Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

In the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, on July 8, 1982, members of the Dawa Party, at the behest of Iran, tried to unsuccessfully assassinate Saddam Hussein in the town of Dujail. On December 30, 2006 the Dawa Party finally got their man.

Saddam Hussein’s hanging after a deeply flawed trial is not likely to increase the violence in Iraq. However, the hanging is likely to make the already remote possibility of political reconciliation that much more distant. The death of Saddam at the hands of Iranian-backed Shia will also rehabilitate Saddam Hussein’s legacy in the Arab world. The erstwhile Butcher of Baghdad will become a martyr of sorts - an Arab nationalist who resisted Western forces and died at the hands of an unholy alliance between Iranian and Western powers. Saddam will be remembered as a bloodier version of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Saddam Hussein will represent to Iraqi nationalists what Mohammed Mossadeqh represents to Iranians - a nationalist leader who was overthrown by Western powers for a few more barrels of oil.

There is simply no way around this fact - the United States of America allowed Saddam Hussein to be killed by the very pro-Iranian Shia party that is responsible for killing hundreds of Americans in terrorist bombings. The United States allowed Saddam to be killed for a crime he committed while he was an agent of America against Iran. These are the ironies of the American involvement in Iraq today. The occupying power has served up the head of Saddam to one of the warring parties engaged in a civil war. If the goal is to push Iraq further into civil war, today’s hanging will help achieve it.

While Mr. Maliki of the Dawa Party and Mr. Jabr, the death squad leader of SCIRI, were cooling their heels in Damascus in the Spring of 2003, they probably could not have imagined that just over 3 years later America would hand over Iraq and the head of Saddam Hussein to them and their Iranian backers. After all, they had fled to Syria and Iran because of their attacks against Saddam Hussein and American interests in Kuwait and Lebanon. After trying to assassinate Saddam Hussein in Dujail, the Dawa Party, on Iranian orders, exploded truck bombs at the American and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983:

The driver of the truck that exploded in an attack on the United States Embassy in Kuwait on Monday has reportedly been identified by Kuwaiti investigators as a pro-Iranian Moslem fundamentalist from Iraq.

According to diplomats in Kuwait and press reports there, the driver, who was killed, was 25-year-old Raad Mouchbil.

An Iraqi Embassy spokesman said in a statement issued in Kuwait that Mr. Mouchbil had already been condemned to death in Baghdad for what the statement said were ‘’criminal activities.'’

The Iraqi spokesman said Mr. Mouchbil was a member of the banned Moslem fundamentalist pro-Iranian Al Dawa group in Baghdad. He described Mr. Mouchbil as having been a strong supporter of Iran’s policies.

The United States stepped up support for Saddam Hussein after the attacks by the Dawa Party. Iran and the Dawa Party terrorists were the enemy. And of course Saddam Hussein had oil and there was money to be made:

Another key element in the growing American involvement here is the planned construction of a $1 billion oil pipeline from Iraq’s Kirkuk refinery through Jordan to the Gulf of Aqaba. The project, now under negotiation, would include a $570 million contract for the Bechtel Corporation.

From the American point of view, the pipeline, along with a second planned line through Saudi Arabia, would help tie Iraq to what are regarded as moderate pro-Western countries in the region. The Iraqi perspective is that having an American equity in the project - particularly that of Bechtel, whose former officers are prominent in the Reagan Administration - will guarantee its protection from Israel.

Iraq is now pumping about 700 million barrels of oil a day through its Turkish pipeline. A second pipeline through Syria, which supports Iran, was shut off by Damascus.

The United States has also granted Iraq about $2 billion in commodity credits to buy food over the last two years. Donald Rumsfeld, the former Middle East special envoy, held two private meetings with the Iraqi President here.

While Donald Rumsfeld, as the representative of the American President,  was negotiating for Bechtel and giving out map coordinates for chemical weapons attacks, there was no mention of the killings in Dujail or the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iran.

So, now 14 years after Dujail, Saddam has been hanged for his response to an assassination attempt by the Dawa Party. Saddam’s response at the time was to kill over a hundred Shia of Dujail as retribution - and the United States turned a blind eye. Fourteen years after the fact the Butcher of Baghdad has himself been butchered by terrorists who themselves have American blood on their hands. Today’s killing does not look like justice to me - it looks like an assassination.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is tracking a man in a red suit led by what appears to be a red-nosed creature high above the Earth. He is expected to enter American airspace sometime in the next 12 to 24 hours. NORAD is urging everyone to stay in your homes, ensure that your children are in bed early, and leave out milk and cookies by the fireplace.

For up-to-the-minute tracking information and the latest sightings, please visit the NORAD website.

 ——————————————————————————————————————–

Merry Christmas everyone.

"Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more;"

- King Henry V at the siege of Harfleur, Act III, Scene 1, William Shakespeare’s "Henry V"

Iraq is not France and Baghdad is not Harfleur. And George W Bush is not Henry the Fifth. The rumor is that George W Bush is enamored of the notion of a "surge" in Iraq - a "surge" that will snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in Iraq. It is all very manly. The word itself invokes a powerful rush of strength, a rush of victorious energy, a rising tide of manliness - in short, very George W Bush.

After the Iraq Study Group cut Mr. Bush from his secure "stay the course" moorings by making the fantasy of "progress" in Iraq unsustainable, a change in direction at the White House was inevitable. Waiting in the wings were the neo-conservatives with their pet theory of neo-colonialism at the barrel of a gun. Building upon their first disaster in Iraq, some neo-conservatives are finding their inner-Kissingers in full bloom. Just like Kissinger, who has yet to quench his appetite for war crimes, the neo-Kissingers are also finding a willing, albeit less discriminating, ear in the Oval Office.

Enter Fred Kagan and the "surge". Not too long ago, Mr. Kagan was of the opinion that Iraq was going swimmingly, and Mr. Bush should stay the course:

If the U.S. were to keep its troop levels constant over the next 18 months, the manpower available to perform all of these critical tasks would increase dramatically as Iraqi forces became available to handle basic security functions.

Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Bush administration favors such a course. Repeated rumors–including a report about U.S. plans to withdraw, leaked by the British Ministry of Defense recently, and statements by the new U.S. ambassador to Iraq–indicate that the administration would prefer to pull U.S. troops out of Iraq as Iraqi forces become available in larger numbers.

Understandable though that desire is, it is wrongheaded. Now, above all, is the moment when determination and perseverance are most needed. If the U.S. begins pulling troops out prematurely, it runs the risk of allowing the insurgency to grow, perhaps becoming what it now is not–a real military threat to the government.

If, on the other hand, Bush stays the course and pays the price for success, the prospects for winning will get better every day.

Mr. Kagan, always an advocate of more troops in Iraq, was more concerned about Mr. Bush paying the price for success than our troops paying the price for Mr. Bush’s "success".

Mr. Kagan has been hawking his "surge" idea for a while now.  In the spring of this year Mr. Kagan proposed a two-phase plan for "victory":

With an additional 7 brigades devoted to active combat operations, it should be possible to conduct clear-hold-build operations in two phases, totaling perhaps 12 to 18 months of significant combat, followed by a longer-term commitment of substantially smaller numbers of "leave-behind" forces. The general concept of the operation is to move from the outside in.

…

The first phase of the operation would clear the three river valleys except for Ramadi. U.S. forces would advance town by town from the upper Euphrates, upper Tigris, and upper Diyala rivers toward Baghdad, clearing and holding as they went and leaving behind a significant ISF presence, leavened with U.S. forces, to consolidate.

…

When clearing operations were completed, the ISF troops that had participated would remain in place to consolidate, supported by about 5 American battalions (2.5 brigades). That would leave about 9 battalions (4.5 brigades), in addition to those already deployed in Iraq, to continue active operations in the second phase: clearing Ramadi and the southern suburbs of Baghdad, and beginning to clear Baghdad itself.

…

It may be that the fastest way to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis and draw down American forces is not a steady decline of troop numbers. Instead, the fastest possible "exit strategy" may require one last surge effort to bring the insurgency down to a level that the indigenous forces can handle on their own. [Emphasis added by me.] 

He is old school - he believes that a determined local population can be "pacified" by an occupying power if the right amount of force is applied and the right number of locals are killed. Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of insurgencies that have outlasted the occupying power’s will to fight. Mr. Kagan and his neo-Kissingers would argue that if only the occupier would have stayed longer and been more brutal, the outcome might have been different. If only.

My hope is that not a single American soldier has to lose his or her life in the service of armchair ideologues like Fred Kagan and their pet theories. It appears that the joint chiefs are making an effort to put an end to this hair-brained scheme called a "surge". Let us hope they succeed.

While the press has been obsessed with the "surge", the International Crisis Group released their proposal for rescuing Iraq from the abyss. In a report entitled "After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq" the ICG lays out 27 recommendations that deserve serious attention. However, the report was released with barely any press attention at all.

I will have a more detailed post on the ICG report tomorrow, but for now, I wanted to give the report some airtime on the blogosphere.

While the ICG report agrees with the ISG report that the situation in Iraq is dire, it takes issue with the ISG recommendations for not going far enough:

Slowly, incrementally, the realisation that a new strategy is needed for Iraq finally is dawning on U.S. policy-makers. It was about time. By underscoring the U.S. intervention’s disastrous political, security, and economic balance sheet, and by highlighting the need for both a new regional and Iraqi strategy, the Baker-Hamilton report represents an important and refreshing moment in the country’s domestic debate. Many of its key – and controversial – recommendations should be wholly supported, including engaging Iran and Syria, revitalising the Arab-Israeli peace process, reintegrating Baathists, instituting a far-reaching amnesty, delaying the Kirkuk referendum, negotiating the withdrawal of U.S. forces with Iraqis and engaging all parties in Iraq.

But the change the report advocates is not nearly radical enough, and its prescriptions are no match for its diagnosis. What is needed today is a clean break both in the way the U.S. and other international actors deal with the Iraqi government, and in the way the U.S. deals with the region: in essence, a new multinational effort to achieve a new political compact between all relevant Iraqi constituents.

A new course of action must begin with an honest assessment of where things stand. Hollowed out and fatally weakened, the Iraqi state today is prey to armed militias, sectarian forces and a political class that, by putting short term personal benefit ahead of long term national interests, is complicit in Iraq’s tragic destruction. Not unlike the groups they combat, the forces that dominate the current government thrive on identity politics, communal polarisation, and a cycle of intensifying violence and counter-violence. Increasingly indifferent to the country’s interests, political leaders gradually are becoming warlords. What Iraq desperately needs are national leaders.

As it approaches its fifth year, the conflict also has become both a magnet for deeper regional interference and a source of greater regional instability. Instead of working together toward an outcome they all could live with – a weak but united Iraq that does not present a threat to its neighbours – regional actors are taking measures in anticipation of the outcome they most fear: Iraq’s descent into all-out chaos and fragmentation. By increasing support for some Iraqi actors against others, their actions have all the wisdom of a self-fulfilling prophecy: steps that will accelerate the very process they claim to wish to avoid.

The report’s recommendations are novel because they put three issues squarely on the table: the withdrawal of American troops and American bases, movement from fighting the insurgency to protecting the civilian population, and stepping away from supporting one group over another in Iraq’s civil war. These three issues, it seems to me, are essential ingredients of any stable future for Iraq.

The report offers recommendations for Iraq, for its neighbors, for the international community and for the United States. Among its recommendations are some urgent steps that United States should take to stem the violence:

18.  Adopt a less aggressive military posture in Iraq by:

(a)  redirecting resources to a program of embedding U.S. troops in Iraqi units; and

(b)  moving away from fighting the insurgency to focusing on protecting the civilian population, and in particular halting blind sweeps that endanger civilians, antagonise the population and have had limited effect on the insurgency.

…

21.  Avoid steps to engineer a cabinet reshuffle aimed at side-lining Muqtada al-Sadr, which would further inflame the situation.

…

23.  Free and compensate Iraqi prisoners detained by the U.S. without charge.

24.  Compensate Iraqis who have suffered as a result of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign.

…

26.   Abandon the super-embassy project and move a reduced embassy to a more neutral location.

27.  Publicly deny any intention of establishing long-term military bases or seeking to control Iraq’s oil.

The recommendations are aimed at fostering reconciliation and shifting to a less belligerent posture. In that they are the exact opposite of the "surge" approach. While the ICG recommendations may save lives, the "surge" is guaranteed to take lives, both Iraqi and American.

The goal of the ICG report is the stabilization of Iraq and the reduction of the American footprint in Iraq. These twin goals can serve as the underpinnings of a strategy to extricate ourselves from George W Bush’s mess and avoid the "surge" that leads to the quagmire of Kaganistan.

 [Cross posted at Taylor Marsh and Daily Kos]

Mubarak Hussain is almost home. Last spring, when the U.S. government released the names of the detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, it became apparent that at least some of the detainees were not what Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney claimed they were. At the time, I questioned whether the information they had on the Bangladeshi detainees was accurate. It seemed to me that if the U.S. government did not even bother to check that they had the correct information on Mubarak Hussain, one of the Bangladeshi detainees, that their claims that this man was a "terrorist" who was so dangerous that he had to be locked away without charge probably amounted to a load of bullshit.

It turns out that after five years of holding Mubarak Hussain without charge, the U.S. government flew him back to Bangladesh without even a hint of an apology:

U.S. authorities repatriated a Bangladeshi man on Sunday after years of imprisonment in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a police official said.

"We are interrogating him," Tahera Banu, an official of the airport police station in Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka, told The Associated Press by telephone.

The 28-year old man’s name, according to the Pentagon, is "Hashem, Mubarak Hussain Bin Abul," Banu said without giving further details.

Police did not immediately allow reporters or the man’s relatives to talk to him.

According to the Pentagon, Mubarak, born on January 1, 1978, is from "Baria" Bangladesh, which is actually Brahmanbaria. The area is 80 kilometers (50 miles) east of the capital, Dhaka.

Today Mubarak Hussain is in police custody in Dhaka. The police in Bangladesh will no doubt torture the man a little to give Mr. Bush his money’s worth. He is being held on a three day remand for "questioning":

Mobarak went to Pakistan for studies in 1998 and taught in a madrasa in Karachi after completion of two-year study.

In 2001, Pakistan intelligence arrested him and suspecting his link with al-Qaeda, handed over to the US authorities who later took him to the Guantanamo Bay prison.

Mobarak need to be quizzed to learn his ‘true’ objective for going to Pakistan, if he was a member of any banned organisation in the country and if he had any criminal records, said Sub-Inspector Masud of Airport police in the remand prayer.

Police also revealed that Mobarak went to Kabul in Afghanistan to visit his friend Rafiq, whom he met while teaching at a Karachi madrasa.

Then he went to Jalalabad in Afghanistan from where Pakistan intelligence arrested him and kept detained for 32 weeks.

The Pakistan authorities later handed him over to the US authorities, who interrogated him at different camps in Pakistan and lastly sent to the Guantanamo Bay prison, Masud said in the police report placed before the court.

Mobarak’s father Abul Hashem reiterated his claim that his son is innocent. "If they [US authorities] had found the slightest clue about his militancy link, they would not have released him," he told The Daily Star. [Emphasis added by me.]

This is your "War on Terror". While Osama bin Laden is still on the loose, we are rounding up hapless people around the globe so Mr. Bush can look like he is "winning" the war. If anyone is still in doubt about the quality of justice at Guantanamo Bay, feel free to peruse the Combatant Status Review Tribunal transcripts. The tribunals make Kangaroo Courts look good.

Mubarak Hussain’s ordeal at Guantanamo Bay has finally come to an end. I am sure Mr. Hussain has learned a lot about Mr. Bush’s freedom agenda in his five wasted years. Mr. Bush is spreading democracy all over the globe one destroyed life at a time.

"Kill three million of them," said President Yahya Khan at the February conference, "and the rest will eat out of our hands." […]

I am a child of genocide. Bangladeshis of my generation who have survived the slaughter of 1971 owe our lives and our freedom to those who resisted and the three million who were murdered for speaking the wrong language or for belonging to the wrong religion.

This is the story of the birth of a nation and the death of millions. This is the story of a nation and a people coming to the aid of another. This is also the story of American hubris and American compassion.

Thirty-five years ago today, on December 16, 1971, the Pakistan Army unconditionally surrendered to the Indian Army at the Dhaka Race Course in Bangladesh. With the stroke of a pen, Bangladesh was born.

In 1971, Bangladesh, then called East Pakistan, was part of a geographical monstrosity created by the British in 1947. Pakistan, as created by the British, consisted of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, separated by the vast expanse of the Indian land mass in the middle. East and West Pakistan spoke different languages and were culturally distinct. East Pakistan accounted for the majority of Pakistan’s population, yet it was economically exploited and politically marginalized by West Pakistan. Bengalis, the people of East Pakistan, were also persecuted for speaking their native language and for being either Muslims who had converted from Hinduism or for being Hindus. Pakistan, translated as "The Land of the Pure", was intolerant of Bengalis because they were not ‘pure" Muslims.

The tension between East and West Pakistan began to boil over in 1970 after West Pakistan’s minimal response to the devastation wreaked by the cyclone of 1970 in East Pakistan. Nearly half a million Bengalis died as a result of the cyclone and the indifferent response by the Pakistani government. In the midst of the tension, the Pakistani military rulers decided to hold the first democratic elections in Pakistan’s history. The Awami League, representing Bengalis in East Pakistan, won the majority of seats in the National Assembly. However, the military leadership of West Pakistan refused to allow the Awami League to form a government.

The siege of East Pakistan by the Pakistani Army had begun. War was now inevitable. On March 7, 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, gave a speech at the Dhaka Race Course that mobilized the Bengali nation for resistance. He began the speech with a call to arms:

The struggle this time is for emancipation! The struggle this time is for independence!

On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Searchlight to "eliminate" the Awami League and its supporters in East Pakistan. The goal was to "crush" the will of the Bengalis. The killing began shortly after 10 p.m. In the first 48 hours the orgy of killing had ravaged Dhaka city. The Hindu population of Dhaka took the brunt of the slaughter. Dhaka University was targeted and Hindu students were gunned down. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and the rest of the Awami League leadership went into hiding. The genocide had just begun:

On February 22, 1971 the generals in West Pakistan took a decision to crush the Awami League and its supporters. It was recognized from the first that a campaign of genocide would be necessary to eradicate the threat: "Kill three million of them," said President Yahya Khan at the February conference, "and the rest will eat out of our hands." (Robert Payne, Massacre [1972], p. 50.) On March 25 the genocide was launched. The university in Dacca was attacked and students exterminated in their hundreds. Death squads roamed the streets of Dacca, killing some 7,000 people in a single night. It was only the beginning. "Within a week, half the population of Dacca had fled, and at least 30,000 people had been killed. Chittagong, too, had lost half its population. All over East Pakistan people were taking flight, and it was estimated that in April some thirty million people [!] were wandering helplessly across East Pakistan to escape the grasp of the military." (Payne, Massacre, p. 48.) Ten million refugees fled to India, overwhelming that country’s resources and spurring the eventual Indian military intervention. (The population of Bangladesh/East Pakistan at the outbreak of the genocide was about 75 million.)

The will of the Bengali people was not broken on the night of March 25, 1971. On the contrary, while Dhaka burned so burned the illusion of a united Pakistan.

At 7:45 pm on March 27, 1971 Major Ziaur Rahman, leader of a rebel army unit in East Pakistan, broadcast Bangladesh’s independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. With the following words, the armed resistance to the Pakistan army began:

This is Shadhin Bangla Betar Kendro [Free Bangla Radio]. I, Major Ziaur Rahman, at the direction of Bangobondhu Mujibur Rahman, hereby declare that the independent People’s Republic of Bangladesh has been established. At his direction, I have taken command as the temporary Head of the Republic. In the name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, I call upon all Bengalis to rise against the attack by the West Pakistani Army. We shall fight to the last to free our Motherland. By the grace of Allah, victory is ours. Joy Bangla.

Major Zia’s broadcast from a small radio station in Chittagong, Bangladesh was picked up by a Japanese ship in the Bay of Bengal. It was later rebroadcast by Radio Australia and the BBC.

As the Pakistani military crackdown in East Pakistan began, the United States, under President Richard Nixon and his future Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, chose to side with the military rulers of Pakistan in a policy that came to be known as "The Tilt". Richard Nixon chose to turn a blind eye to the genocide in Bangladesh and ordered the United States government to covertly support the Pakistani crackdown with arms and intelligence in defiance of the United States Congress. Nixon’s position was succinctly captured in a handwritten note that stated: "To all hands. Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time - RMN."

The U.S. consulate in Dhaka, however, laid bare the atrocities that Nixon chose to pay for and support. Consul General Archer Blood would become a Bangladeshi hero in defiance of his government. On March 28, 1971, Blood sent a telegram to the Secretary of State entitled "Selective Genocide":

1. Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak Military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down

2. Among those marked for extinction in addition to the A.L. hierarchy are student leaders and university faculty. In this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman head of the philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of the department of history, have been killed. Razzak of the political science department is rumored dead. Also on the list are the bulk of MNA’s elect and number of MPA’s.

3. Moreover, with the support of the Pak[istani] Military. non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people’s quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus. The streets of Dacca are aflood with hindus and others seeking to get out of Dacca. Many bengalis have sought refuge in homes of Americans, most of whom are extending shelter.

…

5. Full horror of Pak military atrocities will come to light sooner of later. I, therefore, question continued advisability of present USG [U.S. government] posture of pretending to believe GOP [government of Pakistan] false assertions and denying, for understood reasons, that this office is communicating detailed account of events in East Pakistan. We should be expressing our shock, at least privately to GOP, at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military. I, of course, would have to be identified as source of information and presumably GOP would ask me to leave. I do not believe safety of American community would be threatened as a consequence, but our communication capability would be compromised.

On March 29, 1971 the American Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State with similar concerns:

Am deeply shocked at massacre by Pakistani military in east Pakistan, appalled at possibility these atrocities are being committed with American equipment, and greatly concerned at United States vulnerability to damaging allegations of association with reign of military terror. I believe USG: (A) should promptly, publicly and prominently deplore this brutality, (B) should privately lay it on line with GOP and so advise GOI [government of India], and (C) should announce unilateral abrogation of one-time exception military supply agreement, and suspension of all military deliveries under 1967 restrictive policy (spare parts, ammo, non-lethal, etc.). It most important these actions be taken now, prior to inevitable and imminent emergence of horrible truths and prior to communist initiatives to exploit situation. This is time when principles make best politics.

The Nixon administration, however, did not heed Ambassador Keating’s advice or warning. The United States continued to support Pakistan until the very end.

On March 30, 1971 Blood sent another telegram noting the killing of students and faculty at Dhaka University:

American serving with FAO in East Pakistan visited Congen March 30 to report on tour of Dacca University March 27. Was told weapons students had at Iqbal Hall served only to infuriate army. Students either shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups. Saw tightly packed pile of approximately twenty five corpses. Was told this was last batch of bodies remaining, others having been disposed of by army. While there, empty army truck arrived to remove bodies. Major atrocity recounted to him took place at Kokeya Girls’ Hall, where building set ablaze and girls machine-gunned as they fled building. (USIS local who lives nearby confirms girls gunned down.) Girls had no weapons, forty killed. Attacks aimed at eliminating female student leadership, since army apparently told girl student activists resided there. Estimated 1,000 persons, mostly students, but including faculty members resident in dorms, killed. He claimed university contacts who conducted him on tour had been noted for their reliability for information in past. Told all university files burned by army in what appeared be purposeful move.

On March 31, 1971 Blood sent a telegram summing up the goal of the Pakistan military:

1. We are still hard put to estimate number of casualties that have occurred and are continuing to occur as result of military crackdown. The most conservative estimate of number of students killed in university is 500 and has ranged as high as 1,000. Police sources indicate that from 600-800 East Pakistani police were killed in Dacca during the really hard fighting on night of the 25th. The number of casualties in the old city where army troops burned Hindu and Bengali areas and shot occupants as they came tumbling out is also difficult to estimate. Most observers put these casualties in the range of 2,000 to 4,000. At this juncture, then, we would estimate that perhaps as many as 4,000 to 6,000 people thus far have lost their lives as a result of military action. We have no information of military casualties but we gather some occurred during encounter with police who were well dug in at police lines.

2. It seems clear that the whole objective of the West Pak army apparently was and is to hit hard and terrorize population into submission. All evidence suggests they have been fairly successful.

Finally on April 6, 1971 Archer Blood sent a telegram known as the "Blood Telegram". It was signed by 29 American government officials and strongly dissented from the American government policy toward Pakistan. The telegram was entitled "Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan":

 1. Aware of the task force proposals on "openess’, in the foreign service, and with the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numorous officers of Amcongen Dacca, USAID Dacca and USIS Dacca consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and derservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya a message defending democracy, comdemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan, our interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter of a soverign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage our nation’s position as a moral leader of the free world.

…

I believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangla Desh. At the moment we possess the good will of the Awami League. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser. [Emphasis added by me.]

For his dissent from Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s policy, Archer Blood was recalled to Washington. To millions of Bengalis Archer Blood remains a hero. He died September 3, 2004 at his home in Fort Collins, Colorado. Joe Gallaway, himself an American treasure, paid tribute to Archer Blood as an American Hero.

The Pakistani military atrocities spread across all of East Pakistan after the initial assault on Dhaka. Bengalis fled the country in millions to escape the killings. A guerilla army formed under the leadership of rebel military officers and organized student activists. This guerilla army, known as the Mukti Juddha in Bengali, fought a war of attrition with the Pakistani army until December, 1971. The Pakistani army was constantly harassed by the Bangladeshi resistance. In response the Pakistani army slaughtered more Bengalis. Bangladesh received substantial miltary, diplomatic and moral support from India during the war. India sheltered and housed over 10 million Bangladeshi refugees and successfully lobbied at the United Nations against the Pakistani and American alliance. On December 3, 1971 India formally joined the war on behalf of Bangladesh. In less than two weeks the Indian army overran the isolated and demoralized Pakistani army.

The Pakistan army, on the verge of defeat, was determined to wipe out Bengali culture in one final act of barbarism. On December 14, 1971, the Pakistan army unleased the paramilitary units al-Badr and al-Shams to exterminate Bengali intellectuals. The goal was to find and kill Bengali political thinkers, educators, scientists, poets, doctors, lawyers, journalists and other intellectuals. The al-Badr and al-Shams fanned out with lists of names to find and execute the core of the Bengali intellectuals. The intellectuals were arrested and taken to Rayerbazar, a marshy area in Dhaka city. There, they were gunned down with their eyes blindfolded and their hands tied behind their backs. Over 1000 dead intellectuals were slaughtered in Dhaka city alone on the night of December 14.

On December 16, 1971 the Pakistani army in Bangladesh formally surrendered. At the cost of three million dead the nation of Bangladesh was born. It was the most concentrated act of genocide of the Twentieth Century. Thirty-five years after the birth of the nation, many have forgotten the sacrifices of those who are no longer with us. But for those of us who survived, for our parents who kept us safe through the months of terror, there is no erasing the horrors of 1971.

We, the children of genocide, on this day remember our fallen. Those who died are remembered in silent black and white pictures hanging on practically every Bangladeshi’s home. The pictures are usually of someone young, a boy or a girl, a brother or a sister, who was killed in a ditch, or maybe in their home, whose body was either found floating in a river or a pond, or who simply "disappeared". We, the children of genocide, understand the true nature of war. There is no glory in it - only inhumanity and death. Only loved ones not with us, only images of terror as army boots kick down your door in the middle of the night, only the warmth of a mother’s arms as planes come in for another strafing run.

I am scarred by the legacy of 1971. I despise war. I cannot understand why anyone would launch a war of choice. Those who have never suffered war cannot fathom its evils. My wish for the reader who has not suffered war is that war is never visited upon you. In 1971 the people of Bangladesh fought to survive, we fought the extermination of our society. They slaughtered millions of us yet they did not prevail. The end of the war was a forgone conclusion at the very beginning. Having launched the war, Pakistan was condemned to lose it. Yet, they killed three million before they finally accepted defeat. Why?

So, today I say "Joi Bangla". The phrase means "Victory for Bangla". Ours was a victory over extermination. Never forget.

Today Mohammad Yunus accepted the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize at a ceremony in Oslo, Norway. He shares the Nobel Prize jointly with Grameen Bank, the microcredit bank he founded. While Bangladesh teeters on the brink, the ceremony at Oslo City Hall offered hope at a time of disturbing developments in the country.

Professor Yunus’s Nobel Lecture today was a call to arms on the global war on poverty. Below are excerpts from his speech. The full text is available here. A video of the ceremony is available here.

By giving us this prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has given important support to the proposition that peace is inextricably linked to poverty. Poverty is a threat to peace.

World’s income distribution gives a very telling story. Ninety four percent of the world income goes to 40 percent of the population while sixty percent of people live on only 6 per cent of world income. Half of the world population lives on two dollars a day. Over one billion people live on less than a dollar a day. This is no formula for peace.

The new millennium began with a great global dream. World leaders gathered at the United Nations in 2000 and adopted, among others, a historic goal to reduce poverty by half by 2015. Never in human history had such a bold goal been adopted by the entire world in one voice, one that specified time and size. But then came September 11 and the Iraq war, and suddenly the world became derailed from the pursuit of this dream, with the attention of world leaders shifting from the war on poverty to the war on terrorism. Till now over $ 530 billion has been spent on the war in Iraq by the USA alone.

I believe terrorism cannot be won over by military action. Terrorism must be condemned in the strongest language. We must stand solidly against it, and find all the means to end it. We must address the root causes of terrorism to end it for all time to come. I believe that putting resources into improving the lives of the poor people is a better strategy than spending it on guns.

…

I believe that we can create a poverty-free world because poverty is not created by poor people. It has been created and sustained by the economic and social system that we have designed for ourselves; the institutions and concepts that make up that system; the policies that we pursue.

Poverty is created because we built our theoretical framework on assumptions which under-estimates human capacity, by designing concepts, which are too narrow (such as concept of business, credit- worthiness, entrepreneurship, employment) or developing institutions, which remain half-done (such as financial institutions, where poor are left out). Poverty is caused by the failure at the conceptual level, rather than any lack of capability on the part of people.

I firmly believe that we can create a poverty-free world if we collectively believe in it. In a poverty-free world, the only place you would be able to see poverty is in the poverty museums. When school children take a tour of the poverty museums, they would be horrified to see the misery and indignity that some human beings had to go through. They would blame their forefathers for tolerating this inhuman condition, which existed for so long, for so many people.

A human being is born into this world fully equipped not only to take care of him or herself, but also to contribute to enlarging the well being of the world as a whole. Some get the chance to explore their potential to some degree, but many others never get any opportunity, during their lifetime, to unwrap the wonderful gift they were born with. They die unexplored and the world remains deprived of their creativity, and their contribution.

Grameen has given me an unshakeable faith in the creativity of human beings. This has led me to believe that human beings are not born to suffer the misery of hunger and poverty.

To me poor people are like bonsai trees. When you plant the best seed of the tallest tree in a flower-pot, you get a replica of the tallest tree, only inches tall. There is nothing wrong with the seed you planted, only the soil-base that is too inadequate. Poor people are bonsai people. There is nothing wrong in their seeds. Simply, society never gave them the base to grow on. All it needs to get the poor people out of poverty for us to create an enabling environment for them. Once the poor can unleash their energy and creativity, poverty will disappear very quickly.

Let us join hands to give every human being a fair chance to unleash their energy and creativity.

Congratulations Professor Yunus.

When George W Bush was presented the Iraq Study Group report last week, according to Lawrence Eagleburger, Mr. Bush’s reaction was "Where’s my drink?"

Since its release, the report has been much maligned from both sides of the political aisle. In my previous post, I wrote that the report was significant because its assessment of the situation in Iraq has neutered Mr. Bush’s argument about "progress" in Iraq. It has also quite clearly demonstrated Mr. Bush’s foreign policy as an utter failure. While the right is making a valiant attempt to discredit the report, I think the damage has already been done. Mr. Bush will need that drink, he may even huff and puff, but I stand by my assertion that the foreign policy of the United States is no longer in the hands of this president. He has been put in a corner like a petulant preschooler.

My previous post focused on the "Assessment" part of the report. This post will address the 79 recommendations. As I mentioned earlier, I think the report’s central failure is its recommendation that Iraqi forces be trained by the U.S. military into 2008. The recommendations, taken together, really are not recommendations at all. It seems to me the recommendations themselves are simply criticisms of Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy - the recommendations point out specific failures that have led us to the Iraq of today as spelled out in the "Assessment".

The recommendations are in three parts. First, Mr. Bush’s failure to engage in regional diplomacy. Second, Mr. Bush’s failure to pursue national reconciliation. Third, Mr. Bush’s failure to properly train and equip the Iraqi security forces. The failures together have facilitated Iraq’s slide into chaos. The report holds out the hope that if those failures are remedied immediately there is a chance that chaos may be averted in Iraq. I have my doubts.

Mr. Bush’s failure in Iraq is rooted in the same failure that led to the war in the first place. It is a failure to grasp reality. When ideology drives policy, reality is not that important to the ideologues. However, reality has a way of asserting itself. The report explains the basics to Mr. Bush:

Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals. [p.95]

While the rest of the world understood that the insurgency in Iraq was complex, Mr. Bush and his lackeys "knew" that it was al Qaeda and a few "dead-enders". Therefore, no effort was expended finding out about the nature of the enemy:

While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.

…

Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode those devices. [pp. 93-94]

You see, Mr. Bush knows they are "evil-doers". So, it is not important to know what motivates them and how they operate. A smarter or more curious man might think it was important to know your enemy’s motivations so that you can combat your enemy more effectively. But not this president.

The two recommendations that follow, recommendations 77 and 78, after the ISG points out our lack of knowledge about our enemy are almost cursory.

The report points out the importance of engaging Iraq’s neighbors. The reason is quite simple - all of Iraq’s neighbors have a stake in a stable Iraq, almost certainly more of a stake than the United States:

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq’s neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of the Iraqi state. [p. 47]

Given the importance of engaging Iraq’s neighbors, it is striking how little has been accomplished in this area. To date, Iraq has not yet established a working embassy even in Saudi Arabia [recommendation 2].

The report also states that Iran and Syria should be engaged without preconditions:

Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions. [p. 50]

Engaging one’s enemy is anathema to the Decider - he has already scoffed at the idea. However, Mr. Bush does not hold many cards and an ostrich is sometimes forced to pull its head out of the sand if it wants to breathe. Recommendations 9 and 16 offer carrots to Iran and Syria to sit down at the bargaining table. Those two recommendations have already set the tone for U.S. foreign policy, sooner or later Mr. Bush will be forced to follow, or remain irrelevant.

It is in the area of national reconciliation where the report breaks important ground. A number of the ideas have been proposed separately in the past. The report ties them together within a coherent strategy with a nice payoff at the end:

The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. [p.67]

To that end, recommendation 34 calls for the issue of U.S. force presence in Iraq to be on the table for any national reconciliation dialogue. This is a far cry from Mr. Bush’s belligerent tone to date.

The report proposes the reversal of the disastrous de-baathification process (recommendation 27) and it calls for oil revenue to be shared based on population (recommendation 28). The oil revenue recommendation specifically addresses the ambiguity that exists in the current draft of the Iraqi constitution. The report calls for the revenue from future oil fields to also be shared based on population. This recommendation is essential to bringing the Sunnis into the national reconciliation process.

The report punts on the most difficult, and perhaps the most intractable, of Iraq’s issues - Kirkuk. Recommendation 30 does suggest wisely that the referendum of the future of Kirkuk be postponed to avoid violence. In many ways, the Kirkuk problem is beginning to resemble the Kashmir issue in the Indian sub-continent - what is popular at the local level may not necessarily be in the national interest. Unsurprisingly, Kurds led by Massoud Barzani (and parroted by Jalal Talabani) have been critical of the report because it favors more central control of Iraq than the Kurds would prefer. The Kurdish claim to Kirkuk and its oil revenues are directly challenged by the report.

Above all, the report stresses the importance of talking to your enemies - the essential ingredient of national reconciliation. It proposes far-reaching amnesty (recommendation 31), engaging all parties, including Moqtada al-Sadr (recommendation 35), and less meddling by the United States:

Recommendation 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.

As part of national reconciliation, the report proposes the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the militias:

The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence against institutions of the state. However, solving the problem of militias requires national reconciliation.

…

Because the United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should not be involved in implementing such a program. [pp.68-69]

The report recommends the presence of neutral international experts, who have significant experience from previous civil wars, to facilitate the DDR of militias [recommendation 38]. It is Mr. Bush’s failure to recognize the conflict for what it is that has prevented this essential step in national reconciliation from taking place.

While the report, in my opinion, errs in the area of training security forces, it nonetheless does offer one very important and necessary recommendation:

Recommendation 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.

This recommendation is important for two reasons. First, the Iraqi National Police is geared toward counterinsurgency and not police work. Therefore, it does not belong under the Ministry of Interior. The Iraqi Police Service, which does police work, is the appropriate force to be under the Ministry of Interior. Second and more importantly, by moving the Iraqi National Police out from under the MOI (which is under Shia militia control), Shia militia control of the force is diluted. It should come as no surprise that SCIRI has condemned this recommendation so harshly.

The ISG report is focused on bringing parties into the national reconciliation process. This is something the Bush Administration should have been pursuing from the start. The report makes overtures toward the Shia nationalists (Sadrists) as well as the Iraqi Sunnis, the ethnic minority. It does point to the essential formula of a future stable Iraq, if one is to emerge from this chaos. In any national reconciliation, the stronger group must make accomodations to include the weaker group if peace is to be the outcome. The report thus recognizes the importance of bringing the Iraqi Sunnis into the dialogue. This is in marked contrast to the "80% solution" being contemplated by the Bush Administration. It seems to me, that taken together, the national reconciliation and the regional diplomacy proposed by the report set the groundwork for an American withdrawal from Iraq.

Upon reading the full report, one wonders why the recommendations of the report have not already been tried by the Bush Administration in the last 3 years. One wonders what they have been doing the last 3 years. While the American military have been taking casualties, it appears that the White House has been out to lunch. That is the result of ignoring reality in favor of ideology.

While it is debatable if  "success" was ever in the cards once Mr. Bush made the ill-informed and ill-conceived decision to invade Iraq, the ISG report makes it clear that whatever hope of  "success" might have existed in Iraq was out of reach for this most incompetent of administrations. That will be the legacy of this report - exposing George W Bush for his incompetence in Iraq the way the television pictures from New Orleans exposed George W Bush’s incompetence in protecting the American people at home.

The long awaited, much anticipated, and often pre-judged Iraq Study Group report was finally unleashed on Washington. Predictably, it was trashed, even before the ink was dry, in the progressive blogosphere for failing to call for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq. However, I think dismissing the report as a "dud" or ridiculing it ignores the very real and consequential substance in the report.

It is important to realize that this report is an intervention. I cannot recall any other time in modern American history when a sitting president has been so publicly and so stunningly rebuked in a time of war. The ISG report strikes at the heart of the American President’s article II power as the commander-in-chief. It accuses President George W Bush of orchestrating, by his own choice, the destabilization of the Middle East and, if left unchecked, the destabilization of the global economy. Make no mistake, this report is an intervention. It is designed to save not the President, but the Presidency and the American body politic. George W Bush has abused his commander-in-chief powers in the prosecution of the Iraq war and this report aims to relieve him of his duties. Regardless of what occurs between now and the end of George W Bush’s term in office, he is no longer driving the ship of state. Mr. Bush has effectively been impeached.

The report itself has two parts. The first part, "Assessment", surveys the current mess in Iraq. The second part, "The Way Forward - A New Approach" lays out the much talked about 79 recommendations for extricating the United States from Iraq. There is also a GWB-sized executive summary, a letter from the co-chairs, and an appendix to the report. In this post, I will cover the first part of the report and the supporting documents. I will do a separate post on the 79 recommendations tomorrow.

 The goal of the report is national consensus, not Iraqi national consensus, but American national consensus:

U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure - as is any course of action in Iraq - if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus. [Letter from the Co-Chairs, p. x]

The implicit charge in the report is that George W Bush has embarked on a foreign misadventure without the consent of the people of this democracy. That kind of behavior may work in a dictatorship, but cannot be sustained in a democracy.

The very first two sentences of the Executive Summary paint a bleak picture for Iraq:

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. [Executive Summary, p. iii]

The ISG report does hold out the hope that all is not lost and the United States can still influence events there, although it may not be able to do so in the near future:

The ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing. [p. 1]

I have argued before that the United States has already lost the ability to influence events positively in Iraq. By staying in Iraq, I believe, the United States acts as a force for continued instability. The ISG apparently believes there is still time to salvage the situation. This belief may be a result of hope and obligation rather than rational analysis:

Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. [p. 2]

While I agree with the statement above, it does not necessarily follow that the national and moral interest is served by staying in Iraq and making one more go at it.

The flaw at the center of the report is the belief that America can control events in Iraq. The report concedes that combat operations by the United States military will not rescue Iraq. Indeed, it calls for a complete withdrawal of all American combat troops by early 2008. However, the report then subscribes to the misguided notion that the problem in Iraq can be solved by training Iraqi security forces:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. [Executive Summary, p. vi]

The problem with Iraqi security forces is not training. Before the United States invaded Iraq, the country had a functioning military and police force, so I doubt they are incapable of training themselves. As the report readily admits, the security forces are infiltrated with sectarian militias - you simply cannot train the "sectarian" out of a militia member. There is also the problem of perception. If the United States remains in Iraq in large numbers and successfully trains the Iraqi security forces (that is, succeeds in making the security forces non-sectarian), those security forces and the government who controls them will be perceived as American puppets. American training, in either instance, will be counter-productive. We will either train militias or we will train American puppets - both will have tragic consequences (as no doubt the incoming Secretary of Defense knows from his experience in Central America).

There is also a puzzling contradiction in the report. In an attempt to avoid an open-ended commitment of American forces in Iraq, the report warns:

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of mile-stones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. [Executive Summary, p. vii]

It is not clear to me why it makes sense to pull out of Iraq if the Iraqi government underperforms. If as the report claims, Iraq is "vital to regional and even global stability", why then would the United States pull out if the ISG believes the United States should stay to stabilize Iraq. To put it another way, according to the report an underperforming Iraqi government will cause the United States to throw in the towel.

While the report fumbles somewhat in charting a viable exit strategy from Iraq, it quite clearly is focused on extricating the United States from Iraq. The report examines a number of alternative approaches and points out their flaws. Most notably the report categorically rejects the "stay the course" policy of George W Bush. It points out that staying the course in Iraq endangers our national security. The report points out, in a section entitled "Staying the Course", that:

Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is constrained. [p. 38]

That leaves only Barney and Mr. Bush on the "stay the course" bandwagon.

The report also rejects a precipitate withdrawal from Iraq as too risky. However, it does not discuss a more orderly withdrawal as an option. The report also rejects John McCain’s plan to send more troops to Iraq as unrealistic:

Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. [p.38]

Finally, the report rejects Joseph Biden’s idea of a partition into three regions due to potential for ethnic cleansing and the inconvenient fact that most of Iraq’s cities have mixed populations. Iraq cannot be so cleanly carved up without a massive movement of people.

The report lays out the facts on the ground that should make it clear to even George W Bush’s dog that Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy has been a failure across the board. It paints a picture of a country in chaos with mass human suffering:

The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.

Six percent of Iraq’s population have been internally displaced and seven percent have fled the country. That means that 13% of the country’s population have fled their homes. Those are staggering statistics.

The report reminds Mr. Bush that both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, which have infiltrated the police, are engaged in sectarian violence and the Badr Brigade in particular is involved in death squad activity. Perhaps if the report were released earlier, Mr. Bush might have chosen not to host a death squad leader at the White House last Monday.

The Iraqi economy is predictably underperforming. The freedom Mr. Bush has given Iraqis has led to misery:

Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation. [p.23]

To compound the problem, reconstruction funds for Iraq have dried up as the Administration struggles to manage the security situation in Iraq:

The administration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. [p.25]

As for the two countries in the Middle East that the Bush Administration does not want to talk to, Mr. Bush’s muddled policy in Iraq serves these two countries just fine:

Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. … One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad."

…

Like Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. [pp.28-29]

In the short term, both Iran and Syria benefit from the chaotic American presence in Iraq. Only by leaving Iraq does the United States focus the attention of Iran and Syria on the need to have a stable neighbor in Iraq.

The report makes clear why there was a need for intervention to save the United States from its president:

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world.

…

If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.

…

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald’s."

…

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. … And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

…

If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. [pp.33-35]

Far from bringing stability to the Middle East and showing American might to its adversaries, George W Bush has weakened America in the eyes of the world. His war of choice has endangered America, the Middle East and the world.

The reality that the report lays out will be hard for Mr. Bush to ignore. The conversation in Washington is no longer how to win in Iraq; it is how to salvage America and Iraq from George W Bush’s blunders. That is the importance of the report. There can now be no denying the stark reality of failure. The discussion has now moved to how best to bring our soldiers home and leave behind some semblance of stability. To that end, the report’s recommendations, however imperfect, can be a starting point for the discussion. The authors of the report readily admit that events on the ground may overtake the recommendations of the report. I believe that Iraq has already reached that point and American presence there is now counterproductive - the authors of the report disagree, at least for now.

Should I stay or should I go?

Sing it now!:

From today’s White House press briefing [hat tip: BarbinMD]:

Q Tony, I’d like to follow up on the al Hakim meeting, if I can, for just a second.

MR. SNOW: Yes, sure.

Q U.S. intelligence and military sources have him intimately connected to death squads, he is closely tied to Iran —

MR. SNOW: "Intimately connected" with death squads? In what sense?

Q Well, that he was responsible for the —

MR. SNOW: That he was giving orders?

Q Yes, it could be giving of — when death squads began to emerge, there are intelligence sources that say he was if not running the show, very closely connected with the policy of implementing it. So that’s number one. Number two, he’s closely tied to Iran. So what’s a guy like this doing in the Oval Office?

MR. SNOW: Well, there are a couple of things — and we addressed the Iran question in the gaggle this morning. This is a man who spent 20 years in Iran when Saddam Hussein was in power, but he’s also made it clear that he sees himself as an Iraqi leader, not somebody who is beholden to Iran.

As regards the issue of militias, certainly they’re going to be discussed in the meeting with the President. What Mr. al Hakim has also done is he has talked about the importance of reconciliation within Iraq. He leads a parliamentary bloc that includes 128 members of the Iraqi parliament. And what the President is going to talk about — I believe the meeting ought to be starting any moment now, and that’s why we’ll give you a readout on it — is the importance of reconciliation, of finding people who will be moderates — Sunni, Shia, and otherwise — who are going to be able to work constructively toward a government that’s going to be operating in conditions of peace.

What you have is a man who has had a number of discussions with this government and continues to, and the President has had conversations with him, and has met with him once before, who represents the largest single — I believe it’s the largest single Shia bloc within the Iraqi parliament. He is a significant force in Iraqi politics, and he’s somebody who can play a very constructive role, and we hope he will.

Some background on today’s White House guest.