Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

The talk of Washington is the Iraq Study Group. Everyone, including the Democrats, is waiting for the two beltway sages, James Baker and Lee Hamilton, to rescue them from the chaos in Iraq. You will recall that some time ago Washington was eagerly awaiting a similar sounding group, the Iraq Survey Group, to rescue George W Bush from his temper tantrum in Iraq, although in a different way. The Iraq Survey Group failed to find any Weapons of Mass Destruction (remember them?) buried in the Iraqi desert, so now its successor, the Iraq Study Group will try to dig out George W Bush’s legacy from the sands of Iraq.

George W Bush, however, is not so easily saved. Rumor has it that Barney has blessed the "stay the course" strategy in Iraq. While others see civil war in Iraq, Mr. Bush and Barney see a mission in need of completion:

President Bush, rejecting what he called "pessimistic" assessments of his Middle East policy, pledged Tuesday to make necessary changes in Iraq but vowed never to pull out U.S. troops before completing the mission there.

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Bush said, "We will continue to be flexible, and we’ll make the changes necessary to succeed. But there’s one thing I’m not going to do. I’m not going to pull our troops off the battlefield before the mission is complete."

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are "part of a struggle between moderation and extremism that is unfolding across the broader Middle East," he said. "And in this struggle, we can accept nothing less than victory for our children and our grandchildren."

Apparently, the mission in Iraq has been "accomplished" but not yet "completed".

Save Mr. Bush’s determination to achieve "victory", the parlor game in Washington is all about when the United States will withdraw and how much damage will be caused, both to the United States and to Iraq, before the withdrawal takes place. Now that the mainstream media has started calling the Iraq Civil War a civil war, we can also now discuss what the possible outcomes of this war will be and what role, if any, the United States should play in that outcome.

In order to not be left out of the parlor game, I offer below my thoughts on the future of Iraq.

Last summer Harvard Professor Monica Toft discussed the three possible ways civil wars can end in an article for the Nieman Watchdog Journalism Project:

Civil wars end in one of three ways: (1) negotiated settlement; (2) partition; or (3) military victory. U.S. support for any of these options comes with considerable costs and only a slim possibility of an outcome that advances U.S. interests beyond what they were at the close of Saddam Hussein’s rule in April of 2003.

She does not see a negotiated settlement as a long term solution in Iraq:

In a negotiated settlement, warring factions agree both to end violence and to become partners in a new government. Although negotiated settlements are the most popular policy option (promising high short-term benefits and low risk), they may not be best if we want a permanent settlement to civil war.

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A negotiated settlement is what the U.S. has attempted to implement for the last two years in Iraq and it has failed. The process of writing and adopting a constitution and electing a president and parliament were all designed to give each of Iraq’s different communities a say in the government. Although the Kurds and the Shiites fully participated in the process, the Sunnis did not.

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A key factor in the failure of negotiated settlements has been that both sides maintain a capacity to harm each other by force of arms, and because the fighting has not reached a clear outcome, both sides can claim legitimacy in their pre-cease-fire resort to violence. Negotiated settlements by their very design leave a state’s offices divided, both in terms of physical infrastructure and human capital. … The bottom line is that most often civil wars ended by negotiated settlement re-ignite within five years, often leading to escalated violence and destruction (and not inconsequently increasing levels of authoritarianism). This is Iraq today.

She also does not see partition as a viable option in Iraq:

Theoretically, partition is an ideal way to end a civil war and keep it ended; especially when that violence involves identity groups that live in largely separate enclaves.

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In effect, Iraq is becoming partitioned today, with the Kurds maintaining their grip on the north and the Sunnis and Shiites consolidating their control over the west and south respectively. The unmixing of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad is only consolidating the populations into concentrated and mutually hostile enclaves. Concentrated enclaves turn out to be one of the most dangerous settlement patterns of ethnic and religious groups in terms of the likelihood of violence and civil war. Think of Chechnya, which continues to fight Russia for independence.

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Partition of Iraq would work only if two conditions held: (1) the parties were consolidated into internationally recognized states and Iraq’s resources were distributed in a way that made each state economically viable; and (2) the partition into independent states was enforced by a generation of occupation by skilled and politically well-supported troops (preferably Muslims). Given that Iraq’s Sunni minority has been implicated in decades of persecution of both Kurds and Shiites, getting Kurds and Shiites to agree to support creation of a viable Sunni state will be difficult to achieve. Moreover, one can hardly imagine a third party both capable and willing to maintain an occupation of Iraq for twenty years to insure the interests of each of the parties, but this is what would need to be done. … Finally, given the long-standing reluctance of the international community to support partition as a general solution to civil wars, the U.S. is unlikely to find much support for partition from its allies. Regional actors will be even more intransigent: Kurds, for example, currently inhabit four of the region’s states (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey). These bordering states would steadfastly resist the creation of an independent Kurdistan.

She sees victory by one of the warring sides as a more lasting option:

A final option is military victory: one side in civil war – rebels or incumbents – demonstrably defeats the other side by force of arms. Military victory is not only the most common type of civil war outcome historically, but also the one which most often results in enduring peace: military victories are far less likely to break down than are negotiated settlements. 

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The U.S. can choose to support either the Sunnis or Shiites. Supporting either side to achieve victory would be difficult and costly in terms of time, taking as long as a decade to succeed given Iraq’s porous borders and the support each of the sides receives from across those borders.

Supporting one of the two sides in the civil war comes at a cost of tipping the regional balance of power either toward the Arabs or toward Iran.

Finally, she suggests the throwaway option of pulling out of Iraq and letting the chips fall where they may. She also suggests a way that Mr. Bush could walk away and declare victory:

Having gone to Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein, the U.S. has discovered that what the people of Iraq wanted most was to be free of Saddam Hussein; but once free (a negative objective), positive objectives varied. The Shiites wanted representation in the control of Iraq commensurate with their population (and many wanted revenge for the persecution they suffered under Sunni rule). The Sunnis wanted to maintain their preferential status. The Kurds wanted their own state. To the extent that the war in Iraq, under U.S. auspices, has become a civil war, the civil war itself represents the success of a U.S. policy of bringing freedom to the people of Iraq.

Although Professor Toft’s listing of the three outcomes of civil wars is sound, she only discusses the three options in the context of an American occupation. She does not discuss fully the throwaway option of an American pullout, and what the three possible outcomes in Iraq then look like. To me, the latter discussion is much more interesting and more relevant since the United States has, dare I say, decided to pull out of Iraq.

I think there is a strong case to be made that the American presence in Iraq is fueling the civil war by delaying its resolution. That is not to say that the United States has effective control of the situation on the ground - it does not, but the presence of American troops gives the respective parties cover to arm and consolidate control of areas of the country. Without a doubt, the American presence guarantees that the Kurds in the north are able to consolidate their hold on Kirkuk and beef up the peshmerga. The American presence also allows the Shia factions to consolidate power in the various arms of the government, especially the security forces. The American forces also act as a buffer between the Shia and the Sunni by providing some measure of protection to the Sunni community to arm and consolidate their power in the western parts of Iraq. The American presence has also allowed the systematic ethnic cleansing of Iraq by Shia, Sunni and the Kurds. The ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods in Baghdad and other parts of the country has now effectively drawn geographical battle lines in Iraq’s civil war. The American presence also holds together a fractious Shia coalition that would otherwise collapse, and probably needs to if Iraq is to survive as a nation.

It seems to me that it is essential that the United States pull out of Iraq. After an American pullout, the Iraqi civil war may start to resolve itself. The Iraqi civil war has regional implications. Those regional forces can, without the constraints of American occupation, begin to pull Iraq toward a resolution.

As cited above, one possible outcome is military victory by one warring side. The conventional wisdom is that if the Americans leave the Shia will prevail in a civil war by virtue of their majority. I do not believe that is likely to occur for three reasons. First, the Sunni Arab countries of the region would see a Shia victory in Iraq as an expansion of Iranian hegemony into Arab territory. Without an American presence, the Sunni Arabs are likely to get significant support from regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. The risk of a regional conflagration is likely to dampen any hopes of a Shia military victory in Iraq. Second, the Shia in Iraq are fractured between pro-Iranian groups such as SCIRI and more nationalistic Shia such as the Sadrists. Moqtada al-Sadr, like his father the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, represents an Iraqi nationalist Shia movement. Sadr’s Shia movement and the Mahdi Army are likely to come into open conflict with the Iranian backed SCIRI and the Badr Brigade when the American occupation ends. Al Maliki’s Dawa Party sits in the uncomfortable middle between Sadr and SCIRI while being at the mercy of both. With an American exit, the Dawa Party is likely to see its fortunes dwindle. Lastly, the Shia cannot prevail over both the Sunni and the Kurds. Any military victory by the Shia would have to accept an independent state in the Kurdish north.

The other possible outcome of a civil war is partition. However, any partition of Iraq that leaves the Kurds with an oil-rich independent country in the north of Iraq will be fiercely opposed by Turkey, and to a lesser extent by Iran and Syria. Turkey has between 25 to 30 millions Kurds who have been long persecuted. Any Kurdish country to Turkey’s east will endanger Turkish territorial integrity and will be a non-starter. The Sunnis in the west and center of Iraq also cannot form a viable country without having access to the oil rich north and south of Iraq. There is no three country map that can be carved out of Iraq that does not deny one of the group’s much needed oil revenue.

The only remaining outcome for Iraq is then a negotiated settlement. The negotiated settlement may however come after an attempt at all out military victory is fought to a stalemate. The negotiated settlement will happen not because it is the preferred outcome, but because it is the only viable outcome. A negotiated settlement will certainly have to include the major regional players such as Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. The negotiated settlement will come after realization by the Arab states, and acceptance by Iran, that Iraq is, and historically has been, the Arab bulwark against Persian influence. Iran will find once again that the Iraqi Shia are not Iran’s fifth column in Iraq. An American departure from Iraq will eventually lead to a restoration of the balance of power in the region between the Arabs and the Iranians.

The Kurds of Iraq will once again be denied an independent homeland. But that denial will likely come at a price for Turkey. Turkey may be forced to give autonomy to its Kurds as a condition for Kurdish guarantee of Iraq’s territorial integrity.

The Iraq that is likely to emerge through the meat grinder of civil war will owe its stability to a regional need for stability, not to some gift of freedom given by George W Bush. Ironically, Mr. Bush is likely to see this precarious yet stable Iraq emerge from the ashes of his failed policy. Yet, it will emerge because Mr. Bush will finally have left it alone, and not because of his efforts at playing puppet master to the Arabs.

"Rock The Casbah" is probably the most misunderstood political song of modern times, but like this post it has nothing to do with rock and roll and everything to do with politics and religion…

I don’t often write about Islam directly. The last time I wrote about my views on Islam was over a half a year ago. But I read a post yesterday via Crooks and Liars that I feel I need to address. The post, entitled "Western Muslim Opinion On The War In Iraq", either inadvertently or deliberately puts up the mother of all straw men. The straw man and its attempt to knock it down is in large part the reason we are still in Iraq. We are in Iraq still because for too long the American public has been fed a steady diet of misinformation about the nature of the conflict there - and this post propagates the misinformation.

I am a Muslim, I live in the West, and I have an opinion on the war in Iraq. Given that the title of the post addresses me directly, I feel that I am well positioned to answer it. In the interest of full disclosure, I will say that I am a Sunni Muslim.

The post, from Eteraz.org, exhorts Muslims to speak out against the methods of Muslims in Iraq:

I have to say, I am severely hurt by what Islam has become in Iraq. In fact, to say that this blatant murdering of civilians by the militants contains any remnants of Islam, is difficult if not impossible. The Islam of the Sunni militants is a theology of anarchy which has no respect for the rules of war, or the values of Islam. The Shi’a themselves are no less. Islam does not stand for total war, but the Sunni and Shi’a militants violate that prescription almost regularly (to the tune of thousands of murders of average Iraqi civilians). We Western Muslims can oppose the American occupation, but we also have to oppose the way the insurgents are brutalizing and defilling life and human dignity.

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The Sunni militants’ version of "insurgency" and "freedomfighting" is non-sensicial; they want not to fight the "occupier" but to kill the occupied. It is the most heinous and disgusting form of "resistance" I have ever seen in my life, or read about. Their strategy is: if we murder enough Iraqi elders, women and children, then the Americans will leave. I beseech Western Muslims to take heed of this. I know you are anti-war, and I know you wish that Americans left Iraq, and I know you think Bush is a liar. I think all these things. But please, for God’s sake, can you at least recognize, that the strategy of "resistance" being employed by the militants is barbaric. I challenge any person to find me any instance in the history of Islam where murdering civilians as a way to resist an opponent was considered legitimate under Islam. There is no such event.

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The "Islamic" thing for the insurgents would be to attack only military targets. If they cannot attack the military targets, then they have lost. These are the rules of Islamic Law. The Shariah doesn’t say that "well, if you can’t attack the military, go ahead and slaughter any one who comes across your way." That’s not Islam. Please recognize that. That’s nihilism. It has no honor. It is not Islamic.

My point is pretty simple: a Muslim that opposes the War in Iraq must also oppose the methods of the insurgents and speak out against them. I don’t care if you think that criticizing the insurgents bolsters the American occupation. If your condemnation of murder is based on political strategy, then I have to say, you need to check your Islam.

The post buys into the meme that Muslims are complicit in the "War on Terror" if somehow they don’t denounce as un-Islamic actions by those designated as "them" in George W Bush’s "War on Terror" in Iraq. It feeds the notion that the Iraq conflict is a part of the "War on Terror" and the "them" is Islam or a "hijacked" version of Islam.

I do not consider it a duty of Muslims to oppose the violence in Iraq as "un-Islamic". The post lays it out: "a Muslim that opposes the War in Iraq must also oppose the methods of the insurgents and speak out against them." Why? Specifically, why Muslims? Who says that Muslims, just like everyone of good conscience, are not horrified by the violence and killings in Iraq? Who says that Muslims are not opposed to this chaos? I feel no inclination to draw a line here between me, a supposed "good" Muslim, and "them", who are the "bad" Muslims in Iraq. Killers and murderers are just that, as they have been throughout history, and I feel no inclination to give them the mantle of Islam, however "bad" their use of it may be. The War in Iraq was not, and is not, a "Clash of Civilizations", and I feel no desire to label it as such. I feel no desire to conflate Iraqis with al Qaeda as "them" as George W Bush’s "we must fight them there so we won’t have to fight them here" slogan implies. Suggesting this conflict has something to do with "what Islam has become in Iraq", as the writer asserts, is a gross misreading of the conflict in Iraq and is the kind of thinking that fuels the remaining support for George W Bush’s ill-advised policy in Iraq.

Iraq has been, since at least March of this year, in a state of civil war. It is a civil war not over religion, but over tribal and sectarian lines. The Shia-Sunni split in today’s civil war is a convenient shorthand but it is not quite accurate. The writer of the post states:

The Sunni militants’ version of "insurgency" and "freedomfighting" is non-sensicial; they want not to fight the "occupier" but to kill the occupied. It is the most heinous and disgusting form of "resistance" I have ever seen in my life, or read about. Their strategy is: if we murder enough Iraqi elders, women and children, then the Americans will leave.

The killing in Iraq right now has very little to do with "resistance" to the occupier. The killing of Shia by Sunnis is not meant to drive the Americans out of Iraq. The American presence in Iraq currently is almost irrelevant. The American invasion and occupation was the catalyst for the civil war, and to that end, it has succeeded spectacularly in destroying civil society in Iraq.

There are a number of conflicts going on in Iraq. There is first the sectarian civil war between the Shia and Sunni Arab communities. There is the struggle for Kirkuk taking place between the Iraqi Arabs and the Kurds (this in many ways is the most intractable of the conflicts facing Iraq). There is a fight emerging between the multiple factions within the Shia community - this is the bloody struggle between the Sadrists and the SCIRI. The government of al Maliki will be a casualty of the battle within the Shia community. There is an Iraqi nationalist insurgency going on against the Americans. And lastly, there is a battle between foreign Islamists and the American forces in Iraq. So, when Iraqis butcher Iraqi, they are settling their own scores - they are not killing Iraqis to expel the Americans. Only people like Dick Cheney in their narcissistic existence believe that Iraqis kill each other because they don’t like him or his boss.

The current Shia-Sunni violence in Iraq is driven by tribal loyalties. It is a political fight and not a religious one. When civil society broke down in Iraq during the American occupation, the country began to disintegrate along tribal and sectarian lines. The so-called debaathification of Iraq essentially decapitated Iraqi civil society - what was left was chaos.

The Shia-Sunni split in Iraq has in many ways come full circle. The Shia-Sunni split in Islam originated in Iraq. The split started as a political and tribal dispute, not a religious one. The dispute is over who should have succeeded Islam’s prophet, Muhammad, as the first caliph (ruler) of the Muslim community. After Muhammad’s death, his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, was elected the first caliph. However, some in the Muslim community felt that Muhammad’s son-in-law (husband to his daughter Fatima), Ali, should have been the first caliph. These followers of Ali, or Shiat Ali (Shia, for short), are the modern day Shia. The Shia believe that the caliphate should pass down the descendants of Muhammad, not through elected position. It is worth noting, at the risk of blasphemy, that Ali is not a direct descendant of Muhammad.

The dispute, between Shia and Sunni, then is all about who should wield political power. It is a tribal dispute between the tribe of Abu Bakr and the tribe of Ali. Its western analogue is the difference between electing your leader and believing that your leader has been divinely ordained, as in western monarchies.

To round out our foray into Islamic history, I should note that the last descendent of Ali was Muhammad al-Mahdi. He is considered the last of the twelve Imams by the Shia. At the age of four, after inheriting the title of Imam, al-Mahdi disappeared. The Shia believe that al-Mahdi did not die, but was "hidden". When al-Mahdi failed to reappear after a few centuries, the Shia chose to elect a supreme Imam from a council of twelve scholars as their spiritual leader. The Shia believe that the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, will return some time in the future.

So, in modern day Iraq, the fight between the Shia and the Sunni once again is over political power. To put it crudely, the dispute is over which tribe should rule Iraq after Saddam Hussein. The unresolved tribal dispute that has its origins in Islamic history, continues to rage in Iraq now that civil society has collapsed. In this fight, George W Bush’s "War on Terror" is irrelevant.

 [Cross posted on Taylor Marsh]

The verdict is in. Saddam Hussein has been found guilty of crimes against humanity. News flash: the Butcher of Baghdad is guilty of being a butcher.

From the beginning of the invasion of Iraq, the United States faced a conundrum. It could either fight the fierce Iraqi nationalism or it could undermine it. However, undermining Iraqi nationalism required a disintegration of Iraqi society into sectarianism. The Bush Administration chose to try to undermine Iraqi nationalism. Weakening Iraqi nationalism meant that it was easier to enter Iraq, however, creating sectarian strife means that it will be harder to leave Iraq. Today’s verdict is another milestone in the dismemberment of Iraqi nationalism.

The Bush Administration has actively pitted the Shia and Sunni against each other in a bid to defeat the insurgency. The ascendancy of the Shia led government in Iraq is no accident - it was anointed by the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration has equipped a massive police force in Iraq comprised largely of the Shia militias (the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade). Faced with a rising insurgency, the Bush Administration has reportedly resurrected the Reagan era "Salvador Option" to try to deal with the Sunni insurgents:

Now, NEWSWEEK has learned, the Pentagon is intensively debating an option that dates back to a still-secret strategy in the Reagan administration’s battle against the leftist guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador in the early 1980s. Then, faced with a losing war against Salvadoran rebels, the U.S. government funded or supported "nationalist" forces that allegedly included so-called death squads directed to hunt down and kill rebel leaders and sympathizers. Eventually the insurgency was quelled, and many U.S. conservatives consider the policy to have been a success—despite the deaths of innocent civilians and the subsequent Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages scandal.

As in El Salvador, the option of pitting one group against another in Iraq has also been a "success". It has transformed the war in Iraq from one that was primarily a nationalist struggle against occuppiers to a much more complicated affair that features a bloody sectarian civil war between Iraqi Shia and Iraqi Sunni. One can argue that this strategy, the "Salvador Option", succeeded spectacularly with the attack on the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006. Iraq has been spiraling into chaos ever since.

Iraqi nationalism, within the larger Arab nationalism, has always been a counter-balance to tribal and religious sectarianism. What bound Iraqi Shia and Iraqi Sunni together was that they were Arabs and Iraqis. Iraqi Shia are distinct from Iranian Shia in that the former are Arabs and the latter are Persian. That distinction is significant and has historically been the key to the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. When Iraq and Iran fought a bitter eight year war, Iraqi Shia fought along side their Sunni countrymen against the Iranians.

The rise of the Ba’th movement ( or "renaissance" ) in Iraq and Syria was an attempt to unify the Arab nation under a secular banner. For all its ills, the Ba’th party in Iraq represented the supremacy of Iraqi nationalism over religious sectarianism. The Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq and then later de-ba’thification of Iraqi society unleashed tribal and religious forces that have now led to the near collapse of Iraqi society. Without a strategy to fill the vacuum of the Ba’th party, the Bush Administration opted for sectarian dismemberment of Iraq.

In the context of the ongoing sectarian violence, where Shia and Sunni are butchering each other, the Saddam Hussein trial and verdict will offer the last little push to Iraqi society on its path to chaos. Allowing the Shia leadership of Iraq to try the Sunni leader Saddam Hussein while a sectarian war is raging was a monumentally stupid decision by the Bush Administration. It has compromised the validity of the trial, which should have been held under an international tribunal, and it has poured fuel onto a raging sectarian fire. The guilt of Saddam Hussein was never in doubt. What was on trial was the trial itself. This trial and verdict will further divide Iraq’s Shia and Sunni populations.

Iraq’s future is being sacrificed at the altar of American domestic politics today. Mr. Bush is so intent on capturing the news cycle on the weekend before the mid-term elections that he has sacrificed untold American and Iraqi lives in the process. Vice President Cheney asserts that the violence in Iraq has increased because the insurgents are trying to influence the elections in America. The notion that Shia and Sunni are butchering each other to influence congressional elections in the United States is absurd. Yet, Mr. Cheney and his boss are quite content to add to the sectarian violence in Iraq for their own political purposes.

Mr. Bush has always looked at Iraq through the prism of domestic politics. Today the verdict is in on Saddam Hussein. On Tuesday, the American people will deliver a verdict on Mr. Bush.

[Cross posted on Taylor Marsh]

Over the weekend Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki offered a national reconciliation plan to the Iraqi National Assembly. The plan offered to the Assembly was lacking some of the more controversial clauses that were part of an earlier draft. Nonetheless the plan signals the beginning of the end of the American occupation of Iraq.

The Prime Minister’s gambit comes a week after his national security advisor floated the idea of a timetable for an American military withdrawal from Iraq. Maliki’s plan highlights the important cross currents in Iraq that the Bush Administration has thus far failed to appreciate or understand. There are three separate wars raging in Iraq. There is a war between the occupying forces and the Iraqi national resistance; there is a war between the United States and the jihadists; and, finally there is a civil war between the Shia, Sunni and Kurds. The United States is fighting only one of these wars - the war against the jihadists.

Maliki’s reconciliation plan aims to end the war against the occupation only. This is the war the United States has been sleepwalking through in its quest to fight the War on Terror on Iraqi soil. The key elements of the national reconciliation plan that address the occupation are:

• A call for a timetable for the withdrawal of all occupying forces
• Release of all security detainees being held by the occupying forces
• Amnesty for resistance forces but not "terrorists" 

These elements of the reconciliation plan have appeal to all major factions in Iraq with the possible exception of the Jihadist foreign fighters. An American withdrawal will take the oxygen out of the Jihadists’ campaign in Iraq. With the Americans gone, the foreign Jihadists become easy targets for native Iraqis and are likely to be driven out rather quickly. With the American withdrawal, Iraq will cease to be a battleground in the war between the United States and the jihadists; a new battleground will undoubtedly be chosen, but at least Iraq will be spared.

A withdrawal of American forces has been the goal of Iraqi Shia, Sunni and Kurds from the outset. However, they have had differing agendas on when and how the withdrawal should take place. The Sunni have always resisted the Americans because they understood that the longer the Americans stay in Iraq, the more firmly the majority Shia will consolidate their hold on power.

The Shia have used the American occupation as cover to consolidate power. They have very astutely managed to ride the American occupation without losing their political independence. You will note that the spiritual leader of the Shia, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has never once met with any American official - choosing instead to work through intermediaries to influence events. Having now consolidated power, the Shia are ready to remove the "training wheels" by asking the Americans to leave.

The Kurds are the faction in Iraq who can afford to wait the longest for the Americans to leave. However, make no mistake, they certainly want the Americans to leave. They have used the occupation to quietly position their militias around the city of Kirkuk. However, they have made no attempt to take Kirkuk while the Americans are on the ground in Iraq. The Kurds view Kirkuk, with its vast oil wealth, as the future capital of Kurdistan. They will almost certainly take Kirkuk after an American withdrawal from Iraq.

The release of all security detainees being held by American forces is another plank of the plan to end the occupation. Iraqis view these detainees as the resistance and similar to prisoners of war. Thus, they expect that at the end of hostilities, that is, when the Americans withdraw, these prisoners will be released.

The call for amnesty for the Iraqi resistance is perhaps the most controversial element of Maliki’s plan. However, it is a necessary condition for the Iraqis. The earlier draft of the plan made a distinction between "resistance" and "terrorists". This is a crucial distinction for the Iraqis. But the definition of "terrorist" is not the same in Baghdad as it is in Washington. It is clear to the Iraqis that the "resistance" is any Iraqi engaged in attacking American soldiers. To Washington, what Iraqis call the "resistance" are "terrorists". However, when Maliki or the Shia ruling alliance call someone a "terrorist" they are referring to both foreign Jihadists and Sunnis who are engaged in sectarian violence against the Shia. Washington makes no such distinction when it comes to "terrorist"; in Washington, everyone involved in violence in Iraq is a terrorist. When Maliki’s plan calls for offering amnesty to the "resistance" he is aiming to end the occupation, not the civil war. This is an important distinction that the Bush Administration and much of the American press fail to understand.

The American occupation of Iraq was always destined to end. Whether President Bush chooses to "cut and run" or leave at the request of the Iraqis, the occupation by its very nature was always time limited. The Iraqis have always known it. The only unknown was how much havoc it was going to cause Iraqi society. Unfortunately, the more intractable conflict will continue to rage. That is the civil war between the three main factions in Iraq. There is little indication that the civil war is going to subside any time in the future. All indications are that it continues to rage and is likely to get worse. Maliki’s plan, even if it is implemented, will do very little to quell the civil war. The tensions that have been unleashed by the American invasion of Iraq are now set to play themselves out. That tension, manifested in the current Iraqi civil war, has the potential of becoming a regional conflict. If that happens, the legacy of George W Bush will not only be a failed invasion of Iraq but also a destabilization of the entire region.

Today in Iraq a suicide bomber killed 17 police recruits in Fallujah. In Baghdad, 37 people were found handcuffed and shot to death. That 54 people lost their lives in Iraq in one day has become so commonplace that the news did not even warrant a prominent place on The Washington Post web site. As I write this the headline on The Washington Post web site is a story about the Washington Nationals baseball team.

Against this backdrop of mayhem in Iraq, Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb have put forward a five-point plan to prevent a further slide into Civil War in Iraq. In an op-ed piece in The New York Times, Messrs. Biden and Gelb argue that Iraq should be divided into ethnic federations along the Bosnian model. While it is commendable that Senator Biden has finally proposed a thoughtful alternative to the Administration’s jingoistic and simplistic "stay the course" plan, the proposal does have some fundamental flaws that need to be addressed.

Senator Biden and Mr. Gelb believe that it is a zero sum game between the American military and the insurgents. They state:

As long as American troops are in Iraq in significant numbers, the insurgents can’t win and we can’t lose. But intercommunal violence has surpassed the insurgency as the main security threat.

This is a fundamental misreading of the situation in Iraq. The United States has already lost Iraq. The war in Iraq is not about military victories; it is about local, regional and global politics. The United States military cannot hope to win enough battles in Iraq to reverse the political loss the United States has already suffered. Insurgencies win against foreign occupations not by vanquishing the occupier on the battlefield but by making continued occupation a painful and counterproductive path for the occupier. By that measure the United States has lost in Iraq and the only political and military calculation left to make is how to withdraw and when. The communal violence in Iraq has not surpassed the insurgency but in fact is a direct consequence of the insurgency and America’s inability to quell it. For better or for worse, civil war in Iraq has been a goal of the insurgency. That civil war has made America’s presence in Iraq irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.

The centerpiece of the Biden and Gelb proposal is a division of Iraq into autonomous zones along ethnic lines:

The first is to establish three largely autonomous regions with a viable central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions would each be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal security. The central government would control border defense, foreign affairs and oil revenues. Baghdad would become a federal zone, while densely populated areas of mixed populations would receive both multisectarian and international police protection.

This proposal has appeal given, as the authors point out, that Iraq is already headed toward violent division. However, the proposal glosses over some difficult truths about Iraq’s ethnic and geographical structure that cannot be ignored.

First, there are sizable minorities that live within majority Shia, Sunni and Kurdish areas. Any partition into autonomous zones would lead to large scale ethnic cleansing and quite likely violent migration patterns as the minorities flee these newly formed autonomous zones. Though Iraq is distinctly divided into Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Turkmen and other minorities demographically, it is not necessarily divided along those lines geographically (except perhaps in the Kurdish controlled north where ethnic cleansing has already taken place). The proposed division of Iraq is less likely to look like Bosnia and more likely to look like the partition of India into India and Pakistan in 1947. In that instance there was large-scale migration of Hindus and Muslims resulting in violent clashes and significant loss of life. The end result was a geographical monstrosity that led to three wars and finally the formation of an independent Bangladesh in 1971.

Second, the proposal glosses over the thorny issue of oil revenues. Iraq’s oil fields are largely concentrated in the predominantly Shia South and in the contested city of Kirkuk in the North. The Sunni areas are largely devoid of oil reserves. The geographic distribution of the oil fields is a major stumbling block in any proposed partition of Iraq along ethnic lines. The city of Kirkuk in particular generates half of Iraq’s oil revenue. The Kurds have historically laid claim to this city and will not cede control of the city or its oil revenues under any federalist agreement. Though the problem of Kirkuk has gone largely unaddressed by the United States, I believe it will be the epicenter of a larger struggle for the future of Iraq. With Kirkuk as their capital, the Kurds have ambitions for a greater Kurdistan that spans Iraq, Turkey and Iran. This is a goal the Kurds are unlikely to give up through any negotiation that does not give them full control of Kirkuk and its oil revenues. Turkey and Iran will almost certainly intervene if and when an autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq comes into being. This is a powder keg that will cause major regional instability and is the fly in the ointment of the partition proposal. There is already cross border fighting between Iran, Turkey and the Kurdish region of Iraq and this will likely flare into open warfare in the event of a partition [via Juan Cole].

The other points in the proposal that offer Sunnis financial incentives, offer protection to women, recommend an orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces, and recommend convening of regional summits all have merit but are eclipsed by the difficult task of overcoming the demographic and geographical challenges in Iraq. The incentives to Sunnis and the protection of women in fact argue for a stronger central government rather than a loose federation as has been proposed.

Senator Biden and Leslie Gelb have begun the process of exploring alternatives to the current policy of failure. The White House characteristically has rejected this proposal out of hand. However flawed the proposal is it is perhaps the first step in working our way out of the mess in Iraq and hopefully will spur other serious alternatives that may stem the civil war already raging in Iraq. The prospects of turning back from a violent restructuring of Iraq are bleak, but any proposal that attempts to avert further bloodshed should be given serious consideration.

The center of gravity in the civil war in Iraq is not Baghdad - it is Kirkuk. Kirkuk is the prize that the Sunnis lost, the Kurds want, and the Shia will not give. The Kirkuk oil field has about 10 billion barrels of oil reserves and produces almost half of Iraq’s oil exports. He who controls Kirkuk controls Iraq’s oil and Iraq’s wealth.

Over the last year Kirkuk has become the central front in the struggle for control of Iraq’s wealth. Kurdish peshmerga militias, Shia militias as well as Sunni insurgents have been slowly but surely taking up positions in and around Kirkuk in preparation for the bloodbath to come. The various militias in Kirkuk have been carefully maneuvering around each other under the watchful eyes of the American military. The battle for Kirkuk will likely begin when the American military begins its inevitable withdrawal from Iraq.

After the fall of Saddam the peshmerga quickly took control over Kirkuk. After Turkey expressed alarm at the possibility of Kurdish control of the Kirkuk oil fields (and the resulting wealth) the Kurdish militia withdrew to barracks outside the city. However, they have remained a presence in and around the city since that time. The Kurdish militias have also systematically infiltrated the Iraqi Army units in the north of Iraq:

Kurdish leaders have inserted more than 10,000 of their militia members into Iraqi army divisions in northern Iraq to lay the groundwork to swarm south, seize the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and possibly half of Mosul, Iraq’s third-largest city, and secure the borders of an independent Kurdistan.

While the Kurds reinforce their control of the Iraqi Army, the Shia militias have begun to pour into Kirkuk in recent weeks and months:

Hundreds of Shiite Muslim militiamen have deployed in recent weeks to this restive city — widely considered the most likely flash point for an Iraqi civil war — vowing to fight any attempt to shift control over Kirkuk to the Kurdish-governed north, according to U.S. commanders and diplomats, local police and politicians.

The Shia militias in Kirkuk along with the Sunni insurgents in and around Kirkuk are bound together in this struggle as Arabs versus the Kurdish militias. The maelstrom in Kirkuk is a peculiar confluence of oil, wealth, Arab and Kurdish nationalism. Ever since oil was first discovered in Kirkuk in the 1920s, Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen have been vying for control of this city’s riches. Starting in the 1960s the ruling Baath Party began a process of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk. This ethnic cleansing, called "Arabization", forced Kurds, Turkmen and other ethnic groups from their homes and replaced them with ethnic Arabs from the south of Iraq:

Turkmens and Kurds alike were suppressed by the aggressive Arabism of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. Official ‘’Arabization'’ began in the 1960’s and accelerated significantly in 1975, when the Iraqi regime began forcibly removing tens of thousands of Kurds, Turkmens and Assyrian Christians from Kirkuk and bringing in Arabs to take their place. This Arabization was chiefly motivated by the government’s wish to consolidate its grip on the oil-rich and fertile region — and to pre-empt a gradual demographic takeover of the city by the Kurds. Under Arabization, as many as 250,000 non-Arabs, mostly Kurds, were expelled north into Iraqi Kurdistan. Their former land titles were declared invalid, and ownership was assumed by the government, which rented the land to Arabs.

After the fall of Saddam the Kurds have reasserted control over Kirkuk. The Kurds consider Kirkuk to be the capital of a greater Kurdistan spanning from Turkey to Iran. The Kurds are prepared to fight in order to gain control of the city:

"Kirkuk is Kurdistan; it does not belong to the Arabs," Hamid Afandi, the minister of Peshmerga for the Kurdistan Democratic Party, one of the two major Kurdish groups, said. "If we can resolve this by talking, fine, but if not, then we will resolve it by fighting."

The Arabs, Shia and Sunni, are not prepared to hand over Kirkuk to the Kurds without a fight:

In a meeting here last week, Sadr’s representative in the city, Abdul Karim Khalifa, told U.S. officials that more armed loyalists were on the way and that as many as 7,000 to 10,000 Shiite residents were prepared to fight alongside the Mahdi Army if called upon. Legions more Shiite militiamen would push north from Baghdad’s Sadr City slum, he said, according to Wise.

"His message was essentially that any idea of Kirkuk going to the Kurds will mean a fight," Wise said. "He said that their policy here was different from in other places, that they are not going to attack coalition forces because their only enemy here is the Kurds."

The Shia militias in Kirkuk are currently outnumbered significantly by the peshmerga. However, any battle for Kirkuk is sure to draw in forces from Turkey and Iran. Both of these countries have Kurdish minorities that aspire for a greater Kurdistan. Turkey and Iran will both be concerned that a Kurdish controlled Kirkuk will give the Kurds the wealth needed to wage a war for a greater Kurdistan. 

However, under years of American and British protection, and the resulting autonomy, the Kurds of northern Iraq have worked steadily toward a Kurdish homeland. They are determined to make the dream of a greater Kurdistan a reality and any such state must include Kirkuk and its oil fields. The stage is thus set for a major confrontation in Kirkuk over the wealth of Iraq. Shia, Sunni, Kurd and Turkmen of Iraq are about to rendezvous with destiny in Kirkuk.

A few days ago I posted a piece on the right wing response to Jill Carroll’s release. In the comments section following that piece I started a discussion with Jim Benton that quickly turned to a discussion of Islam. He has posted a series of questions on his blog for moderate Muslims. I agreed over the weekend to try to give my answers. I am finally getting around to it. I have decided to post my answers here and then I will try to cross post on Jim’s blog with answers for each individual question.

To begin, I should state that I am not a Muslim scholar nor do I play one on TV. I am however a Muslim. I was born in Bangladesh (which was East Pakistan at the time) and grew up in an overwhelmingly Muslim but secular country. I have lived half my life (and most of my adult life) in the United States. I now find myself in the unusual and sometimes difficult position of being an American and a Muslim in these turbulent times. I am often asked the obligatory "Why do Muslims hate freedom?" question. To me that question is very similar to the "When was the last time you beat your wife?" question.

I am also often commended for being one of those "good" Muslims or a "moderate Muslim". So the only part of Jim’s questions I will take issue with is that he directs his questions to "moderate Muslims". To me, there are two kinds of Muslims: there are Muslims, and then there are Fanatics (I think this distinction probably exists in most organized religions). I happen to be a Muslim. Of course the current news is about the two sects of Islam: the Shia and the Sunni. There are many good books that discuss the two sects of Islam; for my part, I will just say that it is a political dispute that has lasted to this day. All Muslims share one holy book, The Koran, and any difference that exists between practicing Muslims is the work of man not of God.

A significant part of my thinking in terms of Islam is rooted in having seen and experienced man’s inhumanity to man first hand. As I mentioned, I was born in Bangladesh during a time when it was part of Pakistan. The word "Pakistan" means, for those who do not know, "The Land of the Pure". Bengalis, the ethnic group primarily in Bangladesh and in parts of India, were considered by many in the leadership of Pakistan at the time to be "napak", that is "impure". We were considered this largely because most Bengalis were converts to Islam from Hinduism. Bengalis retained their cultural identity through their conversion to Islam and a large minority in Bangladesh continued to practice Hinduism and other religions. The resulting war for the independence of Bangladesh saw perhaps the most egregious persecution of Muslims by Muslims in the twentieth century. Toward the end of the war, when it became clear that Pakistan was about to lose the war, death squads called "Al Badr" (this name should sound familiar to Iraq watchers) spread out across Bangladesh with the goal of finding and killing Bengali technocrats, scholars and intellectuals. The goal was to try to decimate Bengali culture that the Pakistanis felt was tainted, made impure, by our Hindu influence. One of the targets of Al Badr was my father, who if not for the courage and compassion of our Pakistani neighbors would have been murdered in front of his children’s eyes. Instead we watched in horror as my cousin was mercilessly beaten to an inch of his death for not revealing the whereabouts of my father and his family.

So, I know a little bit about what fanaticism can do, and I know a little of what Muslim Fanaticism can do. Now Jim, onto your questions:

1: Do you accept that the Qur’an is the final revelation of God, dictated, through Gabriel, to Mohammed?

I accept that The Koran is the divine word of God. The Koran was orally delivered by The Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) and was not written down until after Mohammed’s death. During his life, the Prophet did not allow The Koran to be transcribed. To this day, Muslims accept that The Koran in its Arabic form is the word of God and any translation into other languages is considered an interpretation and not literal translation. You will find that most interpretions of the Koran into English or other languages differ in meaning simply because of the difficulty in translating Koranic Arabic precisely. A lot of the meaning, the tone, of phrases is lost once translated and the words certainly do not sound as poetic as they do in the original Arabic. Most Muslims, including me, will in the course of their lives learn to recite the Koran in Arabic.

1a: If you do not, what do you consider it is, and what authority do you believe it holds?

I think this is a N/A since I answered the first one in the affirmative

 1b: If you do, how do you explain the inconsistencies, contradictions, and specifically the scientific and historical errors, for example (all quotes are from Pickthal)

18:86:86 Till, when he reached the setting-place of the sun, he found it setting in a muddy spring

18:90.90 Till, when he reached the rising-place of the sun, he found it rising on a people for whom We had appointed no shelter therefrom.
And the many other places where the Qur’an supports a geocentric Universe…

Most misinterpretations of the Koran arise from people (both Muslims and non-Muslims) taking the Revelations in the Koran out of their historical context. Most scholars accept that the Koran is divided into two parts, the early Surahs and the Medina Surahs. Some Revelations in the Koran speak to what it means to be a Muslim while other Revelations are specifically given to Mohammed in response to a particular event. So, reading the Koran without putting the latter Surahs in their historical context is an exercise in failure and frustration. To make matters more confusing, the Surahs in Koran when they were transcribed were not done in a chronological manner. The order of the Surahs in the Koran is from largest to smallest, with the notable exception of Surah Fateha, which is the first Surah.

You cite two verses from the Surah Al Kahaf ( "The Cave" ). Both these verses relate to the travels of Zulqarnain (who a lot of scholars think might be Cyrus the Persian, although the Koran never specifies it). The Surah was revealed probably in response to three questions asked by the Quraish. I think you are misreading the phrases. The more supportable reading is that the traveler went in three directions, the East (18:90) ,  the West (18:86) and some other direction not specified in the Surah. This is the more plausible explanation if you read the Surah as a whole.

 2: Do you believe that Muslims should be under Shariah law — not obey it but be governed by it — either in Muslim countries or in Muslim communities existing in non-Muslim countries?

Shariah law does not come from the Koran. Shariah came about in the ninth century during a political struggle between the traditionalists and the rationalists. The Koran is not a book of laws, unlike texts in some other religions. In fact, early on, the political and religious was specifically kept separate. At some point in the ninth century all that changed with Shariah coming into being from specific cultural conditions of the day. Somehow the notion developed that we must live in the ninth century and these laws are immutable. That is bunk. The Koran itself does not support this notion of immutable human law. On the contrary, the Koran was tailored for the people and culture of the time and the progression of time and societal change should logically follow from a sound reading of the Koran. By the way, any notion that Shariah is divine law is simply false, and wholly unsupported by the Koran.

So, to answer your question, no, I do not believe we should be governed by Shariah. In fact, I think the only two countries that are governed by Shariah are Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, not exactly shining examples of Islamic enlightenment. I should also note the notion that there is one Shariah that should govern is also nonsense. There are at least four schools of thought in Shariah, and if you go back to the ninth century (if you must, I wouldn’t go there), you will find that you were free to choose which Shariah you wanted to follow, if any. Something then happened on the way to the Forum.

2a: In what ways do you see Sharia law as superior to secular law as promulgated in countries such as the US, Canada, and England — or in other Western countries if you know them better and would prefer to discuss them. In what ways, if any, do you see these secular legal systems preferably to Sharia?

Well, given that I don’t think Shariah governs, I think I get a pass on this question. I will note that Islam does not have a clergy class or a papacy. As such, the religion is meant to be a deeply personal thing as well as a communal thing without political structure. Islam should then be wholly consistent with most political systems.

2b: Should apostates be punished criminally if they merely leave Islam? What if they attempt to convince others of their position, with the possibility that they would leave as well?

Should there be a difference if
i) the apostate converts to another ‘religion of the book
ii) converts to a different religion entirely
iii) becomes an agnostic
iv) converts to an ‘Islamic heresy’
v) converts from Sunni to Shia or vice versa

If you have read my previous posts on Abdul Rahman, you probably know the answer I am about to give. Islam states that there should be no compulsion in religion. You cannot square that notion with killing a man for his beliefs. Besides, there is no Church in Islam and you cannot be excommunicated. You become a Muslim by internally having faith in Islam. It’s that simple. So, unless the Afghans have some cool new mind control tool, I dont know how they think they will determine whether a man claiming to be Muslim is a Muslim. So, the whole punishment for apostasy argument kind of falls on its face. Further, if you truly believe that this is a sin, and it may be, will not God make that judgment? I don’t know about the Afghanis, but I am much more comfortable leaving judgments about a person’s faith to God than to man, especially some illiterate judge in Afghanistan.

2c: Should blasphemy be punishable by law?

Again, this refers to Shariah law. Refer to my answers to earlier questions.

2d: As far as I know, neither the Qur’an nor the Hadiths specifically condemn rape, distinctly from other — consensual — sexual sins. If I am wrong, can you quote me a hadith or verse of a Sura where such a condemnation occurs?

I have not searched the Koran for rape, but there are many places in the Koran where it speaks specifically to the rights of women and orphans. As I mentioned above, the Koran is not a book of laws, however it does have a lot to say about women’s and orphan’s rights as these rights did not exist for women in Mohammed’s time. The Koran also forbids violence against women and that presumably would include the violent act of rape. Here are two verses from the Koran concerning women and orphans:

     4.127: And they ask you a decision about women. Say: Allah makes known to you His decision concerning them, and that which is recited to you in the Book concerning female orphans whom you do not give what is appointed for them while you desire to marry them, and concerning the weak among children, and that you should deal towards orphans with equity; and whatever good you do, Allah surely knows it.

     4.128: And if a woman fears ill usage or desertion on the part of her husband, there is no blame on them, if they effect a reconciliation between them, and reconciliation is better, and avarice has been made to be present in the (people’s) minds; and if you do good (to others) and guard (against evil), then surely Allah is aware of what you do.

Finally, according to Hadith, Mohammed once said "Heaven lies at the foot of one’s mother". I have always taken that to mean respect for women (my mother made sure it meant that).

2e: What rights should homosexuals have? Homosexual Muslims?

One important aspect of Islam is the notion that man was instilled with free will. The idea that there should be no compulsion in religion comes from that. Koran asks of the Muslim to seek guidance from God. God is the judge of whether one has lived a good life. Koran preaches treating people with dignity and self-respect. I would think that means all people, not just heterosexuals. I know a good number of Homosexual Muslims and I haven’t felt the urge to flog them recently. Not to turn things political, but the gay issue gets the masses running to the polling booth, but how many thinking people care, or should care, what you do behind closed doors. I care a lot more about high officials molesting the children of our society than who one chooses to love and care for. There’s plenty of hate in this world and we should not be in the business of getting in the way of people who want to make love not hate, be they Muslims, Jews, Christians, or any other religion.

2f: Many of the punishments that are supposedly based on sharia and on specific verses of the Qur’an or on Hadiths are seen as excessively harsh, and when countries have attempted to impliment them, there have been outcries against them, both from within and without the countries. Do you accept such punishments, and if not, how do you get around the Qur’anic verses that seem to call for them?

I think my discussion of Shariah above answers the first part of your question. As for the Koran, many verses that talk of punishment refer very specifically to a particular incident or battle. Most critics of Islam like to take those verses out of context and try to paint with a broad brush. This goes back to my earlier comments about reading the Surahs within their historical context. The Koran is not a straightforward text of laws and doctrine. It is a complex text and those who want to interpret certain verses to serve their own ends are free to do so. I interpret the Koran as it applies to my life in the 21st century as I believe God would want me to do. If I’m wrong, I guess I will see you and most other people in Hell.

3: What values, ethical or moral principles, philosophical ideas or other concepts in Islam cause you to remain a Muslim, rather than to either join another religion or to become ‘a secular good person’?

Three things:

• There is no compulsion in religion.
• Religion is between the believer and God. There is no middleman.
• Man is endowed with Free Will.

I am, and I hope most people are, not shopping for a religion. So the question of switching to another religion does not arise. There are great and horrible things in all religions. After all, religion may be based on Revelation, but the implementation is all man. I choose to look at the good in all religions and find things that unite us, rather than divide us. I also believe in The Bill of Rights - quite frankly, as a work of man it is almost divine in its humanity.

3a: In which cases do you consider Islamic values superior to Western ones on similar topics?

Who says Islamic values are non-western? And what specific western values do you mean? I think there are some basic human values that we all share. I point you to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which even Afghanistan is a signatory.

3b: In which cases do you consider Western values superior?

I refer you to my answer to the previous question.

3c: How can those Western values you prefer be joined onto an Islam many of whose believers consider is unchangeable.

As I stated above, Islam is not unchangeable. The first word in the Koran is "read". Islam acknowledges man has free will and free will means that you learn and explore and not close your mind.

3d: Is Islam compatible with democracy and democratic values?

Bangladesh has been a secular Islamic country since 1971. Bangladesh has had free (and mostly fair) elections since 1996 after overthrowing a military dictatorship in a bloodless coup. The notion that Bangladesh somehow is overrun with extremists is fantasy. Is the current Government in Bangladesh corrupt? Yes? Although it is more Tom Delay corruption than Mullah Omar corruption.

3e: If you feel it is, how do you answer an ultraconservative who argues as follows (referring to our ultraconservative "Islam Q&A" )

Answer : Praise be to Allaah.Yes, we must make this distinction. The one who rejects the law of Allaah and casts it aside, and replaces it with man-made laws and the opinions of individuals has committed an act of kufr which puts him beyond the pale of Islam. Whereas the one who adheres to the religion of Islam, but is a sinner and wrongdoer by virtue of his following his whims and desires in some cases, or pursuing some worldly interest, but admits that he is a wrongdoer by doing so, is not guilty of kufr which would put him beyond the pale of Islam.Whoever thinks that ruling by man-made laws is equal to ruling by sharee’ah, and thinks that it is OK to do that, is also guilty of kufr that puts him beyond the pale of Islam, even if it is only in one instance. Shaykh ‘Abd-Allaah al-Ghunaymaan

I would ask the Shaykh to check his facts and read history. Shariah is man-made law. Anyone who does not know or understand that is simply ignorant.

3f: There are many tenets of Islam that I can wholeheartedly agree with, such as giving to the poor, the equality of all, taking care of relatives, etc. But in Islam, these commands seem to be limited to believers, thus ‘all Muslims are equal before God. Other religions are less strict in such dinstinctions. For example, Jewish and Christian charities, in most cases — not all — give benefits to those not of their faiths. Can Islam extend those ideas to non-believers as well?

The Koran does not support your assertion that Muslims should only give to poor Muslims. A poor man is a poor man, regardless of his creed. Islam very specifically preaches mercy to all, especially your enemy in battle. Rules of battle in Islam are surprisingly modern considering when the Koran was revealed. Some of these rules include the treatment of non-combatants, women, children, etc. For a very well known practical example of mercy, read about Salahuddin’s retaking of Jerusalem and contrast that with what had happened when the Crusaders had done the same thing. Incidentally, for our friends in the Middle East fomenting hatred, please note that the most famous of Muslim warriors, Salahuddin, was a Kurd.

3g: Several places in the Qur’an assume the existence of slavery, particularly the enslavement of prisoners of war. (Thus the first punishment for killing a believer accidentally is to free a believing slave. And there are several verses permitting a — male — Muslim to have sex with a slave.) Yet, today, slavery is viewed as barbaric, inhuman, and something that humanity has ‘put behind itself." How do you reconcile or accept this?

The Koran was revealed at a time slavery existed and women had no rights. The Koran progressively moved that society to grant women rights, grant orphans rights, and grant slaves rights. The most famous Muezzin (the one who calls to prayer) in Islam had been a slave (Hazrat Bilal). The verses in the Koran, again, need to be read in their historical context and the evolution within the Koran can be seen as moving a society from ignorance into knowledge. Sadly, some have decided that Islam did not need to evolve after the ninth century.

I hope you find the answers I’ve given to be satisfactory. I am sure I am not the only Muslim to have similar thoughts. When you look a little deeper into Islam, and beyond the caricatures and the Fanatics, you might find that the vast majority of practicing devout Muslims live a life of peace and tolerance. It may not fit the image of Islam some people want to see; it may not fit the Clash of Civilizations argument; but it reflects reality.

I will submit to you that most people in the world want the same things: a little bit of dignity, ability to live without fear of persecution, ability to raise their children in a safe environment, the ability to work and feed one’s family, and the occasional chance at laughter. Sadly, most of the world’s population lives in abject poverty while we play "my religion can beat up your religion" and the slaughter of millions happens right in front of our eyes. There is nothing Muslim, Christian, Hindu or Jewish about standing by as a large part of the world’s children starve to death.

The New York Times is reporting today that Shia and Sunni Iraqis have begun to flee from mixed Shia-Sunni areas. This migration comes on the heels of increased sectarian strife, death squad activity; and bombings targeting political figures, businesses, ordinary citizens and religious establishments.

The daily body count in Iraq ranges anywhere from 30 to 60 deaths, depending on which source you cite. That translates to 10950 to 21900 deaths per year if the current trend remains steady and does not accelerate. To put these numbers in perspective, consider that during the rule of Saddam Hussein from 1979 to 2003, the US Government’s estimate of the number of deaths is 300,000. That is, about 12500 deaths per year. The current death rate in Iraq equals or far exceeds the deaths during the rule of Saddam Hussein. So, if you pose to the common Iraqi the Ronald Reagan question, "Are you better off today than you were four years ago?" it should not come as a surprise if the answer is "No."

The reader can continue the gruesome exercise of comparing body counts with such well-known civil wars as Lebanon and Algeria. If you do work the numbers you will find that in terms of the death rate, Iraq today either equals or exceeds the death rates in these and other civil wars of the 20th Century.

The consequence of the Shia and Sunni communities separating geographically will be further bloodshed. Mixed communities were the last strands of the chord holding Iraq together. Without the countervailing force of these mixed neighborhoods there is nothing to slow the rapid acceleration of sectarian strife. 

Into the imbroglio enter the United States. We have not too subtly asked the Iraqi Prime Minister to step down. Washington Post is reporting today that there are now calls from within Iraq for the Prime Minister to step down. The United States may unfortunately get its wish here. It is unfortunate because al-Jaafari’s likely replacement will be Adel Abdul Mahdi. Abdul Mahdi is the candidate backed directly by SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq). I think the name of the organization speaks for itself. Incidentally, the Badr Brigade, the militia blamed for a large number of the killings, is the military wing of SCIRI.

The pushing aside of al-Jaafari, with the backing of the United States, will further de-legitimize the Iraqi Government. It will certainly give no comfort to the Sunni minority to see the U.S., however inadvertently, offering support to SCIRI. Further compounding the problem is the large-scale infiltration of the Iraqi police and army by the Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army militias. Of these police forces, GlobalSecurity.org reports that the U.S. Army General in charge of security in Baghdad, General James Thurman, said this week:

Iraqi troops and police units are more and more often taking the lead in counter-insurgency operations in Baghdad and the three provinces to the south that come under his responsibility. He also says more Iraqis are calling a special phone number to report insurgent activity. He says there have been more than 3,000 such calls since January, and that most of them have resulted in military operations that found insurgents, criminals or weapons caches.

The paradox is what looks like progress in training the Iraqi police and military is in fact resulting in these forces creating the very instability we are training them to control. We have, like it or not, taken sides in this civil war. Our stated objective is to stay out of any civil war that may be occurring or may occur in the future. But, the reality is that you cannot have a 138,000 strong army sitting on its hands while a civil war rages all around. The logic of the situation will force the United States to choose one side over another (consider the examples of Lebanon or Somalia).

What then will be the role of the U.S. military in Iraq with civil war breaking out all around them? There is no viable role for the military in Iraq that does not entail a long-term entanglement in the conflict - with the outcome decidedly uncertain. It is time, then, to withdraw our troops in some sort of orderly fashion. Very little further damage to our credibility will result from a quick withdrawal. Our three years in Iraq have damaged our credibility to levels below which it is unlikely to go.

I think the Iraqi conflict train has already left the station. We are left only with trying to affect a quick resolution of the civil war. This does not require a military presence, and in fact, a military presence might hinder any such progress for reasons mentioned above. Our goal from this point should and must be to try to work to ease tensions within Iraq and to work with Iraq’s neighbors to contain the conflict within Iraq’s borders.

It is not an attractive proposition, but we are where we are.