The Alfred E. Neuman School Of Foreign Policy

What is the goal of the United States in the War on Terror? What is the plan to win the war? What is the strategy? And how do we measure success? Are we trying to win hearts and minds while defeating the terrorists militarily?

An article in the New York Times today argues that the U.S. effort of funding the Somali warlords has been counterproductive and has failed. There is a remarkable quote attributed to a senior Bush Administration official in the article that brings into focus the Bush foreign policy agenda:

"You’ve got to find and nullify enemy leadership," one senior Bush administration official said. "We are going to support any viable political actor that we think will help us with counterterrorism." [Emphasis added by me.]

Isn’t that exactly what is wrong with the Bush foreign policy?

Foreign policy that is driven by a single-minded focus on killing the enemy regardless of the consequences seems to be the hallmark of this Administration’s machinations in the War on Terror thus far. This policy is susceptible to sabotage by unscrupulous foreign forces. In order to fight "terrorists" we lay in bed with some very unsavory characters who likely pose a more significant threat to U.S. interests. Warlords and two-bit Third World power brokers transform themselves into "anti-terrorist" forces and manipulate the United States to serve their own local agendas. The military and economic might of the United States is usurped by our "friends" to settle local scores. In short, the United States is getting played.

In the War on Terror the Bush Administration has paid lip service to diplomacy, to alliance building, to containment, and other proven tools to combat a hostile foe in the international arena. Instead the Bush Administration has focused primarily on military force either directly or by supporting proxies – the old rules apparently do not apply in the post 9/11 world. This focus on military means has so far proven to be a complete failure. The Bush Administration has allied itself with Afghan warlords, with Central Asian dictators, with Shia Islamists in Iraq, and Somali warlords because all of them promised to get the "terrorists". Instead what they have gotten is more instability and chaos.

There does not appear to be any broader policy goal in Somalia or the War on Terror other than killing the enemy. Apparently the lure of funding warlords was so strong that the Bush Administration has forsaken a broader policy for a narrower "capture dead or alive" philosophy:

Among those who have criticized the C.I.A. operation as short-sighted have been senior Foreign Service officers at the United States Embassy in Nairobi. Earlier this year, Leslie Rowe, the embassy’s second-ranking official, signed off on a cable back to State Department headquarters that detailed grave concerns throughout the region about American efforts in Somalia, according to several people with knowledge of the report.

 Around that time, the State Department’s political officer for Somalia, Michael Zorick, who had been based in Nairobi, was reassigned to Chad after he sent a cable to Washington criticizing Washington’s policy of paying Somali warlords.

One American government official who traveled to Nairobi this year said officials from various government agencies working in Somalia had expressed concern that American activities in the country were not being carried out in the context of a broader policy.

"They were fully aware that they were doing so without any strategic framework," the official said. "And they realized that there might be negative implications to what they are doing."

It is then not so surprising that this policy has contributed to failure in Somalia:

Some Africa experts contend that the United States has lost its focus on how to deal with the larger threat of terrorism in East Africa by putting a premium on its effort to capture or kill a small number of high-level suspects.

Indeed, some of the experts point to the American effort to finance the warlords as one of the factors that led to the resurgence of Islamic militias in the country. They argue that American support for secular warlords, who joined together under the banner of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, may have helped to unnerve the Islamic militias and prompted them to launch pre-emptive strikes. The Islamic militias have been routing the warlords, and on Monday they claimed to have taken control of most of the Somali capital.

"This has blown up in our face, frankly," said John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group, a nonprofit research organization with extensive field experience in Somalia.

After the U.S. funded warlords were routed, the Bush Administration is now ready to talk to the Islamists in Somalia:

Senior American officials indicated this week that the United States might now be willing to hold discussions with the Islamic militias, known as the Islamic Courts Union. President Bush said Tuesday that the first priority for the United States was to keep Somalia from becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

The Administration has it backwards. First you try diplomacy and then you use the military option, not the other way around.

The Somalia experience is a benchmark for the more general war on terror. The ill concieved Bush Administration strategy of "fighting them there so we don’t have to fight them here" is not working.  From Kabul to Mogadishu, from Tehran to Baghdad, we are in a more dangerous world now then we were on September 12th, 2001. Its time for some grown ups at the wheel.