79 Bottles Of Beer On The Wall

Posted on December 10, 2006 by Mash

George W Bush at "war"When George W Bush was presented the Iraq Study Group report last week, according to Lawrence Eagleburger, Mr. Bush’s reaction was "Where’s my drink?"

Since its release, the report has been much maligned from both sides of the political aisle. In my previous post, I wrote that the report was significant because its assessment of the situation in Iraq has neutered Mr. Bush’s argument about "progress" in Iraq. It has also quite clearly demonstrated Mr. Bush’s foreign policy as an utter failure. While the right is making a valiant attempt to discredit the report, I think the damage has already been done. Mr. Bush will need that drink, he may even huff and puff, but I stand by my assertion that the foreign policy of the United States is no longer in the hands of this president. He has been put in a corner like a petulant preschooler.

My previous post focused on the "Assessment" part of the report. This post will address the 79 recommendations. As I mentioned earlier, I think the report’s central failure is its recommendation that Iraqi forces be trained by the U.S. military into 2008. The recommendations, taken together, really are not recommendations at all. It seems to me the recommendations themselves are simply criticisms of Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy – the recommendations point out specific failures that have led us to the Iraq of today as spelled out in the "Assessment".

The recommendations are in three parts. First, Mr. Bush’s failure to engage in regional diplomacy. Second, Mr. Bush’s failure to pursue national reconciliation. Third, Mr. Bush’s failure to properly train and equip the Iraqi security forces. The failures together have facilitated Iraq’s slide into chaos. The report holds out the hope that if those failures are remedied immediately there is a chance that chaos may be averted in Iraq. I have my doubts.

Mr. Bush’s failure in Iraq is rooted in the same failure that led to the war in the first place. It is a failure to grasp reality. When ideology drives policy, reality is not that important to the ideologues. However, reality has a way of asserting itself. The report explains the basics to Mr. Bush:

Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals. [p.95]

While the rest of the world understood that the insurgency in Iraq was complex, Mr. Bush and his lackeys "knew" that it was al Qaeda and a few "dead-enders". Therefore, no effort was expended finding out about the nature of the enemy:

While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.

…

Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode those devices. [pp. 93-94]

You see, Mr. Bush knows they are "evil-doers". So, it is not important to know what motivates them and how they operate. A smarter or more curious man might think it was important to know your enemy’s motivations so that you can combat your enemy more effectively. But not this president.

The two recommendations that follow, recommendations 77 and 78, after the ISG points out our lack of knowledge about our enemy are almost cursory.

The report points out the importance of engaging Iraq’s neighbors. The reason is quite simple – all of Iraq’s neighbors have a stake in a stable Iraq, almost certainly more of a stake than the United States:

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq’s neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of the Iraqi state. [p. 47]

Given the importance of engaging Iraq’s neighbors, it is striking how little has been accomplished in this area. To date, Iraq has not yet established a working embassy even in Saudi Arabia [recommendation 2].

The report also states that Iran and Syria should be engaged without preconditions:

Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions. [p. 50]

Engaging one’s enemy is anathema to the Decider – he has already scoffed at the idea. However, Mr. Bush does not hold many cards and an ostrich is sometimes forced to pull its head out of the sand if it wants to breathe. Recommendations 9 and 16 offer carrots to Iran and Syria to sit down at the bargaining table. Those two recommendations have already set the tone for U.S. foreign policy, sooner or later Mr. Bush will be forced to follow, or remain irrelevant.

It is in the area of national reconciliation where the report breaks important ground. A number of the ideas have been proposed separately in the past. The report ties them together within a coherent strategy with a nice payoff at the end:

The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. [p.67]

To that end, recommendation 34 calls for the issue of U.S. force presence in Iraq to be on the table for any national reconciliation dialogue. This is a far cry from Mr. Bush’s belligerent tone to date.

The report proposes the reversal of the disastrous de-baathification process (recommendation 27) and it calls for oil revenue to be shared based on population (recommendation 28). The oil revenue recommendation specifically addresses the ambiguity that exists in the current draft of the Iraqi constitution. The report calls for the revenue from future oil fields to also be shared based on population. This recommendation is essential to bringing the Sunnis into the national reconciliation process.

The report punts on the most difficult, and perhaps the most intractable, of Iraq’s issues – Kirkuk. Recommendation 30 does suggest wisely that the referendum of the future of Kirkuk be postponed to avoid violence. In many ways, the Kirkuk problem is beginning to resemble the Kashmir issue in the Indian sub-continent – what is popular at the local level may not necessarily be in the national interest. Unsurprisingly, Kurds led by Massoud Barzani (and parroted by Jalal Talabani) have been critical of the report because it favors more central control of Iraq than the Kurds would prefer. The Kurdish claim to Kirkuk and its oil revenues are directly challenged by the report.

Above all, the report stresses the importance of talking to your enemies – the essential ingredient of national reconciliation. It proposes far-reaching amnesty (recommendation 31), engaging all parties, including Moqtada al-Sadr (recommendation 35), and less meddling by the United States:

Recommendation 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.

As part of national reconciliation, the report proposes the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the militias:

The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence against institutions of the state. However, solving the problem of militias requires national reconciliation.

…

Because the United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should not be involved in implementing such a program. [pp.68-69]

The report recommends the presence of neutral international experts, who have significant experience from previous civil wars, to facilitate the DDR of militias [recommendation 38]. It is Mr. Bush’s failure to recognize the conflict for what it is that has prevented this essential step in national reconciliation from taking place.

While the report, in my opinion, errs in the area of training security forces, it nonetheless does offer one very important and necessary recommendation:

Recommendation 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.

This recommendation is important for two reasons. First, the Iraqi National Police is geared toward counterinsurgency and not police work. Therefore, it does not belong under the Ministry of Interior. The Iraqi Police Service, which does police work, is the appropriate force to be under the Ministry of Interior. Second and more importantly, by moving the Iraqi National Police out from under the MOI (which is under Shia militia control), Shia militia control of the force is diluted. It should come as no surprise that SCIRI has condemned this recommendation so harshly.

The ISG report is focused on bringing parties into the national reconciliation process. This is something the Bush Administration should have been pursuing from the start. The report makes overtures toward the Shia nationalists (Sadrists) as well as the Iraqi Sunnis, the ethnic minority. It does point to the essential formula of a future stable Iraq, if one is to emerge from this chaos. In any national reconciliation, the stronger group must make accomodations to include the weaker group if peace is to be the outcome. The report thus recognizes the importance of bringing the Iraqi Sunnis into the dialogue. This is in marked contrast to the "80% solution" being contemplated by the Bush Administration. It seems to me, that taken together, the national reconciliation and the regional diplomacy proposed by the report set the groundwork for an American withdrawal from Iraq.

Upon reading the full report, one wonders why the recommendations of the report have not already been tried by the Bush Administration in the last 3 years. One wonders what they have been doing the last 3 years. While the American military have been taking casualties, it appears that the White House has been out to lunch. That is the result of ignoring reality in favor of ideology.

While it is debatable if  "success" was ever in the cards once Mr. Bush made the ill-informed and ill-conceived decision to invade Iraq, the ISG report makes it clear that whatever hope of  "success" might have existed in Iraq was out of reach for this most incompetent of administrations. That will be the legacy of this report – exposing George W Bush for his incompetence in Iraq the way the television pictures from New Orleans exposed George W Bush’s incompetence in protecting the American people at home.

Posted in Foreign Policy, Iraq, Politics | Comments Off on 79 Bottles Of Beer On The Wall

An Intervention

Posted on December 7, 2006 by Mash

George W Bush plays dress-upThe long awaited, much anticipated, and often pre-judged Iraq Study Group report was finally unleashed on Washington. Predictably, it was trashed, even before the ink was dry, in the progressive blogosphere for failing to call for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq. However, I think dismissing the report as a "dud" or ridiculing it ignores the very real and consequential substance in the report.

It is important to realize that this report is an intervention. I cannot recall any other time in modern American history when a sitting president has been so publicly and so stunningly rebuked in a time of war. The ISG report strikes at the heart of the American President’s article II power as the commander-in-chief. It accuses President George W Bush of orchestrating, by his own choice, the destabilization of the Middle East and, if left unchecked, the destabilization of the global economy. Make no mistake, this report is an intervention. It is designed to save not the President, but the Presidency and the American body politic. George W Bush has abused his commander-in-chief powers in the prosecution of the Iraq war and this report aims to relieve him of his duties. Regardless of what occurs between now and the end of George W Bush’s term in office, he is no longer driving the ship of state. Mr. Bush has effectively been impeached.

The report itself has two parts. The first part, "Assessment", surveys the current mess in Iraq. The second part, "The Way Forward – A New Approach" lays out the much talked about 79 recommendations for extricating the United States from Iraq. There is also a GWB-sized executive summary, a letter from the co-chairs, and an appendix to the report. In this post, I will cover the first part of the report and the supporting documents. I will do a separate post on the 79 recommendations tomorrow.

 The goal of the report is national consensus, not Iraqi national consensus, but American national consensus:

U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure – as is any course of action in Iraq – if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus. [Letter from the Co-Chairs, p. x]

The implicit charge in the report is that George W Bush has embarked on a foreign misadventure without the consent of the people of this democracy. That kind of behavior may work in a dictatorship, but cannot be sustained in a democracy.

The very first two sentences of the Executive Summary paint a bleak picture for Iraq:

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. [Executive Summary, p. iii]

The ISG report does hold out the hope that all is not lost and the United States can still influence events there, although it may not be able to do so in the near future:

The ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing. [p. 1]

I have argued before that the United States has already lost the ability to influence events positively in Iraq. By staying in Iraq, I believe, the United States acts as a force for continued instability. The ISG apparently believes there is still time to salvage the situation. This belief may be a result of hope and obligation rather than rational analysis:

Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. [p. 2]

While I agree with the statement above, it does not necessarily follow that the national and moral interest is served by staying in Iraq and making one more go at it.

The flaw at the center of the report is the belief that America can control events in Iraq. The report concedes that combat operations by the United States military will not rescue Iraq. Indeed, it calls for a complete withdrawal of all American combat troops by early 2008. However, the report then subscribes to the misguided notion that the problem in Iraq can be solved by training Iraqi security forces:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. [Executive Summary, p. vi]

The problem with Iraqi security forces is not training. Before the United States invaded Iraq, the country had a functioning military and police force, so I doubt they are incapable of training themselves. As the report readily admits, the security forces are infiltrated with sectarian militias – you simply cannot train the "sectarian" out of a militia member. There is also the problem of perception. If the United States remains in Iraq in large numbers and successfully trains the Iraqi security forces (that is, succeeds in making the security forces non-sectarian), those security forces and the government who controls them will be perceived as American puppets. American training, in either instance, will be counter-productive. We will either train militias or we will train American puppets – both will have tragic consequences (as no doubt the incoming Secretary of Defense knows from his experience in Central America).

There is also a puzzling contradiction in the report. In an attempt to avoid an open-ended commitment of American forces in Iraq, the report warns:

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of mile-stones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. [Executive Summary, p. vii]

It is not clear to me why it makes sense to pull out of Iraq if the Iraqi government underperforms. If as the report claims, Iraq is "vital to regional and even global stability", why then would the United States pull out if the ISG believes the United States should stay to stabilize Iraq. To put it another way, according to the report an underperforming Iraqi government will cause the United States to throw in the towel.

While the report fumbles somewhat in charting a viable exit strategy from Iraq, it quite clearly is focused on extricating the United States from Iraq. The report examines a number of alternative approaches and points out their flaws. Most notably the report categorically rejects the "stay the course" policy of George W Bush. It points out that staying the course in Iraq endangers our national security. The report points out, in a section entitled "Staying the Course", that:

Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is constrained. [p. 38]

That leaves only Barney and Mr. Bush on the "stay the course" bandwagon.

The report also rejects a precipitate withdrawal from Iraq as too risky. However, it does not discuss a more orderly withdrawal as an option. The report also rejects John McCain’s plan to send more troops to Iraq as unrealistic:

Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. [p.38]

Finally, the report rejects Joseph Biden’s idea of a partition into three regions due to potential for ethnic cleansing and the inconvenient fact that most of Iraq’s cities have mixed populations. Iraq cannot be so cleanly carved up without a massive movement of people.

The report lays out the facts on the ground that should make it clear to even George W Bush’s dog that Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy has been a failure across the board. It paints a picture of a country in chaos with mass human suffering:

The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.

Six percent of Iraq’s population have been internally displaced and seven percent have fled the country. That means that 13% of the country’s population have fled their homes. Those are staggering statistics.

The report reminds Mr. Bush that both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, which have infiltrated the police, are engaged in sectarian violence and the Badr Brigade in particular is involved in death squad activity. Perhaps if the report were released earlier, Mr. Bush might have chosen not to host a death squad leader at the White House last Monday.

The Iraqi economy is predictably underperforming. The freedom Mr. Bush has given Iraqis has led to misery:

Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation. [p.23]

To compound the problem, reconstruction funds for Iraq have dried up as the Administration struggles to manage the security situation in Iraq:

The administration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. [p.25]

As for the two countries in the Middle East that the Bush Administration does not want to talk to, Mr. Bush’s muddled policy in Iraq serves these two countries just fine:

Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. … One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad."

…

Like Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. [pp.28-29]

In the short term, both Iran and Syria benefit from the chaotic American presence in Iraq. Only by leaving Iraq does the United States focus the attention of Iran and Syria on the need to have a stable neighbor in Iraq.

The report makes clear why there was a need for intervention to save the United States from its president:

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world.

…

If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.

…

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald’s."

…

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. … And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

…

If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. [pp.33-35]

 

Far from bringing stability to the Middle East and showing American might to its adversaries, George W Bush has weakened America in the eyes of the world. His war of choice has endangered America, the Middle East and the world.

The reality that the report lays out will be hard for Mr. Bush to ignore. The conversation in Washington is no longer how to win in Iraq; it is how to salvage America and Iraq from George W Bush’s blunders. That is the importance of the report. There can now be no denying the stark reality of failure. The discussion has now moved to how best to bring our soldiers home and leave behind some semblance of stability. To that end, the report’s recommendations, however imperfect, can be a starting point for the discussion. The authors of the report readily admit that events on the ground may overtake the recommendations of the report. I believe that Iraq has already reached that point and American presence there is now counterproductive – the authors of the report disagree, at least for now.

 

Posted in Foreign Policy, Iran, Iraq, Middle East Conflict, Politics | 11 Comments

Ode To John Bolton

Posted on December 5, 2006 by Mash

John bolton

Should I stay or should I go?

Sing it now!:

Posted in Foreign Policy, Humor, Politics | 3 Comments

A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Words

Posted on December 4, 2006 by Mash

President Bush shaking hands with Abdul Aziz al Hakim

From today’s White House press briefing [hat tip: BarbinMD]:

Q Tony, I’d like to follow up on the al Hakim meeting, if I can, for just a second.

MR. SNOW: Yes, sure.

Q U.S. intelligence and military sources have him intimately connected to death squads, he is closely tied to Iran —

MR. SNOW: "Intimately connected" with death squads? In what sense?

Q Well, that he was responsible for the —

MR. SNOW: That he was giving orders?

Q Yes, it could be giving of — when death squads began to emerge, there are intelligence sources that say he was if not running the show, very closely connected with the policy of implementing it. So that’s number one. Number two, he’s closely tied to Iran. So what’s a guy like this doing in the Oval Office?

MR. SNOW: Well, there are a couple of things — and we addressed the Iran question in the gaggle this morning. This is a man who spent 20 years in Iran when Saddam Hussein was in power, but he’s also made it clear that he sees himself as an Iraqi leader, not somebody who is beholden to Iran.

As regards the issue of militias, certainly they’re going to be discussed in the meeting with the President. What Mr. al Hakim has also done is he has talked about the importance of reconciliation within Iraq. He leads a parliamentary bloc that includes 128 members of the Iraqi parliament. And what the President is going to talk about — I believe the meeting ought to be starting any moment now, and that’s why we’ll give you a readout on it — is the importance of reconciliation, of finding people who will be moderates — Sunni, Shia, and otherwise — who are going to be able to work constructively toward a government that’s going to be operating in conditions of peace.

What you have is a man who has had a number of discussions with this government and continues to, and the President has had conversations with him, and has met with him once before, who represents the largest single — I believe it’s the largest single Shia bloc within the Iraqi parliament. He is a significant force in Iraqi politics, and he’s somebody who can play a very constructive role, and we hope he will.

Some background on today’s White House guest.

Posted in Foreign Policy, Iraq | 6 Comments

Mr. Hakim Goes To Washington

Posted on December 3, 2006 by Mash

Abdul Aziz al-HakimOn Monday President Bush is scheduled to meet Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Mr. Hakim is to get the full treatment topped off with a White House meeting with Mr. Bush. On the heels of Mr. Bush’s ill-conceived summit meeting with beleaguered Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki comes another ill-conceived meeting with the head of the Badr Brigade militia in Iraq. Either Mr. Bush is involved in a bit of Machiavellian mischief in Iraq or he is utterly ignorant.

Mr. Hakim’s upcoming White House visit is remarkable and troubling. It marks the point where the President of the United States has become personally and publicly involved in the domestic politics of Iraq. It also marks the first time in this conflict that the President of the United States will host the leader of death squads in Iraq. I think it is safe to say that we have come a long way since Vietnam – a conflict in which the President of the United States was deciding which hill to bomb. In Iraq, the President of the United States is deciding which death squad to back.

Mr. Hakim’s SCIRI was formed by Iran in 1982 as a Shia insurgency group during the Iran-Iraq war. SCIRI was formed with the Hakim family at its center. While most Iraqi Shia fought against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, SCIRI was the only group of Shia that supported Iran. SCIRI has since been funded by Iran while its military wing, the Badr Brigade, has been armed and trained by Tehran. Since the American invasion of Iraq, the Badr Brigade has taken over the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. One of the leaders of the Badr Brigade, Bayan Jabr, was until recently the Minister of Interior, in charge of the police forces. His police, that is the Badr Brigade, are largely responsible for the many tortured corpses that turn up on the streets of Baghdad:

In May 2005, Shiite militia groups in Iraq began depositing corpses into the streets and garbage dumps of Baghdad. The victims, overwhelmingly Sunni, were typically found blindfolded and handcuffed, their corpses showing signs of torture—broken skulls, burn marks, gouged-out eyeballs, electric drill holes; by that October, the death toll attributed to such groups had grown to more than 500. In November, American troops discovered more than 160 beaten, whipped, and starved prisoners—again, mostly Sunni—at a secret detention center run by the country’s Interior Ministry. Since then, Shiite militias have become so integrated into the Iraqi government’s security apparatus and their work so organized, systematic, and targeted that they are commonly referred to in Iraq (and in the American media) by their proper name: death squads. The death squads, which have expanded their area of operations from the capital across much of the country, are now believed to be responsible for more civilian deaths than the Sunni and foreign insurgents who are the United States’ ostensible enemies there. By any reasonable measure, Iraq is in a state of civil war, and some of its most ruthless and lawless combatants are members of the government’s own security units.

…

The rise of the death squads corresponds almost precisely to the April 2005 appointment of Bayan Jabr as interior minister in Iraq’s transitional government. The Interior Ministry, which is something like a combined FBI and Department of Homeland Security, controls billions of dollars and more than 100,000 men in police and paramilitary units. Jabr was a former high-ranking member of the Iranian-backed Badr Brigade, the military arm of the fundamentalist Shiite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) that is now the dominant political force in the country. After taking over the Interior Ministry, he quickly purged it of Sunnis, and members of the Badr Brigade were widely incorporated into the ministry’s police and paramilitary units.

Jabr—who in May of this year was named finance minister in a new government headed by Nuri al-Maliki—has disavowed any personal or institutional responsibility for violence committed by the death squads. He has now acknowledged that some groups operated within the Interior Ministry while he headed it, but he insists that they were few in number; he blames much of the sectarian killing on terrorists “using the clothes of the police or the military.” At a press conference last November that followed the discovery of the torture chamber in an Interior Ministry building, Jabr said, “You can be proud of our forces. [They] respect human rights.” (For this article, Jabr did not respond to requests for comment sent to his press office in Iraq.)

Mr. Jabr is just a small taste of the violent nature of the secretive Badr Brigade. While Moqtada al-Sadr’s rag-tag Mahdi Army gets all the press, the well-trained and battle hardened Badr Brigade continue their killing machine with ruthless efficiency.

While SCIRI and the Sadrists are both involved in sectarian violence against Iraqi Sunnis, there are significant and important differences between the two forces. While SCIRI is a pro-Iranian Shia party, the Sadrists are Shia nationalists. The goal of SCIRI, as its name pretty much gives away (Note to Mr. Bush: READ), is to form an Islamic republic in Iraq, and failing that, to form an Islamic state in the south of Iraq. Moqtada al-Sadr’s group, on the other hand, opposes any partition of Iraq. The politics of SCIRI and the Sadrists flow from their respective religious ideologies. SCIRI follows the Qom School of Shia thought, while the Sadrists follow the Najaf School (or quietist approach) of Shia thought. Briefly, the Qom School, that is the Iranian approach, believes that the state should be run by the ulema, the Muslim clerics. The Najaf School, followed by most Iraqi Shia, believes in "quietism", which believes that the ulema should not directly govern but have influence on the government. These two schools of thought are incompatible, and therein lies the conflict between the Iranian-backed SCIRI and the nationalist Shia movement of Sadr. If Iraq is to come through the meat grinder, it is the nationalist Sadrists and the nationalist Sunnis who will have to reconcile; the SCIRI will be left to the mercy of their Iranian backers.

Mr. Bush’s desperate grasp at "diplomacy" is once again ill-conceived. If the goal is to reach out to Iran to resolve the crisis in Iraq, giving legitimacy to its proxy in Iraq is not the best approach. Mr. Bush first must decide what the goal of American foreign policy in the region should be. I don’t believe it should be the expansion of Iranian hegemony into Iraq. Throwing American support behind SCIRI, and no doubt a high profile visit by Hakim to the White House signals American support of SCIRI, is a dangerous course of action. Iran certainly has a legitimate interest in a stable Iraq and the removal of American forces. That should be a starting point of dialogue with Tehran. The starting point should not be support for the Iranian clergy’s puppets in Baghdad. That kind of approach makes an already weak George W Bush look weaker.

In his knee-jerk attempt to isolate Moqtada al-Sadr, Mr. Bush apparently is throwing his weight behind the next Shia he sees. But, that has always been the problem with George W Bush. His bubble is very small and populated with only a few actors. It is this kind of narrow and myopic vision that has led him domestically to cronyism, such as his ill-fated nominations of Harriet Miers and Bernard Kerik, and internationally to charlatans and death squad leaders, such as his backing of Ahmad Chalabi and now Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.

We should demand some curiosity from the leader of the free world. Tomorrow, when the President of the United States shakes hands with a death squad leader and an Iranian puppet, we should all ponder how far the Decider has fallen from his grand visions of democracy in Iraq.

 

 

Posted in Foreign Policy, Iraq, Terrorism, Torture | 5 Comments