An Intervention

The long awaited, much anticipated, and often pre-judged Iraq Study Group report was finally unleashed on Washington. Predictably, it was trashed, even before the ink was dry, in the progressive blogosphere for failing to call for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq. However, I think dismissing the report as a "dud" or ridiculing it ignores the very real and consequential substance in the report.

It is important to realize that this report is an intervention. I cannot recall any other time in modern American history when a sitting president has been so publicly and so stunningly rebuked in a time of war. The ISG report strikes at the heart of the American President’s article II power as the commander-in-chief. It accuses President George W Bush of orchestrating, by his own choice, the destabilization of the Middle East and, if left unchecked, the destabilization of the global economy. Make no mistake, this report is an intervention. It is designed to save not the President, but the Presidency and the American body politic. George W Bush has abused his commander-in-chief powers in the prosecution of the Iraq war and this report aims to relieve him of his duties. Regardless of what occurs between now and the end of George W Bush’s term in office, he is no longer driving the ship of state. Mr. Bush has effectively been impeached.

The report itself has two parts. The first part, "Assessment", surveys the current mess in Iraq. The second part, "The Way Forward – A New Approach" lays out the much talked about 79 recommendations for extricating the United States from Iraq. There is also a GWB-sized executive summary, a letter from the co-chairs, and an appendix to the report. In this post, I will cover the first part of the report and the supporting documents. I will do a separate post on the 79 recommendations tomorrow.

 The goal of the report is national consensus, not Iraqi national consensus, but American national consensus:

U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure – as is any course of action in Iraq – if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus. [Letter from the Co-Chairs, p. x]

The implicit charge in the report is that George W Bush has embarked on a foreign misadventure without the consent of the people of this democracy. That kind of behavior may work in a dictatorship, but cannot be sustained in a democracy.

The very first two sentences of the Executive Summary paint a bleak picture for Iraq:

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. [Executive Summary, p. iii]

The ISG report does hold out the hope that all is not lost and the United States can still influence events there, although it may not be able to do so in the near future:

The ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing. [p. 1]

I have argued before that the United States has already lost the ability to influence events positively in Iraq. By staying in Iraq, I believe, the United States acts as a force for continued instability. The ISG apparently believes there is still time to salvage the situation. This belief may be a result of hope and obligation rather than rational analysis:

Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. [p. 2]

While I agree with the statement above, it does not necessarily follow that the national and moral interest is served by staying in Iraq and making one more go at it.

The flaw at the center of the report is the belief that America can control events in Iraq. The report concedes that combat operations by the United States military will not rescue Iraq. Indeed, it calls for a complete withdrawal of all American combat troops by early 2008. However, the report then subscribes to the misguided notion that the problem in Iraq can be solved by training Iraqi security forces:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. [Executive Summary, p. vi]

The problem with Iraqi security forces is not training. Before the United States invaded Iraq, the country had a functioning military and police force, so I doubt they are incapable of training themselves. As the report readily admits, the security forces are infiltrated with sectarian militias – you simply cannot train the "sectarian" out of a militia member. There is also the problem of perception. If the United States remains in Iraq in large numbers and successfully trains the Iraqi security forces (that is, succeeds in making the security forces non-sectarian), those security forces and the government who controls them will be perceived as American puppets. American training, in either instance, will be counter-productive. We will either train militias or we will train American puppets – both will have tragic consequences (as no doubt the incoming Secretary of Defense knows from his experience in Central America).

There is also a puzzling contradiction in the report. In an attempt to avoid an open-ended commitment of American forces in Iraq, the report warns:

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of mile-stones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. [Executive Summary, p. vii]

It is not clear to me why it makes sense to pull out of Iraq if the Iraqi government underperforms. If as the report claims, Iraq is "vital to regional and even global stability", why then would the United States pull out if the ISG believes the United States should stay to stabilize Iraq. To put it another way, according to the report an underperforming Iraqi government will cause the United States to throw in the towel.

While the report fumbles somewhat in charting a viable exit strategy from Iraq, it quite clearly is focused on extricating the United States from Iraq. The report examines a number of alternative approaches and points out their flaws. Most notably the report categorically rejects the "stay the course" policy of George W Bush. It points out that staying the course in Iraq endangers our national security. The report points out, in a section entitled "Staying the Course", that:

Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is constrained. [p. 38]

That leaves only Barney and Mr. Bush on the "stay the course" bandwagon.

The report also rejects a precipitate withdrawal from Iraq as too risky. However, it does not discuss a more orderly withdrawal as an option. The report also rejects John McCain’s plan to send more troops to Iraq as unrealistic:

Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. [p.38]

Finally, the report rejects Joseph Biden’s idea of a partition into three regions due to potential for ethnic cleansing and the inconvenient fact that most of Iraq’s cities have mixed populations. Iraq cannot be so cleanly carved up without a massive movement of people.

The report lays out the facts on the ground that should make it clear to even George W Bush’s dog that Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy has been a failure across the board. It paints a picture of a country in chaos with mass human suffering:

The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.

Six percent of Iraq’s population have been internally displaced and seven percent have fled the country. That means that 13% of the country’s population have fled their homes. Those are staggering statistics.

The report reminds Mr. Bush that both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, which have infiltrated the police, are engaged in sectarian violence and the Badr Brigade in particular is involved in death squad activity. Perhaps if the report were released earlier, Mr. Bush might have chosen not to host a death squad leader at the White House last Monday.

The Iraqi economy is predictably underperforming. The freedom Mr. Bush has given Iraqis has led to misery:

Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation. [p.23]

To compound the problem, reconstruction funds for Iraq have dried up as the Administration struggles to manage the security situation in Iraq:

The administration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. [p.25]

As for the two countries in the Middle East that the Bush Administration does not want to talk to, Mr. Bush’s muddled policy in Iraq serves these two countries just fine:

Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. … One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad."

…

Like Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. [pp.28-29]

In the short term, both Iran and Syria benefit from the chaotic American presence in Iraq. Only by leaving Iraq does the United States focus the attention of Iran and Syria on the need to have a stable neighbor in Iraq.

The report makes clear why there was a need for intervention to save the United States from its president:

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world.

…

If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.

…

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald’s."

…

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. … And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

…

If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. [pp.33-35]

Far from bringing stability to the Middle East and showing American might to its adversaries, George W Bush has weakened America in the eyes of the world. His war of choice has endangered America, the Middle East and the world.

The reality that the report lays out will be hard for Mr. Bush to ignore. The conversation in Washington is no longer how to win in Iraq; it is how to salvage America and Iraq from George W Bush’s blunders. That is the importance of the report. There can now be no denying the stark reality of failure. The discussion has now moved to how best to bring our soldiers home and leave behind some semblance of stability. To that end, the report’s recommendations, however imperfect, can be a starting point for the discussion. The authors of the report readily admit that events on the ground may overtake the recommendations of the report. I believe that Iraq has already reached that point and American presence there is now counterproductive – the authors of the report disagree, at least for now.