Detainee 546 at Guantanamo Bay is an Afghan farmer named Muhibullah. He was picked up by Afghan warlords and likely sold to the American forces in Afghanistan. Muhibullah is a Pashtu speaking farmer who is poor and illiterate. He is believed to be about 35 years old, although he is not really sure how old he is.

After being picked up by Afghan warlords he was put in prison and tortured. He was then handed over to the Americans and subsequently ended up at Guantanamo Bay. He does not allege that he was tortured in Guantanamo Bay. He was taken by the Afghan warlords because they were rounding up all Pashtu speaking people they could find to later sell to the Americans.

To give you an idea of the caliber of detainees the Bush Administration is holding at Guantanamo Bay, I will list for you the charges against him from his appearance, with the assistance of an interpreter, at the Combatant Status Review Tribunal [p. 64]:

  • He is accused of being a night security guard between 1998 and 1999 for Syed Sha Aga, a Taliban commander in Kabul.
  • He is accused of being a local tribal mediator for water disputes between November 2000 and February 2001, and between September 2001 and November 2001. He is not accused of being a fighter during this time.
  • He is accused of attending a dinner with Kamal, a local Northern Alliance Commander under warlord Ismail Khan, the legendary Mujahideen commander.
  • He is accused of acquiring an AK-47 from a man named Abdul Ghafar.
  • He is accused of surrendering to the Northern Alliance in November 2001.

He was also earlier accused of being the Acting Governor of Shibarghan Province. The New York Times gives us a flavor of how his defense was handled:

At one review hearing last year, an Afghan referred to by the single name Muhibullah denied accusations that he was either the former Taliban governor of Shibarghan Province or had worked for the governor. The solution to his case should have been simple, Mr. Muhibullah suggested to the three American officers reviewing his case: They should contact the Shibarghan governor and ask him.

But the presiding Marine Corps colonel said it was really up to the detainee to try to contact the governor. Assuming that the annual review board denied his petition for freedom, noted the officer, whose name was censored from the document, Mr. Muhibullah would have a year to do so.

"How do I find the governor of Shibarghan or anybody?" the detainee asked.

"Write to them," the presiding officer responded. "We know that it is difficult but you need to do your best."

"I appreciate your suggestion, but it is not that easy," Mr. Muhibullah said.

The rest of his Tribunal appearance also followed a similar script.

Muhibullah admitted to working as a night security guard in 1998 and 1999. In his defense he stated that he was not fighting anyone and most villagers had to perform these duties for the Government. He also pointed out the obvious fact that at the time Afghanistan was not at war with the United States.

He admitted to being a local dispute mediator in the village and again pointed out the obvious fact that he was not a combatant. In fact, at the time he was picked up he was not aware who was fighting whom - he did not know if the Americans were fighting the Northern Alliance or the Taliban.

He admitted to attending a dinner at Kamal’s house. He said he had gone to Kamal’s house at his relatives’ advice to seek assistance in safely getting back to his village. Instead, Kamal took all his money and belongings and threw him in jail the next morning. He was later tortured and then finally handed over to the Americans. He pointed out the obvious fact that he is accused of having dinner with his captor and having dinner with an American ally does not seem particularly sinister.

He claimed to not know anyone named Abdul Ghafar and categorically denied receiving an AK-47 from a man he does not know. Here is the exchange between Muhibullah and the Tribunal President [p. 67]:

4. The Detainee acquired a rifle from a Mujahideen fighter, Abdul Ghafar.

Muhibullah: I do not know this person. I do not know Abdul Ghafar. I do not know if he is working with the Americans or against the American Government. I did not have any rifle or any type of weapon from this person. If the Tribunal can explain this question to me in detail - who is this person, where or when - then I might know something. But with that point, I totally disagree because I cannot remember that person.

Tribunal President: That is fine. We have no further evidence.

Finally, Muhibullah explained that he had not surrendered to anyone. Surrendering suggests that he was fighting, and no one had accused him of being a fighter. He also pointed out that he, even by the American military’s version of events, had gone to Kamal’s house and had dinner with him. Kamal took him prisoner the next morning against his wishes. He explained that that does not amount to surrender.

After hearing Muhibullah’s defense, the Tribunal decided that Muhibullah should not be released from Guantanamo Bay. Ultimately the tribunal decided that there was more reason to hold him than to release him. The factors that favored continued detention, according to the Tribunal, were [p. 82]:

  • His association with the Taliban:
    • He is alleged to have surrendered to the forces of Ismail Khan.
    • He was a night watchman in 1998 and 1999.
  • Training:
    • He received AK-47 and RPG training from his uncle. [Not mentioned at his hearing.]
  • Intent:
    • He admitted to carrying an AK-47 while on duty as a night watchman.

I doubt if any respectable legal system in the world would find grounds to hold this man. However, the Bush Administration and its kangaroo courts at Guantanamo Bay have found cause to hold this poor man.

One has to wonder, if this is the level of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, how successful the Bush Administration has been in actually apprehending real al Qaeda terrorists.

 [Cross posted at Bloggers Against Torture]

According to Human Rights Watch, the Bush Administration has operated a secret prison near Kabul, Afghanistan since 2002. The secret prison is affectionately known as "The Dark Prison". It has served as the drop off point for detainees captured in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East. Detainees are introduced to the art of torture here before being shipped off to other secret CIA torture stations or to Guantanamo Bay. The Dark Prison is the halfway house of the torture world. They practice the kinder gentler version of torture at The Dark Prison, leaving the more esoteric forms of torture to the more permanent CIA black sites.

The authorized kinder gentler torture techniques practiced by the CIA include (in increasing levels of discomfort):

1. The Attention Grab: The interrogator forcefully grabs the shirt front of the prisoner and shakes him.

2. Attention Slap: An open-handed slap aimed at causing pain and triggering fear.

3. The Belly Slap: A hard open-handed slap to the stomach. The aim is to cause pain, but not internal injury. Doctors consulted advised against using a punch, which could cause lasting internal damage.

4. Long Time Standing: This technique is described as among the most effective. Prisoners are forced to stand, handcuffed and with their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for more than 40 hours. Exhaustion and sleep deprivation are effective in yielding confessions.

5. The Cold Cell: The prisoner is left to stand naked in a cell kept near 50 degrees. Throughout the time in the cell the prisoner is doused with cold water.

6. Water Boarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a halt.

These authorized techniques combine with creative freelance techniques to give The Dark Prison its reputation. Human Rights Watch has documented reports from detainees who have been guests there:

The detainees said U.S. interrogators slapped or punched them during interrogations. They described being held in complete darkness for weeks on end, shackled to rings bolted into the walls of their cells, with loud music or other sounds played continuously. Some detainees said they were shackled in a manner that made it impossible to lie down or sleep, with restraints that caused their hands and wrists to swell up or bruise. The detainees said they were deprived of food for days at a time, and given only filthy water to drink.  

It was pitch black no lights on in the rooms for most of the time…. They hung me up. I was allowed a few hours of sleep on the second day, then hung up again, this time for two days. My legs had swollen. My wrists and hands had gone numb…. There was loud music, [Eminem’s] “Slim Shady” and Dr. Dre for 20 days…. [Then] they changed the sounds to horrible ghost laughter and Halloween sounds. [At one point, I was] chained to the rails for a fortnight…. The CIA worked on people, including me, day and night…. Plenty lost their minds. I could hear people knocking their heads against the walls and the doors, screaming their heads off.

On the upside, no detainee claimed to have been kept at the facility for longer than six weeks. The other benefit of being in The Dark Prison is that it is convenient to the airport:

Most of the detainees said they were arrested in other countries in Asia and the Middle East, and then flown to Afghanistan. Detainees who arrived by airplane said they were driven about five minutes from a landing field to the prison. Afghan guards told some of them that the facility was located near Kabul. Some detainees who were kept at the facility were transferred at various times to and from another secret facility near Kabul. The detainees said they were later transferred to the main U.S. military detention facility near Bagram, where many other Guantánamo detainees say they were initially held.  

The downside of course is that if you are unlucky to be an inmate at The Dark Prison, you are likely at the beginning of a long journey that will be punctuated by torture and more torture at other facilities around the world. You will either be "disappeared" or find yourself in Guantanamo Bay.

There is some speculation that The Dark Prison may have been closed in late 2004 in favor of the better-equipped facility in Bagram, Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this facility remains as another dark spot in the tortured legacy of George W Bush and his Administration.

When the Bush Administration has been relegated to the dustbin of history, we will look back at facilities like The Dark Prison and Abu Ghraib with shame and disgust. We will look back at this time in history as the period when America misplaced its humanity.

[Cross posted at Bloggers Against Torture]

 

Remnants of an Army

 

On January 13, 1842 a wounded and battered British military doctor, Dr. William Brydon, riding atop a dying horse arrived at the British garrison in Jalalabad. He was the only survivor of the 16,000 strong British Army that was in full retreat from Kabul. The remaining soldiers had been slaughtered by the Afghanis in the snowy mountain passes between Kabul and Jalalabad.

The British discovered in 1842 what every other conquering army has come to learn - that Afghanistan is easily taken but never kept. Since the time of Alexander The Great conquering armies have made forays into Afghanistan only to find that it is the graveyard of occupying armies. Nonetheless in the 19th century the British and the Russians competed for control of Afghanistan in what has come to be known as The Great Game. This Game has always been played with the foreign power installing a puppet regime in Afghanistan, which eventually is destroyed by local forces. As The Great Game has been played out the Afghan distaste of foreign occupiers has grown.

The Great Game continued in the 20th Century with the Americans replacing the British as Russia’s adversary after the Second World War. On Christmas day in 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and installed a puppet regime. With that action The Great Game between the United States and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was launched in earnest. Over the next 10 years the Soviets unsuccessfully battled an insurgency, the Afghan Mujahideen, backed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Soviet Army lost over 15,000 soldiers in Afghanistan while over a million Afghans lost their lives in the same period. Yet after 10 years of fighting the Soviet Union was unsuccessful in breaking the back of the insurgency. On February 15, 1989 the battered and demoralized Soviet Red Army completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan. The humiliation of the Afghan campaign and the financial strain put upon the Soviet economy by the invasion and occupation played a significant part in the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. The 10-year Soviet occupation also left the economy and society of Afghanistan in tatters.

More than a decade later the United States finds itself as the occupying force in Afghanistan playing The Great Game once again. In response to the attacks of September 11th 2001, on October 7, 2001 the United States launched an aerial bombing campaign in Afghanistan that led to the rapid collapse of the Taliban regime. After the routing of the Taliban the United States installed the government of Hamid Karzai in power. Subsequently an election was held that legitimized the Karzai government.

As in previous occupations of Afghanistan what appeared initially as a routing of the local forces is beginning to appear as anything but that. Over the past few years the seemingly defeated Taliban have regrouped into an ever more potent insurgency. As the Afghan population has soured of the continued foreign occupation the Taliban have regained support as the defenders of Afghanistan. In recent weeks there has been heavy fighting between the American military and the Taliban in the South of Afghanistan. This renewed fighting has led to significant loss of civilian life. With each additional civilian death the United States is rapidly losing hearts and minds in Afghanistan. The inexorable logic of occupation is leading to ever growing resentment of the occupier amongst the local population.

The situation in Afghanistan has become increasingly more volatile. Any act or accident by the United States is now viewed by the Afghans as an act of provocation. In this context the fatal traffic accident in Kabul yesterday involving an American military truck was the spark that was needed to set ablaze Afghan frustration. Yesterday’s riots will undoubtedly be brought under control by the Afghan Government. But by doing so, the Government will inevitably kill or injure Afghan civilians. Any heavy-handed Government tactic will be viewed by the Afghan people with suspicion. The Government will be seen as doing the bidding of the United States. In appealing for calm President Hamid Karzai may have done more harm then good by calling the rioters enemies of Afghanistan:

Karzai, speaking on national television Monday night, condemned "opportunists" for exploiting a simple traffic accident and said people responsible for the violence would be sought and treated severely. "Accidents happen all over the world," he said. "This is not a reason to fight or destroy. Those who have done this are the enemies of Afghanistan." [Emphasis added by me.]

Karzai will be seen more as an American puppet in the aftermath of yesterday’s riots in which Government troops killed up to 20 people. The Washington Post reports on the underlying resentment brought to the fore by the traffic accident:

The riots exposed the bitter resentment that many Afghans harbor toward the U.S.-led military forces that have been stationed here since the Taliban was driven from power. It also reflected the deep ambivalence many Afghan Muslims feel toward the growing Western influence here that includes high fashion and fast-food shops, sprawling aid compounds and even rap music.

The public mood has also been tense since a U.S. airstrike killed at least 16 civilians last week in a village in southern Afghanistan, the scene of heightened fighting this spring. Afghan and U.S. officials blamed Taliban insurgents who had taken shelter in village compounds and then fired at U.S.-led forces.

This is a situation ripe with danger for the United States at a time when it is preoccupied with the worsening civil war in Iraq. The United States and the Karzai Government are in a no win situation. If they allow the rioting and unrest to continue unchecked Kabul and perhaps the rest of the country will become destabilized. On the other hand if the Karzai Government clamps down on the population, as it has begun to do, it will lose any legitimacy it may have and will be seen as a tool of the occupier. Either way the Karzai Government is likely to go the way of other Governments that were installed by occupiers in Afghanistan.

The United States occupation of Afghanistan will come to an end at some time in the future. The only unknowns are whether or not the American military will suffer the fate of previous occupiers and what kind of society the Americans will leave behind in Afghanistan. The Soviets endured 10 years of pinpricks from the Afghan insurgency before the cost of occupation became too great to bear. What will be the breaking point for the United States? The challenge for the United States is to break the cycle of The Great Game and leave behind a functioning Afghan society that does not lead to future interventions and instability. Meeting this challenge requires the United States to be fully engaged not only militarily but also diplomatically. History has shown that foreign militaries have never been able to impose their will on the Afghan people for an extended period of time. If there is a recipe for success in Afghanistan it does not lie in the use of force. With the United States preoccupied in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan promises to slip away toward failure. Urgent attention is required and may not be forthcoming from the Administration of George W Bush. Thus another predictable chapter of The Great Game may be written.