Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

[Hat tip: Beezer]

Israel has embarked on a war that it cannot win. In spite of its overwhelming military firepower Israel is destined to lose this war. In losing this war Israel will have damaged its deterrence capability irrevocably.

Thomas Friedman of The New York Times wrote a column (TimesSelect) last week entitled "Not So Smart" in which he described Hezbollah’s cross-border gambit as, well, not smart:

Profiles of the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah always describe him as the most “brilliant” or “strategic” Arab player. I beg to differ. When the smoke clears, Nasrallah will be remembered as the most foolhardy Arab leader since Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser miscalculated his way into the Six-Day War.

Yes, yes, I know. I am a too-rational Westerner. I don’t understand the Eastern mind and the emotional victory that Nasrallah will reap from all this pain. It isn’t whether you win or lose; it’s whether you kill Jews. Well, maybe — but, ultimately, wars are fought for political ends. An accounting will be rendered, so let’s do some math.

Mr. Friedman, very much like a broken clock, is right on occasion. This is not one of those times. As he has shown with his sliding six-month predictions about the Iraq war, he is often wrong but constantly forgiven. His analysis of Lebanon is similar to his Iraq analysis where he believes fervently in an outcome he would like to see and then attempts through his considerable analytical skills to convince himself and his readers that his chosen outcome is likely to occur. If the outcome fails to materialize he suggests that we wait another 6 months. Although I admire his optimism, he is more often than not wrong.

Israel’s fight against Hezbollah is not a zero sum game. Israel does not have to be defeated for Hezbollah to win. Israel simply has to fail to defeat Hezbollah. After 13 days of fighting it appears that Hezbollah has stood fast and already Israel looks to be losing the initiative:

Figures released by the Israeli army show the pace of Hezbollah rockets raining down on Israel has not slowed — and the guerrillas are nowhere close to being neutralized.

Air power alone is proving insufficient to rout Hezbollah, whose determination and intimate knowledge of the terrain are making them a tougher-than-expected foe.

Mideast observers say Hezbollah only has to remain standing — not beat Israel — to emerge victorious in Arab eyes.

Hezbollah actions such as blowing up an Israeli warship with an Iranian-made radar-guided missile or firing rockets at the once out-of-range city of Haifa have shattered taboos and astounded Israel and the world.

By withstanding an Israeli assault Hezbollah will not only emerge victorious in Arab eyes; Hezbollah will in fact emerge victorious. Mr. Friedman mocks this victory as the figment of "the Eastern mind and the emotional victory." He also compares the Hezbollah leader to Egypt’s Gamal Nasser. Friedman is wrong on both counts. First whereas Nasser was a head of state who had Egypt to lose, Nasrallah’s Hezbollah is at its root a guerrilla movement without territory and state infrastructure to defend and lose. Even though Hezbollah has grown up as a political force in Lebanese politics, on the battlefield it is still a guerrilla army fighting a war of resistance. Nasser did not have that luxury. Second, a guerrilla force fighting a defensive war of resistance does not need to occupy territory. It merely needs to survive and fight a war of attrition against a superior invading or oppressing force. A guerrilla force breaks the will of the invader or the occupier by simply fighting the invader to a stalemate. A stalemate and the march of time are sufficient to ensure victory. Victory comes in the form of an ultimate withdrawal of the invader from the guerrilla force’s native land. History is littered with the wreckage of invading and occupying armies that did not lose militarily but failed to destroy the native guerrilla forces.

Guerrilla Warfare or Mobile Warfare was used to great effect by Mao Tse-Tung in China. Mao’s Red Army used classic guerrilla and mobile warfare tactics to wear down and eventually overwhelm the Kuomintang in 1949. Mao wrote about his mobile warfare methods in the pamphlet "On Guerilla Warfare". In it he wrote:

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance.

…

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

…

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.

Inferior resistance forces have used Mao’s tactics of retreat, avoid, and attack to great success in the 20th century. Hezbollah knows these tactics well and used them to effectively counter the Israeli army during its previous occupation of Lebanon. This time the Israeli military faces the same tactics but against a better equipped and better trained Hezbollah. Hezbollah this time is more entrenched in Lebanese society and will find many allies amongst the civilian population so essential to carrying out a successful guerrilla campaign.

Throughout the last century and the beginning of this one invading armies have struggled to counter Mao’s guerrilla and mobile warfare. They have so far failed. The Americans are failing in Iraq. The Israelis will likely fail in Lebanon.

The political fallout of an Israeli failure on the battlefield promises to be severe. Israel relies on the deterrence capability of its powerful military. With failure against Hezbollah the Israeli military’s perception of invincibility will be damaged. Israel’s enemies in the Palestinian territories as well as regional players will feel emboldened to challenge Israel on the political arena knowing that Israel’s military might has limited offensive use. Further, as its enemies inevitably gain more sophisticated weapons they will be more inclined to challenge Israel militarily – not with the intent of defeating it, but with the intent of causing sufficient pain to wrestle political concessions. Here Israel’s nuclear deterrence is largely useless since it is only a deterrence against an existential threat.

Sadly, the prospect of this kind of political fallout from a military stalemate (defeat) against Hezbollah will mean that Israel will likely escalate this conflict in order to avoid defeat. The risk of such escalation is a wider regional conflict. The outcome of such a regional conflict is far from certain and its global ramifications are likely to be immense. So, Israel is trapped in a difficult quandary by having escalated a Hezbollah kidnapping into a test of Israeli military might. It cannot afford to lose, but unfortunately it cannot win either.

The only certainty in the days and weeks to come is more civilian deaths in Lebanon and Israel. The rest is fraught with uncertainty and further danger.

[Author’s Note: This article is inspired by my friend from China who I know will be reading this. I have learned much from him in our many conversations.]