Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

When George W Bush was presented the Iraq Study Group report last week, according to Lawrence Eagleburger, Mr. Bush’s reaction was "Where’s my drink?"

Since its release, the report has been much maligned from both sides of the political aisle. In my previous post, I wrote that the report was significant because its assessment of the situation in Iraq has neutered Mr. Bush’s argument about "progress" in Iraq. It has also quite clearly demonstrated Mr. Bush’s foreign policy as an utter failure. While the right is making a valiant attempt to discredit the report, I think the damage has already been done. Mr. Bush will need that drink, he may even huff and puff, but I stand by my assertion that the foreign policy of the United States is no longer in the hands of this president. He has been put in a corner like a petulant preschooler.

My previous post focused on the "Assessment" part of the report. This post will address the 79 recommendations. As I mentioned earlier, I think the report’s central failure is its recommendation that Iraqi forces be trained by the U.S. military into 2008. The recommendations, taken together, really are not recommendations at all. It seems to me the recommendations themselves are simply criticisms of Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy - the recommendations point out specific failures that have led us to the Iraq of today as spelled out in the "Assessment".

The recommendations are in three parts. First, Mr. Bush’s failure to engage in regional diplomacy. Second, Mr. Bush’s failure to pursue national reconciliation. Third, Mr. Bush’s failure to properly train and equip the Iraqi security forces. The failures together have facilitated Iraq’s slide into chaos. The report holds out the hope that if those failures are remedied immediately there is a chance that chaos may be averted in Iraq. I have my doubts.

Mr. Bush’s failure in Iraq is rooted in the same failure that led to the war in the first place. It is a failure to grasp reality. When ideology drives policy, reality is not that important to the ideologues. However, reality has a way of asserting itself. The report explains the basics to Mr. Bush:

Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals. [p.95]

While the rest of the world understood that the insurgency in Iraq was complex, Mr. Bush and his lackeys "knew" that it was al Qaeda and a few "dead-enders". Therefore, no effort was expended finding out about the nature of the enemy:

While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.

…

Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode those devices. [pp. 93-94]

You see, Mr. Bush knows they are "evil-doers". So, it is not important to know what motivates them and how they operate. A smarter or more curious man might think it was important to know your enemy’s motivations so that you can combat your enemy more effectively. But not this president.

The two recommendations that follow, recommendations 77 and 78, after the ISG points out our lack of knowledge about our enemy are almost cursory.

The report points out the importance of engaging Iraq’s neighbors. The reason is quite simple - all of Iraq’s neighbors have a stake in a stable Iraq, almost certainly more of a stake than the United States:

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq’s neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of the Iraqi state. [p. 47]

Given the importance of engaging Iraq’s neighbors, it is striking how little has been accomplished in this area. To date, Iraq has not yet established a working embassy even in Saudi Arabia [recommendation 2].

The report also states that Iran and Syria should be engaged without preconditions:

Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions. [p. 50]

Engaging one’s enemy is anathema to the Decider - he has already scoffed at the idea. However, Mr. Bush does not hold many cards and an ostrich is sometimes forced to pull its head out of the sand if it wants to breathe. Recommendations 9 and 16 offer carrots to Iran and Syria to sit down at the bargaining table. Those two recommendations have already set the tone for U.S. foreign policy, sooner or later Mr. Bush will be forced to follow, or remain irrelevant.

It is in the area of national reconciliation where the report breaks important ground. A number of the ideas have been proposed separately in the past. The report ties them together within a coherent strategy with a nice payoff at the end:

The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. [p.67]

To that end, recommendation 34 calls for the issue of U.S. force presence in Iraq to be on the table for any national reconciliation dialogue. This is a far cry from Mr. Bush’s belligerent tone to date.

The report proposes the reversal of the disastrous de-baathification process (recommendation 27) and it calls for oil revenue to be shared based on population (recommendation 28). The oil revenue recommendation specifically addresses the ambiguity that exists in the current draft of the Iraqi constitution. The report calls for the revenue from future oil fields to also be shared based on population. This recommendation is essential to bringing the Sunnis into the national reconciliation process.

The report punts on the most difficult, and perhaps the most intractable, of Iraq’s issues - Kirkuk. Recommendation 30 does suggest wisely that the referendum of the future of Kirkuk be postponed to avoid violence. In many ways, the Kirkuk problem is beginning to resemble the Kashmir issue in the Indian sub-continent - what is popular at the local level may not necessarily be in the national interest. Unsurprisingly, Kurds led by Massoud Barzani (and parroted by Jalal Talabani) have been critical of the report because it favors more central control of Iraq than the Kurds would prefer. The Kurdish claim to Kirkuk and its oil revenues are directly challenged by the report.

Above all, the report stresses the importance of talking to your enemies - the essential ingredient of national reconciliation. It proposes far-reaching amnesty (recommendation 31), engaging all parties, including Moqtada al-Sadr (recommendation 35), and less meddling by the United States:

Recommendation 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.

As part of national reconciliation, the report proposes the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the militias:

The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence against institutions of the state. However, solving the problem of militias requires national reconciliation.

…

Because the United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should not be involved in implementing such a program. [pp.68-69]

The report recommends the presence of neutral international experts, who have significant experience from previous civil wars, to facilitate the DDR of militias [recommendation 38]. It is Mr. Bush’s failure to recognize the conflict for what it is that has prevented this essential step in national reconciliation from taking place.

While the report, in my opinion, errs in the area of training security forces, it nonetheless does offer one very important and necessary recommendation:

Recommendation 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.

This recommendation is important for two reasons. First, the Iraqi National Police is geared toward counterinsurgency and not police work. Therefore, it does not belong under the Ministry of Interior. The Iraqi Police Service, which does police work, is the appropriate force to be under the Ministry of Interior. Second and more importantly, by moving the Iraqi National Police out from under the MOI (which is under Shia militia control), Shia militia control of the force is diluted. It should come as no surprise that SCIRI has condemned this recommendation so harshly.

The ISG report is focused on bringing parties into the national reconciliation process. This is something the Bush Administration should have been pursuing from the start. The report makes overtures toward the Shia nationalists (Sadrists) as well as the Iraqi Sunnis, the ethnic minority. It does point to the essential formula of a future stable Iraq, if one is to emerge from this chaos. In any national reconciliation, the stronger group must make accomodations to include the weaker group if peace is to be the outcome. The report thus recognizes the importance of bringing the Iraqi Sunnis into the dialogue. This is in marked contrast to the "80% solution" being contemplated by the Bush Administration. It seems to me, that taken together, the national reconciliation and the regional diplomacy proposed by the report set the groundwork for an American withdrawal from Iraq.

Upon reading the full report, one wonders why the recommendations of the report have not already been tried by the Bush Administration in the last 3 years. One wonders what they have been doing the last 3 years. While the American military have been taking casualties, it appears that the White House has been out to lunch. That is the result of ignoring reality in favor of ideology.

While it is debatable if  "success" was ever in the cards once Mr. Bush made the ill-informed and ill-conceived decision to invade Iraq, the ISG report makes it clear that whatever hope of  "success" might have existed in Iraq was out of reach for this most incompetent of administrations. That will be the legacy of this report - exposing George W Bush for his incompetence in Iraq the way the television pictures from New Orleans exposed George W Bush’s incompetence in protecting the American people at home.

The long awaited, much anticipated, and often pre-judged Iraq Study Group report was finally unleashed on Washington. Predictably, it was trashed, even before the ink was dry, in the progressive blogosphere for failing to call for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq. However, I think dismissing the report as a "dud" or ridiculing it ignores the very real and consequential substance in the report.

It is important to realize that this report is an intervention. I cannot recall any other time in modern American history when a sitting president has been so publicly and so stunningly rebuked in a time of war. The ISG report strikes at the heart of the American President’s article II power as the commander-in-chief. It accuses President George W Bush of orchestrating, by his own choice, the destabilization of the Middle East and, if left unchecked, the destabilization of the global economy. Make no mistake, this report is an intervention. It is designed to save not the President, but the Presidency and the American body politic. George W Bush has abused his commander-in-chief powers in the prosecution of the Iraq war and this report aims to relieve him of his duties. Regardless of what occurs between now and the end of George W Bush’s term in office, he is no longer driving the ship of state. Mr. Bush has effectively been impeached.

The report itself has two parts. The first part, "Assessment", surveys the current mess in Iraq. The second part, "The Way Forward - A New Approach" lays out the much talked about 79 recommendations for extricating the United States from Iraq. There is also a GWB-sized executive summary, a letter from the co-chairs, and an appendix to the report. In this post, I will cover the first part of the report and the supporting documents. I will do a separate post on the 79 recommendations tomorrow.

 The goal of the report is national consensus, not Iraqi national consensus, but American national consensus:

U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure - as is any course of action in Iraq - if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus. [Letter from the Co-Chairs, p. x]

The implicit charge in the report is that George W Bush has embarked on a foreign misadventure without the consent of the people of this democracy. That kind of behavior may work in a dictatorship, but cannot be sustained in a democracy.

The very first two sentences of the Executive Summary paint a bleak picture for Iraq:

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. [Executive Summary, p. iii]

The ISG report does hold out the hope that all is not lost and the United States can still influence events there, although it may not be able to do so in the near future:

The ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing. [p. 1]

I have argued before that the United States has already lost the ability to influence events positively in Iraq. By staying in Iraq, I believe, the United States acts as a force for continued instability. The ISG apparently believes there is still time to salvage the situation. This belief may be a result of hope and obligation rather than rational analysis:

Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. [p. 2]

While I agree with the statement above, it does not necessarily follow that the national and moral interest is served by staying in Iraq and making one more go at it.

The flaw at the center of the report is the belief that America can control events in Iraq. The report concedes that combat operations by the United States military will not rescue Iraq. Indeed, it calls for a complete withdrawal of all American combat troops by early 2008. However, the report then subscribes to the misguided notion that the problem in Iraq can be solved by training Iraqi security forces:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. [Executive Summary, p. vi]

The problem with Iraqi security forces is not training. Before the United States invaded Iraq, the country had a functioning military and police force, so I doubt they are incapable of training themselves. As the report readily admits, the security forces are infiltrated with sectarian militias - you simply cannot train the "sectarian" out of a militia member. There is also the problem of perception. If the United States remains in Iraq in large numbers and successfully trains the Iraqi security forces (that is, succeeds in making the security forces non-sectarian), those security forces and the government who controls them will be perceived as American puppets. American training, in either instance, will be counter-productive. We will either train militias or we will train American puppets - both will have tragic consequences (as no doubt the incoming Secretary of Defense knows from his experience in Central America).

There is also a puzzling contradiction in the report. In an attempt to avoid an open-ended commitment of American forces in Iraq, the report warns:

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of mile-stones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. [Executive Summary, p. vii]

It is not clear to me why it makes sense to pull out of Iraq if the Iraqi government underperforms. If as the report claims, Iraq is "vital to regional and even global stability", why then would the United States pull out if the ISG believes the United States should stay to stabilize Iraq. To put it another way, according to the report an underperforming Iraqi government will cause the United States to throw in the towel.

While the report fumbles somewhat in charting a viable exit strategy from Iraq, it quite clearly is focused on extricating the United States from Iraq. The report examines a number of alternative approaches and points out their flaws. Most notably the report categorically rejects the "stay the course" policy of George W Bush. It points out that staying the course in Iraq endangers our national security. The report points out, in a section entitled "Staying the Course", that:

Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is constrained. [p. 38]

That leaves only Barney and Mr. Bush on the "stay the course" bandwagon.

The report also rejects a precipitate withdrawal from Iraq as too risky. However, it does not discuss a more orderly withdrawal as an option. The report also rejects John McCain’s plan to send more troops to Iraq as unrealistic:

Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. [p.38]

Finally, the report rejects Joseph Biden’s idea of a partition into three regions due to potential for ethnic cleansing and the inconvenient fact that most of Iraq’s cities have mixed populations. Iraq cannot be so cleanly carved up without a massive movement of people.

The report lays out the facts on the ground that should make it clear to even George W Bush’s dog that Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy has been a failure across the board. It paints a picture of a country in chaos with mass human suffering:

The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.

Six percent of Iraq’s population have been internally displaced and seven percent have fled the country. That means that 13% of the country’s population have fled their homes. Those are staggering statistics.

The report reminds Mr. Bush that both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, which have infiltrated the police, are engaged in sectarian violence and the Badr Brigade in particular is involved in death squad activity. Perhaps if the report were released earlier, Mr. Bush might have chosen not to host a death squad leader at the White House last Monday.

The Iraqi economy is predictably underperforming. The freedom Mr. Bush has given Iraqis has led to misery:

Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation. [p.23]

To compound the problem, reconstruction funds for Iraq have dried up as the Administration struggles to manage the security situation in Iraq:

The administration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. [p.25]

As for the two countries in the Middle East that the Bush Administration does not want to talk to, Mr. Bush’s muddled policy in Iraq serves these two countries just fine:

Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. … One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad."

…

Like Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. [pp.28-29]

In the short term, both Iran and Syria benefit from the chaotic American presence in Iraq. Only by leaving Iraq does the United States focus the attention of Iran and Syria on the need to have a stable neighbor in Iraq.

The report makes clear why there was a need for intervention to save the United States from its president:

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world.

…

If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.

…

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald’s."

…

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. … And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

…

If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. [pp.33-35]

Far from bringing stability to the Middle East and showing American might to its adversaries, George W Bush has weakened America in the eyes of the world. His war of choice has endangered America, the Middle East and the world.

The reality that the report lays out will be hard for Mr. Bush to ignore. The conversation in Washington is no longer how to win in Iraq; it is how to salvage America and Iraq from George W Bush’s blunders. That is the importance of the report. There can now be no denying the stark reality of failure. The discussion has now moved to how best to bring our soldiers home and leave behind some semblance of stability. To that end, the report’s recommendations, however imperfect, can be a starting point for the discussion. The authors of the report readily admit that events on the ground may overtake the recommendations of the report. I believe that Iraq has already reached that point and American presence there is now counterproductive - the authors of the report disagree, at least for now.

As I mentioned in my previous post, I had initially decided not to get too deeply involved in Charles Krauthammer’s tantrum (it is probably best to stay out of the way when you see a man foaming at the mouth). But, I have since changed my mind for two reasons:

• Francis Fukuyama was online today at The Washington Post website answering questions about his book and the Krauthammer column
• Krauthammer’s column has generated substantial debate in the blogosphere

So, I thought I would address the substance of Krauthammer’s charge in his juvenile column more directly. Krauthammer’s column, it seems to me, is basically arguing the following:

1. Francis Fukuyama lied in the Preface of his latest book about a speech Krauthammer made (nana-nana-boo-boo!)
2. Francis Fukuyama in "America At The Crossroads", by making unconvincing arguments,  proves Krauthammer correct that there was no alternative but to attack Iraq (nana-nana-boo-boo!)
3. Francis Fukuyama is a sheep who changed his mind on Iraq after public opinion turned against the war. And everyone knows no self-respecting neo-con can doubt the rightness of one’s cause even against overwhelming evidence to the contrary. (nana-nana-boo-boo!)

There, I think I have captured the essence of Mr. Krauthammer’s bile. Sheesh, these guys don’t like it when they think they are misrepresented. All that venom, and its not even about the book, its about the Preface to the book. Now, that is petty.

I will address each point in turn and, to confuse the reader, I will address them in reverse order. But first, it is well worth pointing out that long before Prof. Fukuyama published his book, he wrote an essay in June 2004 entitled "The Neo-Conservative Moment" for the National Interest critiquing Krauthammer’s speech. In this essay, Fukuyama offers a convincing and compelling critique of Krauthammer’s vision of American dominance in a unipolar world. It is a long essay and I will not attempt to summarize it here. Please read the essay as you may find it remarkably prescient and well informed about our entanglement in Iraq.

In one part of the essay, Fukuyama knocks down one of Krauthammer’s (and Mr. Bush’s) favorite talking points: "Where is it written that Arabs are incapable of democracy?". The implication is that we have a lack of respect for the Arabs when we say this. Fukuyama responds sharply:

It is, of course, nowhere written that Arabs are incapable of democracy, and it is certainly foolish for cynical Europeans to assert with great confidence that democracy is impossible in the Middle East. We have, indeed, been fooled before, not just in Japan but in Eastern Europe prior to the collapse of communism.

But possibility is not likelihood, and good policy is not made by staking everything on a throw of the dice. Culture is not destiny, but culture plays an important role in making possible certain kinds of institutions–something that is usually taken to be a conservative insight. Though I, more than most people, am associated with the idea that history’s arrow points to democracy, I have never believed that democracies can be created anywhere and everywhere through sheer political will. Prior to the Iraq War, there were many reasons for thinking that building a democratic Iraq was a task of a complexity that would be nearly unmanageable. Some reasons had to do with the nature of Iraqi society: the fact that it would be decompressing rapidly from totalitarianism, its ethnic divisions, the role of politicized religion, the society’s propensity for violence, its tribal structure and the dominance of extended kin and patronage networks, and its susceptibility to influence from other parts of the Middle East that were passionately anti-American.

 There, in two short paragraphs, is a concise and coherent reason for not invading Iraq. But, Fukuyama is not breaking new ground here. This is an obvious line of reasoning that the Administration should have seriously contemplated before embarking on our disastrous misadventure in Iraq. Instead, they were drinking Krauthammer’s blood red Kool-Aid.

 Now, to get back to those charges in Krauthammer’s column.

As to the third charge, Fukuyama was against the Iraq invasion publicly from the summer of 2002. Krauthammer is simply misinformed.

As to the second charge, we don’t even have to look at Fukuyama’s book. Fukuyama’s essay outlines many reasons to not invade Iraq (one I mentioned above), not the least of which is that Iraq was not an existential threat to the United States and it therefore did not justify a pre-emptive strike. There were many options on the table for the United States. The argument made after one bad option was exercised to suggest that there were no other plausible alternatives is nonsensical. It is more appropriate to say that Krauthammer saw no other alternative in his own mind because his analysis was clouded by his belief in the certainty of the Iraq mission’s legitimacy. Krauthammer fooled himself, and still fools himself, into believing that his course of action was the only course of action. This is not really about policy, but more about his psyche and best left to the likes of Wittgenstein.

As to the first and obviously the most irksome charge, Fukuyama did not contend that Krauthammer’s speech was about Iraq. Fukuyama’s point was that Krauthammer, in 2004, did not recognize that the failures in Iraq had undermined Krauthammer’s "democratic globalism". Here are the relevant paragraphs from Fukuyama’s critique of the speech:

The 2004 speech is strangely disconnected from reality. Reading Krauthammer, one gets the impression that the Iraq War–the archetypical application of American unipolarity–had been an unqualified success, with all of the assumptions and expectations on which the war had been based fully vindicated. There is not the slightest nod towards the new empirical facts that have emerged in the last year or so: the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the virulent and steadily mounting anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, the growing insurgency in Iraq, the fact that no strong democratic leadership had emerged there, the enormous financial and growing human cost of the war, the failure to leverage the war to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front, and the fact that America’s fellow democratic allies had by and large failed to fall in line and legitimate American actions ex post.

The failure to step up to these facts is dangerous precisely to the neo-neoconservative position that Krauthammer has been seeking to define and justify. As the war in Iraq turns from triumphant liberation to grinding insurgency, other voices–either traditional realists like Brent Scowcroft, nationalist-isolationists like Patrick Buchanan, or liberal internationalists like John Kerry–will step forward as authoritative voices and will have far more influence in defining American post-Iraq War foreign policy. The poorly executed nation-building strategy in Iraq will poison the well for future such exercises, undercutting domestic political support for a generous and visionary internationalism, just as Vietnam did. [Emphasis added by me]

 Fukuyama is quite clear here that Krauthammer does not mention Iraq in his discussion of "democratic globalism" nor does Krauthammer realize that his thesis is not supported by the facts on the ground (does that sound familiar?).

So, it appears to me that Krauthammer has gotten bent out of shape about nothing. He is focusing on the minutia of a Preface of a book to somehow gain the upper hand on an already lost argument. It is truly frightening that the last holdouts of a debunked application of a flawed theory believe so much in the rightness of their cause, that they go to great lengths to deny the reality all around them. Again, it may be time to trot out Wittgenstein.

In the battle of Fukuyama versus Krauthammer, it is safe to say that Krauthammer was knocked out at the opening bell. Compared to Fukuyama’s reasoning, Krauthammer’s thesis sounds downright childish and naive. That is not to say, of course, that Fukuyama is correct in his arguments. But, at least, he is making well thought out arguments that are open for debate amongst reasonable people. And, most importantly, his vision is informed by some connection to reality. As for Krauthammer, it is time to cut back on the Kool-Aid.

"Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"

- The New Collosus by Emma Lazarus

  

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 The Senate Judiciary Committee today approved bipartisan legislation that would create a guest worker program and allow the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States to legalize their status and ultimately apply for naturalization. At its core, this legislation recognizes the obvious - that undocumented immigrants, primarily from Latin America, have become a part of the social and economic fabric of this country. The bill also includes provisions for strengthening Border Patrol and increasing the number of green cards available for skilled workers.

The bill that came out of the Senate Judiciary Committee is vastly different from the draconian bill passed by the House in December. Most notably, the House bill does not contain a guest worker program and is wholly focused on tougher enforcement. The House bill proposes to make undocumented aliens felons and to make aiding an undocumented alien a felony.  Sec. 274(a)(1) of the bill criminalizes actions of those who:

(C) assists, encourages, directs, or induces a person to reside in or remain in the United States, or to attempt to reside in or remain in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to reside in or remain in the United States;

(D) transports or moves a person in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to enter or be in the United States, where the transportation or movement will aid or further in any manner the person’s illegal entry into or illegal presence in the United States;

The two bills reveal the split within the Republican Party between the pro-business wing and the anti-immigration wing. What initially looked like a political winner for the Republicans in the 2006 elections now appears to be far murkier. The Sensenbrenner/Frist wing had hoped to appeal to the baser instincts of the voters by connecting the dots (not too subtly) from undocumented immigrants, to criminals, to terrorists. Although it plays well on right wing radio it is not clear whether the public’s fear of another terrorist attack can be manipulated into an anti-immigration platform and finally into votes in November. The Republican hope is that this will be the same kind of wedge issue in 2006 that gay marriage was for the Republicans in 2004.

I think it is highly unlikely that the House version of the bill would ever pass both chambers (and vice versa). The pro-business Republicans in the Senate would not allow it. However, the controversy generated by this issue and the stark choices will make for good election year politicking. Expect to see Republicans beat the drum pretty hard on this issue if they start getting traction with the voters, but also expect to see no legislative action. Either the bill stalls in the Senate or the two bills become comatose in conference. When you cannot run on your record and have to run away from the President, appealing to the baser instincts of the electorate always seems like a good idea.

So, where does that leave the very real issue of immigration reform? Nowhere, I’m afraid. The urgent need to balance the right of a nation to secure its borders and the great tradition of this country to welcome people seeking a better life will not be addressed this election year. The 11 million undocumented immigrants and the American public will spend another year out in the cold.