countries, thus delaying the push toward elections. This will have the effect of keeping Islamists from being legitimated by the popular vote, as Hamas was just a month ago.

• Reduce coalition casualties in Iraq. As noted by the Philadelphia Inquirer, "Rather than killing American soldiers, the insurgents and foreign fighters are more focused on creating civil strife that could destabilize Iraq’s political process and possibly lead to outright ethnic and religious war."

• Reduce Western casualties outside Iraq. A professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Vali Nasr, notes: "Just when it looked as if Muslims across the region were putting aside their differences to unite in protest against the Danish cartoons, the attack showed that Islamic sectarianism remains the greatest challenge to peace." Put differently, when Sunni terrorists target Shiites and vice-versa, non-Muslims are less likely to be hurt.

Civil war in Iraq, in short, would be a humanitarian tragedy but not a strategic one.

It all makes sense to me now. We misunderstood Mr. Pipes when he said Iraq was going to be a cakewalk. When he said "cakewalk", he meant that defeating Saddam would be a cakewalk. The resulting chaos was not part of his thinking. In fact, the resulting chaos is not even our problem. It is all making sense to me now.

Before you dismiss Mr. Pipes as some right wing chicken hawk on the lunatic fringe, you might want to consider that he does have the ear of the President of the United States. The notion that America should rampage through the world without a care for the devastation this rampage may cause the societies which face our wrath is not a fringe notion - it has significant support within the Administration. In fact, it is the primary driving force behind Mr. Bush’s stay the course policy in Iraq. If you genuinely do not care about the consequences of your actions, it is much easier to label your misadventures as successes. This, I think, in large part explains the strange and often disconnected versions of reality that come from the President and the Vice President. After all, according to Mr. Pipes:

We are engaged in a war, a profound war and long-term war, in which Afghanistan and Iraq are sideshows. The real issue is the war that radical Islam, a global phenomenon, has declared on us and that has already been underway for many years, and we’re still at the beginning of it. That’s the really major issue.

Now, if only the Iraqis understood their rightful role in this war of civilizations; if only they understood that they are cannon fodder in the cause of the greater good; if only they understood that Mr. Pipes, from his perch in front of a television screen, thinks the slaughter of innocents is good theater; then and only then, would they be more grateful to the United States for this great favor we have done them. Instead, they continue this nonsense of caring more for their own lives than the greater glory of Daniel Pipes’s small but influential little mind.

The New York Times is reporting today that Shia and Sunni Iraqis have begun to flee from mixed Shia-Sunni areas. This migration comes on the heels of increased sectarian strife, death squad activity; and bombings targeting political figures, businesses, ordinary citizens and religious establishments.

The daily body count in Iraq ranges anywhere from 30 to 60 deaths, depending on which source you cite. That translates to 10950 to 21900 deaths per year if the current trend remains steady and does not accelerate. To put these numbers in perspective, consider that during the rule of Saddam Hussein from 1979 to 2003, the US Government’s estimate of the number of deaths is 300,000. That is, about 12500 deaths per year. The current death rate in Iraq equals or far exceeds the deaths during the rule of Saddam Hussein. So, if you pose to the common Iraqi the Ronald Reagan question, "Are you better off today than you were four years ago?" it should not come as a surprise if the answer is "No."

The reader can continue the gruesome exercise of comparing body counts with such well-known civil wars as Lebanon and Algeria. If you do work the numbers you will find that in terms of the death rate, Iraq today either equals or exceeds the death rates in these and other civil wars of the 20th Century.

The consequence of the Shia and Sunni communities separating geographically will be further bloodshed. Mixed communities were the last strands of the chord holding Iraq together. Without the countervailing force of these mixed neighborhoods there is nothing to slow the rapid acceleration of sectarian strife. 

Into the imbroglio enter the United States. We have not too subtly asked the Iraqi Prime Minister to step down. Washington Post is reporting today that there are now calls from within Iraq for the Prime Minister to step down. The United States may unfortunately get its wish here. It is unfortunate because al-Jaafari’s likely replacement will be Adel Abdul Mahdi. Abdul Mahdi is the candidate backed directly by SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq). I think the name of the organization speaks for itself. Incidentally, the Badr Brigade, the militia blamed for a large number of the killings, is the military wing of SCIRI.

The pushing aside of al-Jaafari, with the backing of the United States, will further de-legitimize the Iraqi Government. It will certainly give no comfort to the Sunni minority to see the U.S., however inadvertently, offering support to SCIRI. Further compounding the problem is the large-scale infiltration of the Iraqi police and army by the Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army militias. Of these police forces, GlobalSecurity.org reports that the U.S. Army General in charge of security in Baghdad, General James Thurman, said this week:

Iraqi troops and police units are more and more often taking the lead in counter-insurgency operations in Baghdad and the three provinces to the south that come under his responsibility. He also says more Iraqis are calling a special phone number to report insurgent activity. He says there have been more than 3,000 such calls since January, and that most of them have resulted in military operations that found insurgents, criminals or weapons caches.

The paradox is what looks like progress in training the Iraqi police and military is in fact resulting in these forces creating the very instability we are training them to control. We have, like it or not, taken sides in this civil war. Our stated objective is to stay out of any civil war that may be occurring or may occur in the future. But, the reality is that you cannot have a 138,000 strong army sitting on its hands while a civil war rages all around. The logic of the situation will force the United States to choose one side over another (consider the examples of Lebanon or Somalia).

What then will be the role of the U.S. military in Iraq with civil war breaking out all around them? There is no viable role for the military in Iraq that does not entail a long-term entanglement in the conflict - with the outcome decidedly uncertain. It is time, then, to withdraw our troops in some sort of orderly fashion. Very little further damage to our credibility will result from a quick withdrawal. Our three years in Iraq have damaged our credibility to levels below which it is unlikely to go.

I think the Iraqi conflict train has already left the station. We are left only with trying to affect a quick resolution of the civil war. This does not require a military presence, and in fact, a military presence might hinder any such progress for reasons mentioned above. Our goal from this point should and must be to try to work to ease tensions within Iraq and to work with Iraq’s neighbors to contain the conflict within Iraq’s borders.

It is not an attractive proposition, but we are where we are. 

As I mentioned in my previous post, I had initially decided not to get too deeply involved in Charles Krauthammer’s tantrum (it is probably best to stay out of the way when you see a man foaming at the mouth). But, I have since changed my mind for two reasons:

• Francis Fukuyama was online today at The Washington Post website answering questions about his book and the Krauthammer column
• Krauthammer’s column has generated substantial debate in the blogosphere

So, I thought I would address the substance of Krauthammer’s charge in his juvenile column more directly. Krauthammer’s column, it seems to me, is basically arguing the following:

1. Francis Fukuyama lied in the Preface of his latest book about a speech Krauthammer made (nana-nana-boo-boo!)
2. Francis Fukuyama in "America At The Crossroads", by making unconvincing arguments,  proves Krauthammer correct that there was no alternative but to attack Iraq (nana-nana-boo-boo!)
3. Francis Fukuyama is a sheep who changed his mind on Iraq after public opinion turned against the war. And everyone knows no self-respecting neo-con can doubt the rightness of one’s cause even against overwhelming evidence to the contrary. (nana-nana-boo-boo!)

There, I think I have captured the essence of Mr. Krauthammer’s bile. Sheesh, these guys don’t like it when they think they are misrepresented. All that venom, and its not even about the book, its about the Preface to the book. Now, that is petty.

I will address each point in turn and, to confuse the reader, I will address them in reverse order. But first, it is well worth pointing out that long before Prof. Fukuyama published his book, he wrote an essay in June 2004 entitled "The Neo-Conservative Moment" for the National Interest critiquing Krauthammer’s speech. In this essay, Fukuyama offers a convincing and compelling critique of Krauthammer’s vision of American dominance in a unipolar world. It is a long essay and I will not attempt to summarize it here. Please read the essay as you may find it remarkably prescient and well informed about our entanglement in Iraq.

In one part of the essay, Fukuyama knocks down one of Krauthammer’s (and Mr. Bush’s) favorite talking points: "Where is it written that Arabs are incapable of democracy?". The implication is that we have a lack of respect for the Arabs when we say this. Fukuyama responds sharply:

It is, of course, nowhere written that Arabs are incapable of democracy, and it is certainly foolish for cynical Europeans to assert with great confidence that democracy is impossible in the Middle East. We have, indeed, been fooled before, not just in Japan but in Eastern Europe prior to the collapse of communism.

But possibility is not likelihood, and good policy is not made by staking everything on a throw of the dice. Culture is not destiny, but culture plays an important role in making possible certain kinds of institutions–something that is usually taken to be a conservative insight. Though I, more than most people, am associated with the idea that history’s arrow points to democracy, I have never believed that democracies can be created anywhere and everywhere through sheer political will. Prior to the Iraq War, there were many reasons for thinking that building a democratic Iraq was a task of a complexity that would be nearly unmanageable. Some reasons had to do with the nature of Iraqi society: the fact that it would be decompressing rapidly from totalitarianism, its ethnic divisions, the role of politicized religion, the society’s propensity for violence, its tribal structure and the dominance of extended kin and patronage networks, and its susceptibility to influence from other parts of the Middle East that were passionately anti-American.

 There, in two short paragraphs, is a concise and coherent reason for not invading Iraq. But, Fukuyama is not breaking new ground here. This is an obvious line of reasoning that the Administration should have seriously contemplated before embarking on our disastrous misadventure in Iraq. Instead, they were drinking Krauthammer’s blood red Kool-Aid.

 Now, to get back to those charges in Krauthammer’s column.

As to the third charge, Fukuyama was against the Iraq invasion publicly from the summer of 2002. Krauthammer is simply misinformed.

As to the second charge, we don’t even have to look at Fukuyama’s book. Fukuyama’s essay outlines many reasons to not invade Iraq (one I mentioned above), not the least of which is that Iraq was not an existential threat to the United States and it therefore did not justify a pre-emptive strike. There were many options on the table for the United States. The argument made after one bad option was exercised to suggest that there were no other plausible alternatives is nonsensical. It is more appropriate to say that Krauthammer saw no other alternative in his own mind because his analysis was clouded by his belief in the certainty of the Iraq mission’s legitimacy. Krauthammer fooled himself, and still fools himself, into believing that his course of action was the only course of action. This is not really about policy, but more about his psyche and best left to the likes of Wittgenstein.

As to the first and obviously the most irksome charge, Fukuyama did not contend that Krauthammer’s speech was about Iraq. Fukuyama’s point was that Krauthammer, in 2004, did not recognize that the failures in Iraq had undermined Krauthammer’s "democratic globalism". Here are the relevant paragraphs from Fukuyama’s critique of the speech:

The 2004 speech is strangely disconnected from reality. Reading Krauthammer, one gets the impression that the Iraq War–the archetypical application of American unipolarity–had been an unqualified success, with all of the assumptions and expectations on which the war had been based fully vindicated. There is not the slightest nod towards the new empirical facts that have emerged in the last year or so: the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the virulent and steadily mounting anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, the growing insurgency in Iraq, the fact that no strong democratic leadership had emerged there, the enormous financial and growing human cost of the war, the failure to leverage the war to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front, and the fact that America’s fellow democratic allies had by and large failed to fall in line and legitimate American actions ex post.

The failure to step up to these facts is dangerous precisely to the neo-neoconservative position that Krauthammer has been seeking to define and justify. As the war in Iraq turns from triumphant liberation to grinding insurgency, other voices–either traditional realists like Brent Scowcroft, nationalist-isolationists like Patrick Buchanan, or liberal internationalists like John Kerry–will step forward as authoritative voices and will have far more influence in defining American post-Iraq War foreign policy. The poorly executed nation-building strategy in Iraq will poison the well for future such exercises, undercutting domestic political support for a generous and visionary internationalism, just as Vietnam did. [Emphasis added by me]

 Fukuyama is quite clear here that Krauthammer does not mention Iraq in his discussion of "democratic globalism" nor does Krauthammer realize that his thesis is not supported by the facts on the ground (does that sound familiar?).

So, it appears to me that Krauthammer has gotten bent out of shape about nothing. He is focusing on the minutia of a Preface of a book to somehow gain the upper hand on an already lost argument. It is truly frightening that the last holdouts of a debunked application of a flawed theory believe so much in the rightness of their cause, that they go to great lengths to deny the reality all around them. Again, it may be time to trot out Wittgenstein.

In the battle of Fukuyama versus Krauthammer, it is safe to say that Krauthammer was knocked out at the opening bell. Compared to Fukuyama’s reasoning, Krauthammer’s thesis sounds downright childish and naive. That is not to say, of course, that Fukuyama is correct in his arguments. But, at least, he is making well thought out arguments that are open for debate amongst reasonable people. And, most importantly, his vision is informed by some connection to reality. As for Krauthammer, it is time to cut back on the Kool-Aid.

Fresh from his "How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Civil War" column, Charles Krauthammer points his wrath at Francis Fukuyama in his latest column. Krauthammer is mad as hell and he isn’t going to take it anymore. Apparently, Fukuyama used an anecdote that prominently featured Mr. Krauthammer, but he changed the actual events to protect the guilty. Or something along those lines. It is all very confusing, you see, and I really don’t feel comfortable commenting on the he said-he said. Seems like a private matter between two adults to me.

I am sure Krauthammer, when he calms down, will rethink this column and rewrite it about something entirely different. Until then, I will amuse myself by rereading this very mean-spirited column. I’m guessing that the news from Iraq has got Krauthammer seeing red. He is fighting the enemy (Fukuyama) here so that he doesn’t have to fight the enemy there.

There is one interesting nugget in an otherwise personal letter from Krauthammer to Fukuyama. Defending himself, Krauthammer points out that he believed the Iraq war was necessary but perhaps not winnable. Lest I get accused of misrepresenting him, here are his exact words from the column:

My argument then, as now, was the necessity of this undertaking, never its ensured success. And it was necessary because, as I said, there is not a single, remotely plausible, alternative strategy for attacking the root causes of Sept. 11: "The cauldron of political oppression, religious intolerance, and social ruin in the Arab-Islamic world — oppression transmuted and deflected by regimes with no legitimacy into virulent, murderous anti-Americanism."

Krauthammer takes a leap of faith even Kierkegaard would be proud of here. I am not sure attacking the most secular country in the Arab world was the best way to fight the root causes of the Islamic radicalism that led to the attacks of September 11. In fact, to borrow his phrase, I don’t think that even a remotely plausible argument can be made for the attack on Iraq and its connection to September 11. That is why, the WMD argument was trotted out, and that is why the much-touted phantom link between Saddam Hussein and September 11 was dangled in front of us.

This column from Charles Krauthammer, if it has any larger meaning, may be a shot across the bow of all wavering neo-cons and chicken hawks. Abandon ship at your own peril. Your former shipmates will be pointing the ship’s cannons at you before your feet even hit the water below.

This week marks the beginning of the Iraqi Civil War. The American mission in Iraq is over. We can either stay and fight everyone, pick sides, or leave. No choice open to America now will improve the situation on the ground.

The events kicked off by the Samarra bombing have now been book-ended by the attack on the mosque in Baghdad. We have entered the fray in a big way with the attack on the mosque. Images of the dead lying in a prayer room in the mosque and reports that the 80-year-old imam of the mosque has also been killed are being beamed continuously to everyone with a TV and electricity in Iraq. The American military’s protestations that the mosque was not entered will fall on deaf ears. We have no credibility there - not only because we are not trusted, but also because we have been unable or unwilling to stop the bloodletting there.

The ingredient missing from Iraq’s slide into civil war was mainstream outrage and anger and an embracing of the sectarian militias as the only guarantors of security. We have, perhaps unwittingly, provided the last piece of the puzzle and now the civil war picture is complete.

As sectarian violence spins out of control in Iraq, today The Washington Post reports that Moqtada al-Sadr’s compound was struck with two mortars. He was inside and survived injury.

 After the attack, al-Sadr released a statement with the obligatory call for calm. As translated by The Associated Press:

 "I call upon all brothers to stay calm and I call upon the Iraqi army to protect the pilgrims as the Nawasib (militants) are aiming to attack Shiites everyday," the statement said, according to the Associated Press. 

Or did he? The Post article points out:

 In the past two months, attacks on two Shiite targets — a Shiite shrine in the city of Samarra, and Baghdad’s Sadr City neighborhood, a stronghold of Sadr support — have unleashed the greatest sectarian bloodletting since U.S. forces overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. Sadr issued similar appeals for calm after both attacks.

 However, Sadr’s thousands-strong Mahdi Army militia is accused by many U.S. officials and others in the violent retaliation to the mosque bombing and Sadr City attack.

 Al-Sadr uses the word "Nawasib" in his statement. It is a very loaded word and is code for inciting violence in otherwise benign statements. "Nawasib" is understood by the Shiite to mean "those who declared hostility against the household of the Prophet". It is an insult used to refer to Sunnis. It is not a word you would use when you are interested in reconciliation. It is a word you would use to incite hate and violence. To make the comparison more immediate, consider that there are similar words that racists use in the United States (and I will not repeat them here) when they are interested in hatemongering.

 The radicals use our ignorance of their culture against us. They are very adept at playing the Bush Administration for full advantage, on the one hand, getting material support as the "good" guys in the Green Zone, and on the other hand, using that "material support" to kill innocents while we are patting ourselves on the back for teaching these people about democracy.

 Hate always has many names. In Iraq, Hate sometimes likes to call itself "Nawasib".

Peace Takes Courage

via Steve O of Bring it On

We, who sit thousands of miles away, watch the tragedy that is current day Iraq unfold on our television screens. After a while, the daily killings all seem to blur into each other. Not much catches our attention anymore. The tick tick tick of human life expiring at a steady click becomes part of the background noise. We perk our ears and focus our eyes every now and then when something really dramatic occurs that breaks the monotony of mayhem. Otherwise, life lumbers forward and we busy ourselves with our work and our family. This monotony is captured well by E.M. Forster’s pen:

And again and again fell the world like the ebb of a dying sea.

I suspect life is also like that in Iraq. Where the daily killings, even though they are immediate, are taken in stride as life tries to survive and make sense of the horrors all around. I suspect this, but the Iraqis live this. Today see this reality for yourself through the eyes of an Iraqi citizen. Read the post entitled "Lynchings and Holy Wars" on the blog Healing Iraq. See man’s inhumanity to man and ask yourself if you believe that Iraq is not already over the waterfall.

Today, I grieve for Iraq, I grieve for her people and I grieve for her children.

I leave you with the words that stirred Hemingway. A meditation by John Donne:

All mankind is of one author, and is one volume; when one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the book, but translated into a better language; and every chapter must be so translated…As therefore the bell that rings to a sermon, calls not upon the preacher only, but upon the congregation to come: so this bell calls us all: but how much more me, who am brought so near the door by this sickness…No man is an island, entire of itself…any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

This new turn in the PR offensive is finally generating some attention. Check out Michael Signer’s excellent post on Democracy Arsenal here. You can also read my earlier post on Krauthammer’s column.

Here is the State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Iraq, published March 8, 2006. It speaks for itself.