Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

On April 16, 1993 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 819. In it the Security Council demanded:

…that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act

A safe area was created around Srebrenica, in the newly formed Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to protect the Bosnian Muslims from the heavily armed Bosnian Serbs that surrounded it. United Nations peacekeepers were deployed to the safe area to protect the unarmed Bosnian Muslims that had taken refuge there.

On July 6, 1995 Bosnian Serb forces under the leadership of Ratko Mladic laid siege to the town of Srebrenica. As the Serb forces began shelling the town, the residents of Srebrenica took refuge with the 600 lightly armed Dutch UN peacekeepers. The Dutch peacekeepers threatened to call in NATO air strikes against the Serb forces - however, after the Serb forces threatened to kill 30 Dutch soldiers they had taken hostage, the airstrikes were called off.

On July 11, 1995 Ratko Mladic and the Serb forces entered the town of Srebrenica. That evening Ratko Mladic and the Dutch commander, Colonel Ton Kerremans, shared a drink together.

The next day the Serb forces separated the women and children from the men. All men from the age of 12 to 77 were held for "interrogations". The women and children, all 23,000 of them, were bussed out of Srebrenica.

On July 13, 1995 the Dutch peacekeepers handed over 5000 Bosnian Muslim men for 14 Dutch soldiers that were captured by the Serb forces. On that same day the killings began. By the time the Dutch were allowed to leave Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb forces had massacred over 7000 unarmed men.

The Srebrenica massacre was the most prominent of many war crimes committed by the Army of Republica Srpska (the Bosnian Serb forces) during the Bosnian War. It was the worst act of genocide in Europe since World War II. It was genocide that occurred as the United Nations and the so-called international community literally stood idle by.

The Bosnian Serbs were supported, equipped and funded by the government of Serbia during the Bosnian War. It is widely accepted that the Bosnian Serb forces were a proxy army for Serbia and Serbia’s leader Slobodan Milosevic. In fact, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in its indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, called the Serbia-Bosnian Serb nexus a "joint criminal enterprise":

6. Slobodan MILOSEVIC participated in the joint criminal enterprise as set out below. The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as "Bosnia and Herzegovina" ), through the commission of crimes which are in violation of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal.

7. The joint criminal enterprise was in existence by 1 August 1991 and continued until at least 31 December 1995. The individuals participating in this joint criminal enterprise included Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC, General Ratko MLADIC, Borisav JOVIC, Branko KOSTIC, Veljko KADIJEVIC, Blagoje ADZIC, Milan MARTIC, Jovica STANISIC, Franko SIMATOVIC, also known as "Frenki," Radovan STOJICIC, also known as "Badza," Vojislav SESELJ, Zeljko RAZNATOVIC, also known as "Arkan," and other known and unknown participants.

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment against Milosevic were "Genocide" and "Complicity in Genocide" for crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Croats during the Bosnian War, specifically including the massacre in Srebrenica:

32. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation and execution of the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina, including: Bijeljina; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Doboj; Foca; Sarajevo (Ilijas); Kljuc; Kotor Varos; Sarajevo (Novi Grad); Prijedor; Rogatica; Sanski Most; Srebrenica; Visegrad; Vlasenica and Zvornik. The destruction of these groups was effected by:

a) The widespread killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, during and after the take-over of territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those listed above, as specified in Schedule A to this indictment. In many of the territories, educated and leading members of these groups were specifically targeted for execution, often in accordance with pre-prepared lists. After the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, almost all captured Bosnian Muslim men and boys, altogether several thousands, were executed at the places where they had been captured or at sites to which they had been transported for execution.  [Emphasis in last sentence added by me.]

However, on February 26, 2007, in a stunning decision, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide but the state of Serbia was not responsible:

In a 171-page ruling, the International Court of Justice said the massacre of thousands of Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces at the U.N.-protected Srebrenica enclave was an act of genocide.

But the 15-judge panel rejected Bosnia’s claim that the Serbian state was responsible for the killing, saying it did not have effective control over the Bosnian Serb forces it had helped arm and finance. Instead, the judges ruled that Serbia stood by and allowed the massacre to happen.

In the first test of the Genocide Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) since its inception, the international community failed to hold a state party accountable for the actions of its proxy force. The Convention, enacted in the aftermath of the Holocaust, was designed to prevent or punish precisely the kind of crimes that took place in Srebrenica. By failing to find Serbia guilty of genocide, the verdict has effectively sanctioned genocide by proxy.

The ICJ judgment sets a very high bar for state responsibility for genocide. The judgment states:

 -     The test of responsibility

          In order to ascertain whether the international responsibility of the Respondent can have been incurred, on whatever basis, in connection with the massacres committed in the Srebrenica area during the period in question, the Court must consider three questions in turn.  First, it needs to be determined whether the acts of genocide could be attributed to the Respondent on the basis that those acts where committed by its organs or persons whose acts are attributable to it under customary rules of State Responsibility.  Second, the Court needs to ascertain whether acts of the kind referred to in Article III, paragraphs (b) to (e), of the Convention, other than genocide itself, were committed by persons or organs whose conduct is attributable to the Respondent.  Finally, it will be for the Court to rule on the issue as to whether the Respondent complied with its twofold obligation deriving from Article I of the Convention to prevent and punish genocide. 

-     The question of attribution of the Srebrenica genocide to the Respondent on the basis of the conduct of its organs

The first of these two questions relates to the well-established rule, one of the cornerstones of the law of State responsibility, that the conduct of any State organ is to be considered an act of the State under international law, and therefore gives rise to the responsibility of the State if it constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.

          When applied to the present case, this rule first calls for a determination whether the acts of genocide committed in Srebrenica were perpetrated by “persons or entities” having the status of organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as the Respondent was known at the time) under its internal law, as then in force.  According to the Court, it must be said that there is nothing which could justify an affirmative response to this question.  It has not been shown that the FRY army took part in the massacres, nor that the political leaders of the FRY had a hand in preparing, planning or in any way carrying out the massacres.  It is true that there is much evidence of direct or indirect participation by the official army of the FRY, along with the Bosnian Serb armed forces, in military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years prior to the events at Srebrenica. 

That participation was repeatedly condemned by the political organs of the United Nations, which demanded that the FRY put an end to it.  It has however not been shown that there was any such participation in relation to the massacres committed at Srebrenica.  Further, neither the Republika Srpska, nor the VRS were de jure organs of the FRY, since none of them had the status of organ of that State under its internal law.

          With regard to the particular situation of General Mladić, the Court notes first that no evidence has been presented that either General Mladić or any of the other officers whose affairs were handled by the 30th Personnel Centre in Belgrade were, according to the internal law of the Respondent, officers of the army of the Respondent - a de jure organ of the Respondent.  Nor has it been conclusively established that General Mladić was one of those officers;  and even on the basis that he might have been, the Court does not consider that he would, for that reason alone, have to be treated as an organ of the FRY for the purposes of the application of the rules of State responsibility.  There is no doubt that the FRY was providing substantial support, inter alia, financial support, to the Republika Srpska, and that one of the forms that support took was payment of salaries and other benefits to some officers of the VRS, but the Court considers that this did not automatically make them organs of the FRY.  The particular situation of General Mladić, or of any other VRS officer present at Srebrenica who may have been being “administered” from Belgrade, is not such as to lead the Court to modify the conclusion reached in the previous paragraph. [Emphasis added by me.]

According to the judgment, even though the Bosnian Serb forces were financed by Serbia, to the point where their salaries were paid by Belgrade, they cannot be considered to be an organ of the Serbian state. Furthermore, even though it can be shown that the Serbian army has participated directly and indirectly in military operations in Bosnia, since they did not participate in the massacre at Srebrenica, Serbia cannot be held responsible.

The legacy of the ICJ verdict is that as long as a government can maintain plausible deniability, it cannot be held liable for genocide committed by proxy local forces that are on its payroll. Many governments who have been accused of genocide because their proxies carried out mass killings will no doubt breathe a sigh of relief. From the genocide in Bangladesh in 1971 by local collaborators of the Pakistani army to the Sabra and Shatila massacre carried out by Israel’s proxy force in Lebanon to the Darfur genocide carried out by the Sudanese government-backed Janjaweed militia, the search for justice just became exceedingly difficult.

The impact on future conflicts also promises to be great. In an age where conventional wars are being replaced by proxy confrontations, the international community’s ability to hold accountable the ultimate lords of war has now been compromised.

The law is the last recourse of the powerless. This week international law failed the victims of Bosnia and all powerless victims of the evils of state sponsored genocide and terror.

I am always wary when religion and politics are mixed. I am especially wary when the politics of religion is disguised as charity. As a Muslim in America, and as a blogger, I have always attempted to raise the warning flag when I have seen a dangerous politicization of Islam, or when I have seen attacks upon Islam motivated by hate only. In the post-9/11 world I think it is important as a Muslim to explain the religion to non-Muslims in an attempt to foster understanding and hopefully some sanity.

Islam is one of the world’s major religions. It stands on its own. However, when the religion is politicized (as with all religions), bad things happen.

It is with the above in mind, I was quite perturbed when I came across a "Quran Distribution Project" at the blog Eteraz.org. The idea of this project is to donate 1000 copies of English translations of the Koran to "Western mosques and prisons". The project asks readers to donate money to raise $30,000 to help purchase the 1000 copies. Another post offers to give out a free copy of the Koran to Muslims who desire one, and directs non-Muslims to CAIR for their free complementary copy.

I will leave aside my concerns about a political blog raising money to distribute a religious text for a moment. I will focus on the project itself. The project aims to send copies of the an English translation of the Koran by a man named Mohammad Azad, who converted to Islam and became a citizen of Pakistan and Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations. The blog claims that his translation is more accurate than the "Saudi sponsored" translations. In fact, it claims that this translation is the most authoritative English translation of the Koran:

At the Eteraz.Org homepage you will see a large gray box asking for donations. We are trying to raise $30,000 to purchase 1000 copies of the Muhammad Asad Translation and Tafsir (Exegesis) of the Glorious Quran. This work is considered the most authoritative English translation/commentary and corrects a number of errors in the Saudi sponsored Qurans proliferating in the U.S.

…
This particular translation and exegesis is one of the most authoritative in the English language. The edition we are purchasing is also very aesthetically pleasing. Pictures: 1, 2, 3. This project will be the Islamic blogosphere’s first major money raising project. I believe it will be a success and will demonstrate that the global Islamic netroots is alive and powerful; and a force for positive action.

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At the current time, the only English translation which provides in depth commentary on every verse is "The Noble Quran", distributed by the Saudi Arabian King Fahd Center For Printing of the Holy Quran. That translation does not provide any actual exegesis; merely references to various ahadith that relate to some of the verses. In that sense, it is not comprehensive; nevermind the fact that many of the ahadith themselves are far too nuanced for average Muslims with no scholarly background to understand. Hadith is a complex science that most Muslims, including myself, are not equipped to understand. It is no wonder that people reading this Quran often quote verses out of context and often for extremist causes.

The Abdullah Yusuf Ali translation does provide a commentary; however, most authorities believe that the Muhammad Asad commentary is far superior.

…

Studies by Quranic scholars have shown that the Saudi Translation interjects, via parantheticals and other devices, ideas and concepts which are foreign to the Quran, starting from Surah Fatiha itself. This is unacceptable. For example, in no previous English translation except the Saudi sponsored has Surah Fatiha contained a reference to Jews and Christians. Through the insertion of the phrases “such as the Jews” and “such as the Christians,” in Surah Fatiha, the Saudi rendition fixes the meaning of the expressions “those with anger upon them” and “those who are astray.” Such errors and additions in translations merely begin at Surah Fatiha.

Unfortunately, English speaking Muslims have not had a viable alternative because many of us receive our Qurans from free through the charity of the Saudi government. It is our hope to introduce copies of a better, more authentic translation into Muslim channels. For free, God willing.

The blog also has a separate post describing why this translation is better than the "Saudi sponsored" translation.

Let me point out that Muslims believe that the Koran can only be understood when read in the original Arabic. All translations of the Koran into other languages, including English, are considered to be "interpretations" and not translations. Having said that, it is important to debunk a lot of misinformation contained in the posts on this topic at Eteraz.org. If the argument for distributing the Koran, and asking readers for money, is that other translations are inadequate and there is a compelling need to push a particular translation, the argument has to be based on fact and not assertion.

First, it is not the case that the Muhammad Asad "translation" is considered the most authoritative English translation of the Koran. It is a worthy translation, one amongst many. The two most widely read and available English translations of the Koran are the Abdullah Yusuf Ali version and the Marmaduke William Pickthall version (I happen to have both). The Yusuf Ali version is widely regarded as one of the most authoritative versions in existence today. In fact, the "Saudi sponsored" translation that Eteraz.org cites is in fact the Yusuf Ali translation and not some wahhabi text serving the will of the Saudi government. It is also worth noting that Yusuf Ali was an Indian and not a Saudi. If I were to venture a guess, I would bet the few dollars in my pocket that if you counted up all English translations of the Koran ever sold, the Yusuf Ali version would come out on top by a large margin.

Second, Eteraz.org also claims that:

Studies by Quranic scholars have shown that the Saudi Translation interjects, via parantheticals and other devices, ideas and concepts which are foreign to the Quran, starting from Surah Fatiha itself. This is unacceptable.

He is once again referring to the Yusuf Ali version, and claiming that it is the "Saudi Translation". The Yusuf Ali version does indeed contain "parantheticals". So do many other versions, the Picktall and Shakir translations come immediately to mind. As an example of "parantheticals", please see the translation of Surah Fatiha (the first surah in the Koran) by Yusuf Ali, Pickthall and Shakir side-by-side at the University of Southern California Compendium of Muslim Texts project. Clearly, it is not "unacceptable" to use "parantheticals". Given the complexity of translating the Koran from its original Arabic to English, "parantheticals and other devices" are an accepted tool of translation.

Third, Eteraz.org claims that:

For example, in no previous English translation except the Saudi sponsored has Surah Fatiha contained a reference to Jews and Christians. Through the insertion of the phrases “such as the Jews” and “such as the Christians,” in Surah Fatiha, the Saudi rendition fixes the meaning of the expressions “those with anger upon them” and “those who are astray.” Such errors and additions in translations merely begin at Surah Fatiha.

This claim feeds the fear of the Saudi government as anti-Semites and anti-Christians. While it might be convenient to bring the politics of Saudi Arabia into this religious discussion, it must still be based in fact. Click here to read the English translation of Surah Fatiha at the Saudi King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an. As is claimed, "phrases ’such as the Jews’ and ’such as the Christians’" are not "inserted" into the Surah Fatiha in the Saudi translation. As a note, there are many worthy translations (as I will list below) that the reader can examine other than the one available at the King Fahd Complex.

Fourth, Eteraz.org claims that:

Unfortunately, English speaking Muslims have not had a viable alternative because many of us receive our Qurans from free through the charity of the Saudi government. It is our hope to introduce copies of a better, more authentic translation into Muslim channels. For free, God willing.

The above statement is patently false. As I noted above, most English speakers use either the Pickthall version or the Yusuf Ali version. All the popular and scholarly English translations are available free online or via bookstores (and for you online types, Amazon is a great resource).

Finally, on a more humorous note, part of the reason Eteraz.org cited for pushing this particular translation of the Koran is that it contains "depth" commentary that helps the common man "understand" Islam. Many other translations (notably the Yusuf Ali translation) contain commentary. Of course, commentary on religious texts is always risky business. To bolster the argument, Eteraz.org presents us with commentary in his preferred translation that tries to tackle a troublesome passage in the Koran. Specifically, verse 34 of the fourth Surah, "The Women". In this verse, some translated versions seem to suggest that wives should be beaten if they are unfaithful. Eteraz.org explains why the commentary in the Muhammad Asad translation is "valuable":

However, the reason the Asad Quran is more valuable than the Noble Quran is because it offers a comprehensive commentary at the bottom of the page which The Noble Quran does not, and in that commentary, beating is invalidated.

It is this commentary, running throughout the Asad Quran, which is the reason for our support of the Muhammad Asad Quran. It is probably a good idea to expose more Muslims to commentary on Quranic verses, instead of letting them figure out what a verse means on their own, since more knowledge is better than less.

By reading the commentary in the Asad Quran, the reasonable Muslim will become convinced that beating is not a good idea. Meanwhile, The Saudi Noble Quran, which has no commentary, leaves the average reader with the impression that beating is OK.

I am not sure that I agree that is "a good idea to expose more Muslims to commentary on Quranic verses, instead of letting them figure out what a verse means on their own, since more knowledge is better than less." I kind of like the idea of figuring out things. I think suggesting that Muslims should rely on commentary rather than figuring things out sounds more like indoctrination than knowledge (as they say, when in doubt, use the source Luke!). Nonetheless, let’s go to Asad’s explaining away this passage (as quoted in Eteraz.org):

On the basis of these Traditions, all the authorities stress that this "beating", if resorted to at all, should be more or less symbolic - "with a toothbrush, or some such thing" (Tabari, quoting the views of scholars of the earliest times), or even "with a folded handkerchief" (Razi); and some of the greatest Muslim scholars ( e.g., Ash-Shafi’i) are of the opinion that it is just barely permissible, and should preferably be avoided: and they justify this opinion by the Prophet’s personal feelings with regard to this problem.

I am not sure whether this commentary is valuable or simply humorous. I guess a good Muslim will take away from this commentary that we should take a toothbrush or a folded handkerchief to our wives, and beatings "should preferably be avoided". Oh good, beating is ok then - as long as I’ve tried the toothbrush technique first!

I am always wary of any form of "thumping", whether it be "Bible thumping" or "Koran thumping". The project proposed by Eteraz.org seems to me to be Koran thumping.

If the goal is to spread an understanding of Islam, I recommend pointing readers to the many authoritative translations of the Koran as well as many worthy books on Islam. There is absolutely no need to push one version over the other - and certainly not on the basis of false or misleading assertions. For those readers who are interested in the Koran, feel free to peruse the following free online versions or versions that you can purchase on Amazon.com.:

Free Online versions:

• Side-by-side text of three major translations (Yusuf Ali, Pickthall, Shakir) at USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts.
• Four major translations (Yusuf Ali, Pickthall, Shakir, Palmer, Rodwell) available online at sacred-texts.com.
• Yusuf Ali, Pickthall and Shakir translations available separately at SUNY Buffalo.

Translations in book form available at Amazon.com:

• "The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an" by Yusuf Ali (leather-bound version). This is by far the most widely read and cited English text of the Koran.
• "The Glorious Qur’an" by Marmaduke William Pickthall.
• "The Qur’an" by H.M. Shakir.
• "The Message of the Qur’an" by Muhammad Asad.
• "The Koran: The Holy Book of Islam with Introduction and Notes" by E.H. Palmer and Reynold Nicholson

There are many other translations. Feel free to choose any one as a starting point. If you are doing scholarly research, you need to read multiple translations and preferably the original text of the Koran in Arabic.

Finally, there are a number of very good books on Islam. One of my favorites is No god but God, a recent book by Reza Aslan. No one book will give you an understanding of Islam or any religion - similarly, reading a translation of the Koran will not give you a full understanding of Islam. Like the study of any religion, the study of Islam is not a one-stop deal - the reader will benefit from multiple viewpoints and multiple sources. Anyone who pushes one at the expense of others is selling you something. Beware false prophets.

An Inconvenient Truth just won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. Congratulations to Al Gore.

Let the 2008 Presidential race begin.

The Bush Administration has been very successful in controlling the debate on the Iraq war. In a remarkable bit of political jujitsu the Administration pivoted from the findings of the Iraq Study Group that the United States should withdraw from Iraq to a debate on whether to escalate the war or not. By introducing the "surge" into the debate the Administration effectively tied the Democrats in a knot. Instead of debating the withdrawal from Iraq, the Democrats in both the House and the Senate have been debating whether to "surge" or not to "surge" - the withdrawal question was buried deep while the Democrats looked for a politically safe position against an escalation in Iraq. The Democrats have been embarrassingly outmaneuvered. It is time to put the political mathematics aside and debate the national interest. It is time to shift the debate back to the question of withdrawal from Iraq.

There is a strong argument to be made that an withdrawal from Iraq is the best strategic option available to the United States. I contend that the United States is the major destabilizing force in Iraq. I further contend that the longer the United States remains in Iraq, the more unstable Iraq will become. Iraq cannot begin the process of stabilizing until the United States withdraws from Iraq. Finally, the consequences of an American withdrawal from Iraq will not be chaos (as the Administration contends), but a more stable Iraq.

It is time to make the case for a strategic withdrawal from Iraq.

Today in the Washington Post, Toby Dodge, formerly of SOAS, presents a cautionary tale about the British experience in Mesopotamia. He argues that the Bush Administration is reliving the sad history of the British in Iraq:

At the center of Baghdad’s neglected North Gate War Cemetery, near the edge of the old city walls, stands an imposing grave. Sheltered from the weather by a grandiose red sandstone cupola, it is the final resting place of a man from whom George W. Bush could have learned a great deal about the perils of intervening in Iraq.

Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Stanley Maude was head of the British army in Mesopotamia when he marched into Baghdad on a hot, dusty day in March 1917. Soon thereafter, he issued the British government’s "Proclamation to the People of Baghdad," which eerily foreshadowed sentiments that Bush and his administration would express 86 years later: British forces, Maude declared, had entered the city not as conquerors, but as liberators.

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Maude did not live to see the failure of his efforts to rally the people of Iraq to the British occupation. He died eight months later, having contracted cholera from a glass of milk.

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In an echo of what is happening under the U.S. occupation, hopes for a joint Anglo-Iraqi pact to rebuild the country were dashed by a violent uprising. On July 2, 1920, a revolt, or thawra, broke out along the lower Euphrates, fueled by popular resentment of Britain’s heavy-handed behavior in Iraq. The British army had set about taxing the population to pay for the building of the Iraqi state, while British civil servants running the administration refused to consult Iraqi politicians, judging them too inexperienced to play a role in the new government.

Dodge goes on to chronicle the failure of the British to stabilize Iraq. Ultimately, after the loss of much "blood and treasure" and loss of popular support at home, the British government belatedly declared "victory" and withdrew from Iraq. They left behind a legacy that resulted in the reign of Saddam Hussein and the intervention of George W Bush.

Toby Dodge describes what I have often called the logic of occupation. Failure is preordained because ultimately the invader will go home. That inescapable end is always futilely resisted by the occupier - the result is instability and loss of blood and treasure. Dodge describes the three phases of this collapse:

Where does this leave U.S. policy toward Iraq? Historical studies often divide military interventions into three general phases. The first phase, the initial decision to invade, is shaped by common misperceptions that the conflict will be short and that military force can be used to achieve political objectives. World War I began with an assumption that British troops would be home by Christmas; Bush declared "mission accomplished" after three weeks.

The second phase is marked by a slow realization that both these assumptions are wrong. The policy failure leads to increasingly desperate attempts to stay the course, to pour in ever greater numbers of troops, gambling on a resurrection of the initial policy. This middle stage comes to an end with the decision to disengage. Interestingly, this choice — admitting defeat and going home — is usually taken by a new government. [Emphasis added by me.]

Mr. Bush is a victim of forces he has unleashed and he is faithfully playing his time-worn yet ultimately disastrous role as the occupier.

If we are to stop the logic of occupation before it reaches its bitter end, it is time for an intervention - not in Iraq, but regarding Mr. Bush.

General William Odom made the case a few weeks ago for a new strategy in Iraq. In his op-ed entitled "Victory Is Not an Option", he argued in the Washington Post that withdrawal is a precondition for stability and a new strategic direction:

The first and most critical step is to recognize that fighting on now simply prolongs our losses and blocks the way to a new strategy. Getting out of Iraq is the pre-condition for creating new strategic options. Withdrawal will take away the conditions that allow our enemies in the region to enjoy our pain. It will awaken those European states reluctant to collaborate with us in Iraq and the region.

Second, we must recognize that the United States alone cannot stabilize the Middle East.

Third, we must acknowledge that most of our policies are actually destabilizing the region. Spreading democracy, using sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening "regime change," using the hysterical rhetoric of the "global war on terrorism" — all undermine the stability we so desperately need in the Middle East.

Fourth, we must redefine our purpose. It must be a stable region, not primarily a democratic Iraq. We must redirect our military operations so they enhance rather than undermine stability. We can write off the war as a "tactical draw" and make "regional stability" our measure of "victory." That single step would dramatically realign the opposing forces in the region, where most states want stability. Even many in the angry mobs of young Arabs shouting profanities against the United States want predictable order, albeit on better social and economic terms than they now have.

Realigning our diplomacy and military capabilities to achieve order will hugely reduce the numbers of our enemies and gain us new and important allies. This cannot happen, however, until our forces are moving out of Iraq. Why should Iran negotiate to relieve our pain as long as we are increasing its influence in Iraq and beyond? Withdrawal will awaken most leaders in the region to their own need for U.S.-led diplomacy to stabilize their neighborhood.

General Odom has been consistent and consistently right on Iraq. I wrote in March 2006 about his article in Nieman Watchdog where he described the quagmire in Iraq and argued that the precondition for international support and stability in Iraq was an American withdrawal. He was right then, he is right now.

Shortly before the Iraq Study Group released its report, I wrote a post entitled "The Way Forward in Iraq" (please note that I coined "The Way Forward" before both the ISG and Mr. Bush!) where I argued that a post-withdrawal Iraq will not lead to chaos but is more likely to lead to stability. This is what I wrote then and I think it still holds true today:

I think there is a strong case to be made that the American presence in Iraq is fueling the civil war by delaying its resolution. That is not to say that the United States has effective control of the situation on the ground - it does not, but the presence of American troops gives the respective parties cover to arm and consolidate control of areas of the country. Without a doubt, the American presence guarantees that the Kurds in the north are able to consolidate their hold on Kirkuk and beef up the peshmerga. The American presence also allows the Shia factions to consolidate power in the various arms of the government, especially the security forces. The American forces also act as a buffer between the Shia and the Sunni by providing some measure of protection to the Sunni community to arm and consolidate their power in the western parts of Iraq. The American presence has also allowed the systematic ethnic cleansing of Iraq by Shia, Sunni and the Kurds. The ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods in Baghdad and other parts of the country has now effectively drawn geographical battle lines in Iraq’s civil war. The American presence also holds together a fractious Shia coalition that would otherwise collapse, and probably needs to if Iraq is to survive as a nation.

It seems to me that it is essential that the United States pull out of Iraq. After an American pullout, the Iraqi civil war may start to resolve itself. The Iraqi civil war has regional implications. Those regional forces can, without the constraints of American occupation, begin to pull Iraq toward a resolution.

As cited above, one possible outcome is military victory by one warring side. The conventional wisdom is that if the Americans leave the Shia will prevail in a civil war by virtue of their majority. I do not believe that is likely to occur for three reasons. First, the Sunni Arab countries of the region would see a Shia victory in Iraq as an expansion of Iranian hegemony into Arab territory. Without an American presence, the Sunni Arabs are likely to get significant support from regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. The risk of a regional conflagration is likely to dampen any hopes of a Shia military victory in Iraq. Second, the Shia in Iraq are fractured between pro-Iranian groups such as SCIRI and more nationalistic Shia such as the Sadrists. Moqtada al-Sadr, like his father the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, represents an Iraqi nationalist Shia movement. Sadr’s Shia movement and the Mahdi Army are likely to come into open conflict with the Iranian backed SCIRI and the Badr Brigade when the American occupation ends. Al Maliki’s Dawa Party sits in the uncomfortable middle between Sadr and SCIRI while being at the mercy of both. With an American exit, the Dawa Party is likely to see its fortunes dwindle. Lastly, the Shia cannot prevail over both the Sunni and the Kurds. Any military victory by the Shia would have to accept an independent state in the Kurdish north.

The other possible outcome of a civil war is partition. However, any partition of Iraq that leaves the Kurds with an oil-rich independent country in the north of Iraq will be fiercely opposed by Turkey, and to a lesser extent by Iran and Syria. Turkey has between 25 to 30 millions Kurds who have been long persecuted. Any Kurdish country to Turkey’s east will endanger Turkish territorial integrity and will be a non-starter. The Sunnis in the west and center of Iraq also cannot form a viable country without having access to the oil rich north and south of Iraq. There is no three country map that can be carved out of Iraq that does not deny one of the group’s much needed oil revenue.

The only remaining outcome for Iraq is then a negotiated settlement. The negotiated settlement may however come after an attempt at all out military victory is fought to a stalemate. The negotiated settlement will happen not because it is the preferred outcome, but because it is the only viable outcome. A negotiated settlement will certainly have to include the major regional players such as Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. The negotiated settlement will come after realization by the Arab states, and acceptance by Iran, that Iraq is, and historically has been, the Arab bulwark against Persian influence. Iran will find once again that the Iraqi Shia are not Iran’s fifth column in Iraq. An American departure from Iraq will eventually lead to a restoration of the balance of power in the region between the Arabs and the Iranians.

The Kurds of Iraq will once again be denied an independent homeland. But that denial will likely come at a price for Turkey. Turkey may be forced to give autonomy to its Kurds as a condition for Kurdish guarantee of Iraq’s territorial integrity.

The Iraq that is likely to emerge through the meat grinder of civil war will owe its stability to a regional need for stability, not to some gift of freedom given by George W Bush. Ironically, Mr. Bush is likely to see this precarious yet stable Iraq emerge from the ashes of his failed policy. Yet, it will emerge because Mr. Bush will finally have left it alone, and not because of his efforts at playing puppet master to the Arabs.

The above is my case for an American withdrawal from Iraq. I think the above scenario is far more likely than the doom and gloom predictions of the Bush Administration.

Now, to borrow a phrase from Hillary Clinton, let the conversation on the American withdrawal from Iraq begin.

Iraq is being torn apart while George W Bush and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim enable each other. As the Hadley memo points out, Mr. Bush is counting on Mr. Hakim to deliver an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself." Mr. Hakim, for his part, is in the enviable position of being able to use the leader of the free world to pursue his goal of bringing about an Islamic revolution in Iraq. The dialectic between Mr. Bush and Mr. Hakim became abundantly clear today.

Today the US military detained Ammar al-Hakim, the eldest son of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, as he returned to Iraq from Iran:

U.S. forces detained the son of one of Iraq’s most prominent Shiite politicians for several hours Friday, a spokesman for the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq said.

The convoy of Amar al-Hakim, one of the sons of party leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, was stopped as Amar was returning from a trip to Iran, Haitham al-Husseini said.

The senior Hakim, whose party controls the largest number of seats in the Iraqi parliament and who met with President Bush during a visit to Washington in December, spent many years in exile in Iran and has close ties to that country. U.S. officials have said Iran has supplied weapons to militias targeting American forces in Iraq.

The younger al-Hakim, however, was released, with an apology from the American ambassador, after some high level intervention:

State-run television said Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shiite who depends on Mr. Hakim’s support, intervened to help release the son, Amar Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.

…

The American ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said he was “sorry” for the detention. The son is himself a senior official in Mr. Hakim’s political movement and has often taken a leading role in building support for his father’s political efforts throughout Shiite-dominated southern Iraq. A Hakim aide suggested that the son was being groomed to take control of the family’s political dynasty.

…

He also said that United States military officers whom he would not identify had contacted aides to Mr. Hakim and apologized for the detention. Mr. Khalilzad, the American ambassador, was quoted by news agencies as saying that he regretted the episode and that “we do not mean any disrespect” to the Hakim family. [Emphasis added by me.]

It appears that the Bush Administration knows who the real masters are in Iraq. An administration that famously does not say "sorry" for launching wars without justification or killing innocents in Iraq was bending over backwards to not show "disrespect" to the Hakim family.

Ammar al-Hakim is not only the son of Mr. Bush’s man in Iraq, he is also a major political force and power broker in Iraq in his own right. The younger al-Hakim is the second in command, after his father, of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and he is the point man for SCIRI’s push to create a separate Shia state in the south of Iraq.

One of the strongest advocates of a federal state in the south is Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI, one of the major Shia partners in the UIA bloc. He says federalism is a “constitutional right” not only for the Kurds but also for the people of central and southern Iraq.

“Federalism does not mean splitting the country. It is a hope for the future of Iraq, and it is a demand by the masses,” he said recently in Najaf.

Hakim has commissioned his son, Ammar al-Hakim, head of the Shahid al-Mihrab Institute, a SCIRI establishment that promotes Islam in southern Iraq, to mobilise popular support for the federalism project.

In addition to his leading role in advocating for a separate Shia homeland in the Iraqi south, Ammar al-Hakim is very well known in Iraq and has often been the spokesman for SCIRI since the beginning of the Iraq invasion. The major force that stands in opposition to the Hakim family’s plan to create an Iranian proxy state in Iraq is Moqtada al-Sadr. In Mr. Bush’s attempt at isolating Mr. al-Sadr he is handing Iraq over to the Iranian-backed and financed SCIRI and the Iranian-groomed Hakim family.

While Mr. Bush complains about Iranian influence in Iraq, he continues to back the Iranian-supported SCIRI in Iraq. One is forced to ask whether Mr. Bush understands that his actions and alliances in Iraq are undermining Iraq’s territorial integrity. One is forced to ask whether Mr. Bush understands that his actions and alliances in Iraq are giving aid and comfort to Mr. Bush’s stated adversary in Iraq, that is, Iran.

There can only be two possible answers to Mr. Bush’s puzzling dalliance with SCIRI and the Hakim clan. One possibility is that Mr. Bush is ignorant of the complexities in the Iraqi political landscape and does not understand how his actions contribute to Iraqi instability. The other possibility is that Mr. Bush understands fully that his actions in Iraq are empowering Iran. If the latter is the case, then one is forced to ask why Mr. Bush would want to empower Iran in Iraq. It may be that by empowering Iran in Iraq, the only Iraq exit strategy left on the table for Mr. Bush is to strike Iran in order to counter Iran’s increased influence. Recent saber-rattling by the Bush Administration against Iran does not bode well for the future.

Meanwhile, the president of the United States hosts a death squad leader (Abdul Aziz al-Hakim) in the White House and calls him "Your Eminence" and the American ambassador to Iraq is forced to apologize to the death squad leader’s son in case any disrespect was caused by American soldiers.

There is a song that every Bangladeshi knows. It is a song that defines us as a people. It is a song about love and loss.

The song in Bengali is called Amar Bhaier Rokte Rangano and it means "Painted with my brother’s blood". The refrain from the song is "Painted with my brother’s blood is February 21st. How can I forget." The song commemorates the events of February 21, 1952.

The struggle that coalesced into Bangladesh’s struggle for independence began as a struggle for cultural and national identity. After India was partitioned to form the country of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and its Bengali speaking population came under the control of the West Pakistani government. The West Pakistan government ordained that Urdu would be the national language - ignoring its Bengali speaking majority in the East.

Facing suppression of Bengali language and culture, protests against the West Pakistani government began in Bangladesh. Leading the protests were students from Dhaka University with support from Bengali political parties. The students demanded that Bengali be recognized as an official language of Pakistan. After the students and political parties called for a general strike on February 21, 1952 and the government responded by banning public meetings, the stage was set for a confrontation.

On February 21st, as students gathered for a rally at Dhaka University the police responded with tear gas. As students dispersed to nearby Dhaka Medical College the police fired into the crowd killing at least four and wounding many more. Thus began a chain of events that would eventually lead to Bangladesh’s independence.

News of the killings began to filter out of Bangladesh. The New York Times reported on the violence the next day:

News of the first Dacca incident filtered through to Karachi late yesterday. In a press note received early in the morning the Government of East Pakistan acknowledged that one person had been killed on the spot and that two others had died of injuries following a club and revolver charge on 7000 persons, mostly students.

Coudry Mohazzan Hussain, Chancellor of Dacca University, said today that the students had been peaceful and had remained on grounds of Dacca Medical College near where the incident occurred.

On February 21st, 1952 at least four Bengalis became martyrs of what became known as the Language Movement. They were Abdus Salam, Rafiquddin Ahmed, Abul Barkat, and Abdul Jabbar. The next day at least two others lost their lives to Pakistani bullets. Each February 21st, Bangladeshis mourn the loss of those young lives and celebrate the language and culture they gave their lives defending.

In November 1999, the United Nations proclaimed February 21st to be International Mother Language Day in order to safeguard and preserve the world’s cultural and linguistic diversity:

Languages are the most powerful instruments of preserving and developing our tangible and intangible heritage. All moves to promote the dissemination of mother tongues will serve not only to encourage linguistic diversity and multilingual education but also to develop fuller awareness of linguistic and cultural traditions throughout the world and to inspire solidarity based on understanding, tolerance and dialogue.

In commemoration of the Bengali Language Movement and in celebration of International Mother Language Day I invite the reader to listen to the song of Bengali national identity sung in the language of poets.

The New York Times today puts Mr. Cheney at the center of Plame-gate. This bit of news will not come as a surprise to anyone. The real "news" in the article is buried deep.  The article portrays Mr. Bush as a passive figure in the leaking of a covert CIA agent and a National Intelligence Estimate.

Here is the astonishing passage from the article:

Mr. Libby said he found a way around that resistance by getting backdoor approval from the president. In a hush-hush meeting described in testimony, Mr. Libby asked the vice president’s chief counsel, David S. Addington, whether the president could declassify intelligence personally, effectively without C.I.A. knowledge or approval.

Mr. Addington testified that as he explained to Mr. Libby that indeed the president could do so, Mr. Libby shushed him. “He extended his hands out and pushed down a little like that, that would indicate, ‘Hold your voice down,’ ” Mr. Addington said at the trial. Mr. Libby testified that Mr. Cheney then went to Mr. Bush and got a presidential declassification.

White House officials have said Mr. Bush did not know how Mr. Cheney and Mr. Libby intended to use the intelligence. [Emphasis added by me.]

To paraphrase Mr. Bush: what is worse, the President actively leaking a National Intelligence Estimate or the President declassifying an NIE without knowing why?

If we are to believe the New York Times and the "White House officials", then Mr. Bush is rather careless with this nation’s secrets. The President of the United States declassified a highly classified NIE without discussing it with the intelligence community or without bothering to find out why it should be declassified. The question is not whether the President has the power to do so (he does), the question is of judgment. If Mr. Bush chose to declassify the NIE for political purposes, he has chosen politics over national security. If Mr. Bush chose to declassify the NIE without a valid reason, he has displayed very poor judgment indeed. Either scenario does not put Mr. Bush in a favorable light.

In its attempt to spin a story that keeps Mr. Bush in the dark while throwing Mr. Cheney under the bus, the article also suffers from a timeline problem. According to the article, on July 8 2003, after speaking with Judith Miller, Scooter Libby leaked to Andrea Mitchell later in the day:

Cathie Martin, Mr. Cheney’s former communications director, recalled her discomfort at seeing Mr. Libby reading from the estimate later in the day while he called back reporters covering the story, at Mr. Cheney’s direction, among them Andrea Mitchell of NBC News.

Other senior officials were perplexed when they apparently saw some of Mr. Libby’s handiwork from those phone calls in action. After Ms. Mitchell reported that night on NBC News that “The White House blamed an October C.I.A. report for ignoring Wilson’s information,” the president’s deputy national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, indicated that he had got an earful from Mr. Tenet, according to Ms. Martin’s testimony.

Ms. Martin testified that at a senior staff meeting the following morning Mr. Hadley strongly hinted he thought she was responsible and told her the finger-pointing had been a disservice to the president. According to Ms. Martin’s testimony, Mr. Libby let her take the blame and “looked down” as Mr. Hadley shared his chagrin. Mr. Cheney, she said, later told her not to worry about it. [Emphasis added by me.]

Mr. Hadley is portrayed on July 9 2003 as upset that the NIE was leaked. Yet, the very next day, July 10:

At a meeting on July 10, Mr. Hadley had suggested to Mr. Libby and Mr. Cheney that the intelligence estimate could be leaked to a friendly reporter, Mr. Libby testified that his notes said. But neither he nor Mr. Cheney told Mr. Hadley that they had started trying to do so days earlier. [Emphasis added by me.]

Why the change of heart in a matter of 24 hours? It seems unusual for Mr. Hadley to be upset about the leak one day and then become an advocate of leaking the very next day. It stretches credulity that Mr. Hadley became a sudden convert to leaking overnight.

It is clear that Mr. Cheney was a major player in Plame-gate. However, while the article tries to portray Mr. Bush as a hapless bystander, the chronology of events and Mr. Bush’s own actions, and those of his deputy national security advisor, leave a lot of unanswered questions.

As the White House circles the wagons to contain the Iraq fallout, it is time for the New York Times and the mainstream media to ask hard questions of Mr. Bush. The citizens of this country deserve no less.

In his often brilliant, and sometimes misguided, analysis of the international system, The Inequality of Nations, Robert W. Tucker wrote:

"The history of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence."

It is the inequality between nation-states, divided roughly along a North-South geographical axis, that underpins the current international system. The world is divided between haves and have-nots. Nation-states that have and nation-states that have-not have engaged in a grand bargain since World War II in order to bring stability to the world order. One of the pillars of this grand bargain has been the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Bush Administration’s nuclear dance with North Korea and Iran have caused serious damage to the NPT and the grand bargain.

Earlier this week the United States and North Korea agreed to ratchet down the heat in their nuclear standoff:

The United States and four other nations reached a tentative agreement to provide North Korea with roughly $400 million in fuel oil and aid, in return for the North’s starting to disable its nuclear facilities and allowing nuclear inspectors back into the country, according to American officials who have reviewed the proposed text.

While the accord sets a 60-day deadline for North Korea to accomplish those first steps toward disarmament, it leaves until an undefined moment in the future — and to another negotiation — the actual removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the fuel that it has manufactured to produce them.

The deal that George W Bush ultimately got from Kim Jong Il is at best the same deal that was available to the United States when the Bush Administration took the reigns of power in 2001. The significant difference between 2001 and 2007 is that North Korea now has detonated a nuclear device and has perhaps a half a dozen nuclear weapons (which North Korea may get to keep).

The Yosemite Sam of international relations, the anti-diplomat John Bolton, lashed out at the Bush Administration when news of the North Korean deal broke:

John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, blasted the new deal Monday in an interview with CNN, saying it would only encourage other countries trying to secure nuclear weapons.

"It sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: If you hold out long enough and wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded," said Bolton, who was also involved with North Korea earlier as the State Department’s undersecretary for arms control.

"It makes the [Bush] administration look very weak at a time in Iraq and dealing with Iran it needs to look strong," he said.

Mr. Bolton is right on the conclusion, but is, characteristically, wrong on the reasoning.

The Bush Administration should be commended for choosing diplomacy over confrontation in seeking to engage North Korea. However, Mr. Bush’s newfound push for diplomacy comes at the tail end of six years of belligerence. Those six years of belligerence have led to the weakness that Mr. Bolton complains about - those six years of belligerence resulted from the active participation of the anti-diplomat John Bolton. By resorting to diplomacy when threats of regime change and military confrontation failed, the Bush Administration has shown its weakness. Mr. Bush had the option of practicing diplomacy from a position of strength from the outset - he chose not to - and instead steadily lost leverage to North Korea and China.

The rub in the North Korea deal is the timing, not the deal. The previous six years have caused much damage to the international system. Mr. Bush’s freedom agenda, the pursuit of "peace" by sacrificing stability, has been a primary driving force behind the failures that have led to a nuclear North Korea. Threats of regime change and phrases such as the "axis of evil" have poisoned the international system.

The "freedom agenda" has struck at the very heart of treaties such as the NPT. The grand bargain of the NPT is between the nuclear-weapon states (the haves) and the non-nuclear-weapon states (the have-nots). The bargain is as follows: the have-nots agree to not acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assurances from the haves that the have-nots will not be attacked by the haves. Further, the haves agree to not proliferate nuclear weapons to the have-nots and also agree to work toward nuclear disarmament. The Bush Administration policies of the last six years, most notably the attack on Iraq, have given the have-nots reason to fear the haves and reason to acquire nuclear weapons. The delicate balance of the NPT has been upset. It should be noted that since the NPT came into effect no non-nuclear-weapon signatory other than North Korea has ever left the NPT or has ever acquired nuclear weapons. It is also noteworthy that North Korea left the NPT and became a nuclear weapons state under the Bush Administration’s watch.

The lessons of the North Korean experience are clear to the non-nuclear states. First, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a necessary deterrent in a world dominated by a belligerent nuclear superpower. Second, nuclear weapons status is an essential bargaining chip against a belligerent superpower. Third, the NPT is no longer the governing principle in this new world order.

Robert W. Tucker, in concluding his thesis, laid out the challenge to the international order posed by the disparity between the haves and have-nots:

"Will the present beneficiaries of the international system prove able to control the power aspirations of those who will sooner or later seek no more, though no less, than what others have sought before them?… For those who are able to pursue it, the logic of the challenge to inequality is ultimately the logic of nuclear proliferation. In turn, the logic of nuclear proliferation is one of decreasing control over the international system by those who are its present guardians."

Fundamentally, as a guardian of the international system the Bush Administration has failed in its responsibilities. It has failed in the challenge to control the power aspirations of the have-nots by casting aside the grand bargain that was struck in the post World War II era. North Korea is but one symptom of the Bush Administration’s failure - Iran waits at the threshold with many more to follow.

It is ironic that the most warmongering and belligerent administration in American history has failed or is failing in the two wars that it has undertaken - Afghanistan and Iraq. The only real "success" it has seen on the international arena has been achieved not through war, but through diplomacy. Yet, that belated diplomacy has come at a heavy, and avoidable, price to the stability of the world.

United States officials in Baghdad were reported to be in possession of Iranian made weapons. In a brazen display of "intelligence", the Americans proudly showed off their Iranian-made weapons to reporters:

The BBC’s Jane Peel attended the briefing in Baghdad, at which all cameras and recording devices were banned.

Examples of the allegedly smuggled weapons were put on display, including EFPs, mortar shells and rocket propelled grenades which the US claims can be traced to Iran.

"The weapons had characteristics unique to being manufactured in Iran… Iran is the only country in the region that produces these weapons," an official said.

Someone call Michael Gordon.

At a briefing today in Baghdad, US officials accused Iran of arming al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq:

The defense analyst said Iran was working through "multiple surrogates" — mainly "rogue elements" of the Shiite Mahdi Army — to smuggle the EFPs into Iraq. He said most of the components are entering the country at crossing points near Amarah, the Iranian border city of Meran and the Basra area of southern Iraq.

The US officials also neatly tied Iran into the 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Kuwait and the trafficking in arms in Iraq:

Last week, U.S. officials said they were investigating allegations that Shiite lawmaker Jamal Jaafar Mohammed was a main conduit for Iranian weapons entering the country. Mohammed has believed to have fled to Iran.

The "evidence" against Iran and the Mahdi Army continues to pile up. But there is something fishy here.

The Bush Administration claims that Iranians caught in recent raids buttress clams of Iranian involvement. The targets of American ire appear to be Iran and the Mahdi Army. However, the Iranians were captured in Kurdish held Erbil and in Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s compound in Baghdad. In both instances, the Iranians were working with American allies in Iraq - the Kurds and the SCIRI. In the Erbil case, Kurdish leaders protested the American operation and in the curious case of the raid on al-Hakim’s compound, pressure from SCIRI forced the US to release their prize.

Now we come to Mr. Jamal Jaafar Mohammed. Most reports of his involvement in the 1983 bombing gloss over his political affiliation. Mr. Mohammed was at the time of the bombing a member of SCIRI, the same group that is now an ally of Mr. Bush, and is currently a member of the Badr Organization, which is the current incarnation of the military wing of SCIRI:

An engineering graduate from Basra University in southern Iraq, he was active in the Shiite opposition to Saddam and was affiliated with the political and military wing of the Badr Brigade. He served as a top commander in the militia in the 1980s.

The brigade was organized and trained by the Iranians to fight against Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and was led by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, a key political figure here. Shiite officials say the Badr Brigade gave up its weapons and was transformed into a political movement after Saddam’s regime collapsed in 2003.

Mohammed ran for parliament on the Badr ticket. The organization is part of the Shiite alliance that also includes al-Maliki. Mohammed served as a political adviser to al-Maliki’s predecessor, Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

I should also note that the attack on the American and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983 were conducted by the Dawa Party and the SCIRI, which are both now our allies in Iraq. The Dawa Party is also conveniently the party that helped set up Hezbollah in Lebanon:

There are at least five such groups here, known as Al Fajr, Jihad, Jundullah, Hizbullah and Harisullah.

According to Shiite political sources, they are linked with the Iraqi Shiite underground organization Ad Dawa, which has been working to set up Iranian-style Islamic republics in Iraq and other Persian Gulf countries.

It is possible, the analysts and diplomats said, that the pro-Iranian groups have abducted Americans to exchange them for the 22 Dawa members who have been tried and convicted in Kuwait for the bombing Dec. 12 of the American and French embassies.

The Bush Administration has indeed made a fine bed with terrorists in Iraq.

There is very little doubt that Iran is supporting the Shia factions and the Kurds in Iraq. However, the factions Iran is supporting are the same factions that the Bush Administration is supporting. The Shia faction that gets the least support from Iran, and that is ideologically the least aligned with Iran is the Mahdi Army. Yet, the Administration’s plan, as laid out in the Hadley memo, appears to be to isolate the Mahdi Army and empower the very factions, Dawa and SCIRI, that Iran has been helping.

The Bush Administration is spinning a story about Iran that is full of contradictions. The Bush Administration cannot claim to target Iran for arming the same groups that the United States itself is arming, without addressing its own behavior and alliances in Iraq. It has been clear from the start that the United States has put in power terrorists and thugs (Dawa and SCIRI) in Iraq. To support its drumbeat to war against Iran, it cannot now cry foul without addressing its own hypocrisy in Iraq. To the extent that they have both sponsored the same actors in Iraq, the Bush Administration and Iran have been allies.

So, when the Bush Administration claims that some Iranian arms have been found in the hands of Shia militia in Iraq, I am unimpressed. The United States has, over the last four years, armed the Shia militias to the teeth by equipping the SCIRI and Badr Brigade controlled Iraqi Interior Ministry. In the contest of arms shipments to Iraqi Shia militias, the United States wins the arms race hands down. Having armed, equipped and trained a party to a civil war, the Bush Administration has been the driving force of instability in Iraq. When the Bush Administration accuses Iran of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq, it ignores the elephant in the room, that is, the United States.

Michael Gordon of the New York Times announces today that the "Deadliest Bomb in Iraq is made by Iran". The pages of the Gray Lady once again beat the drums of war.

The "intelligence" is damning:

The most lethal weapon directed against American troops in Iraq is an explosive-packed cylinder that United States intelligence asserts is being supplied by Iran.

The assertion of an Iranian role in supplying the device to Shiite militias reflects broad agreement among American intelligence agencies, although officials acknowledge that the picture is not entirely complete.

In interviews, civilian and military officials from a broad range of government agencies provided specific details to support what until now has been a more generally worded claim, in a new National Intelligence Estimate, that Iran is providing “lethal support” to Shiite militants in Iraq.

The focus of American concern is an “explosively formed penetrator,” a particularly deadly type of roadside bomb being used by Shiite groups in attacks on American troops in Iraq. Attacks using the device have doubled in the past year, and have prompted increasing concern among military officers. In the last three months of 2006, attacks using the weapons accounted for a significant portion of Americans killed and wounded in Iraq, though less than a quarter of the total, military officials say.

This is truly breathtaking "news". Iran is actively supplying weapons to Shia militias who are killing American soldiers. If there was ever a need for a casus belli to launch a strike against Iran, it appears one is in the making.

I am reminded of a similar headline in the New York Times on September 8, 2002. That particular headline read "U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For A-Bomb Parts" and offered up the following:

In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which American officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium. American officials said several efforts to arrange the shipment of the aluminum tubes were blocked or intercepted but declined to say, citing the sensitivity of the intelligence, where they came from or how they were stopped.

The diameter, thickness and other technical specifications of the aluminum tubes had persuaded American intelligence experts that they were meant for Iraq’s nuclear program, officials said, and that the latest attempt to ship the material had taken place in recent months.

It was the aluminum tubes that were a sure sign that Iraq was on the verge of going nuclear. It was better to attack Iraq first before a mushroom cloud appeared above an American city.

To emphasize the Iraqi threat, the article also offered up the chemical weapon scare, brought to us by Mr. Bush’s death squad leader White House guest:

Iraq’s nuclear program is not Washington’s only concern. An Iraqi defector said Mr. Hussein had also heightened his efforts to develop new types of chemical weapons. An Iraqi opposition leader also gave American officials a paper from Iranian intelligence indicating that Mr. Hussein has authorized regional commanders to use chemical and biological weapons to put down any Shiite Muslim resistance that might occur if the United States attacks.

The paper, which is being analyzed by American officials, was provided by Abdalaziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, an Iran-based group, during his recent visit with other Iraqi opposition leaders in Washington. [Emphasis added by me.]

The Bush Administration took the claims in the New York Times article and spun their false case for war with Iraq. The article was written by Judith Miller and Michael Gordon. That was then.

This is now. While Judith Miller has been much maligned, Michael Gordon has kept his credibility intact. Now that Ms. Miller has left the Gray Lady, Michael Gordon is left to carry the water for the Administration as it builds a fresh case for war against Iran.

Recently Michael Gordon let us know how he really feels on the Charlie Rose Show:

On Sunday, Calame dealt with a similar issue after Michael Gordon, the paper’s longtime chief military correspondent, spoke on the Charlie Rose show about the Iraq war. The offending incident occurred when Gordon said on the show that "I think, just as a purely personal view…the gap between the rhetoric of having a so-called strategy for victory, and then the reality of what’s going on in Iraq. And I’ve always felt that people in Washington were talking about a strategy for victory, but we actually never marshaled the resources and didn’t work effectively enough in Iraq to accomplish this.

"So I think, you know, as a purely personal view, I think it’s worth it one last effort for sure to try to get this right, because my personal view is we’ve never really tried to win. We’ve simply been managing our way to defeat. And I think that if it’s done right, I think that there is the chance to accomplish something." [Emphasis added by me.]

Clearly, a little extra effort will get us "victory" in Iraq and maybe a war with Iran.

But what do we make of the claim that Iran is supplying Shia militias with IEDs that are killing our soldiers? An astute reader might point out that up until now the reporting has been that IEDs were the weapon of choice for the Sunni insurgents and not Shia militias - that up until now we have been told that it was the Sunni insurgents that were killing American soldiers. If we are to believe Mr. Gordon, it is now Shia militias that are blowing up American soldiers with IEDs. An astute reader might question such a claim as somewhat incredible. An astute reader would be right.

It should, however, not surprise anyone that when building a case for war, small inconveniences such as facts should not get in the way. So, Michael Gordon, I say to you, carry that water - we know its heavy, but you know you can do it.